Civil-Military Coordination

1. Civil-Military Coordination Mr Fredrik Wallenberg UN OCHA / ESB / CMCS Geneva Switzerland

2. What Is UN-CMCoord? • “The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies • Protect and promote humanitarian principles • Avoid competition • Minimize inconsistency • When appropriate pursue common goals.” • Coordination is a shared responsibility, facilitated by liaison and common training.

3. Need for Assistance Military and Civil Defence Assets International Civilian Relief Local/National Response Time

4. CMCoord Focus Civilian Domestic International National Civil-Military Relations - Development (DD&R) - HR/IHL (Training) Domestic Military Traditional Focus of Military CIMIC International Civil- Military Relations or “UN-CMCoord” International

5. Range of Possible Civil Military Relations Cooperation Coexistence Competition Conflict

6. Peace Enforcement Peace- time Peace- keeping Combat Conditions Stable Unstable Failed State Military Missions and Political Conditions Mission

7. Mission Peace Enforcement Peace- time Peace- keeping Natural Disasters Combat Conditions Complex Emergencies Stable Oslo Guidelines Unstable • MCDA Guidelines • Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys • IASC Reference Paper • Country Specific Guidelines Failed State Overview of UN-CMCoord Guidelines Availability and Impartiality of Military Decrease Potential Need for Assistance Increases

8. Civil-Military Coordination in Cyclone Nargis response operation Mr Fredrik Wallenberg UN OCHA / ESB / CMCS Geneva Switzerland

9. Situation Cyclone Nargis 2-3 May. Wind speed up to 70 m/s followed by a 3.5 meter tide wave. Worst natural disaster to strike one single country in 25 (?) years. Worst cyclone since 1970 Bhola in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Death toll: 77,738 persons (official estimate, source: state TV, date: 16 May) ·Persons missing: 55,917 persons (official estimate, source: state TV, date: 16 May) ·Persons affected: 2,400,000 (UN estimate, includes those severely affected)

10. Initial challenges: Concerns on scope of disaster. Military Junta suspicious against the western world, main driving force: to remain in power? In-kind donations of relief goods to government welcome, but not humanitarian workers. Access: Few visas to Yangon for short term. No access to delta region. Tap on - tap off No assessment of needs. Conflicting figures. Initial “blind” assessment: Lack of everything.

11. Why UN-CMCoord in the operation? • Military units involved in early bilateral response • Scale of disaster creating potential need for military assets • Experience from Tsunami operation • Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand

12. Arrival (10th - 28th May) • Establish contact with humanitarian organisations • IASC Head of Cluster meeting • Log Cluster / WFP • Inventory of main military actors • US Transport airplanes. • French, US and UK navy vessels outside Irrawaddy delta • India and Thailand on bilateral basis. • Thailand, Australia, India and Singapore and Malaysia.

13. Available military resources • Air transport from Log Base in Thailand to Yangon • Water purification (Mistral: 100 M3 / 24 hrs) • Handling of cargo at Yangon airport • Landing crafts in delta region. • Medical teams • Food, NFI, shelter. • Helicopters

14. Transport to affected areas Mae Sot US Helicopter flights No permission O Don Muang WFP Log Base O U-Tapao US C-130 Flights O

15. Logistics Unclear situation with no waiver for customs clearance. Consignees a problem. Cargo confiscated by Myanmar authorities? Access to delta region by national staff only. When will we get access? After referendum? All messages interpreted. From Yangon – to Irrawaddy delta: Fuel and bridges are a problem – mainly shipping by barges and boats. Port in Yangon damaged. Airlift No high loader at Yangon, but personnel available. Accountability? Don Muang Airport or U-Tapao UN Mi-8 Helicopters, now in mission. No military helicopters allowed into Myanmar airspace.

16. US • Participated in multinational civil-military exercise in Thailand. • Helicopter flights planned from Mae Sot into Myanmar and later from USS Essex • In contact with Myanmar military officers. • Initial plan to airdrop from C-130 in Irrawaddy delta. • Bilateral agreement with Myanmar covered only shipment of goods to Yangon. • Up to 9-12 sorties daily with C-130 from U-tapao. • As of 02 June: 100 flights w/total weight: 897 Metric Tonnes • Offered to deliver cargo to implementing partners on ground. Origin of aid?

17. United States Cargo Delivery Capacity Vehicle / Cargo Sorties/Capacity per Day C-130 5-12 per day Capacity=25000 lbs per 125,000-300,000 lbs (11 MT) (56.7-136MT) 22 Heavy Lift Helicopters 6 CH-53 Helicopter 9 per day Capacity=15000 lbs 135,000 lbs (6.8 MT) (61.2 MT) 16 CH-46 Helicopters 26 per day Capacity=3000 lbs 78,000 lbs (1.4 MT) (35.4 MT) 4 Heavy Lift Landing Craft 2 Landing Craft Units 2 per day Capacity=180 tons 360 tons (163 MT) (326.6 MT) 2 Landing Craft 4 per day Air Cushioned Capacity=60 tons 240 tons (54.4 MT) (210 MT) Total Daily Lift Capacity 690-769.2 MT 1

18. Granted access – later denied. • Off-loaded in Phuket and goods transported by commercial means to Yangon. Le Mistral, French helicopter carrier • Use of UN helicopters from Le Mistral? 400 tonnes of rice 10,000 cans of water 40,000 water purification tables 20,000 tarpaulins 10,000 mosquito nets 10,000 sets of cooking utensils Medical teams Landing Crafts Engineers

19. Conclusions Natural disaster but very politicized context. Main challenge was consequences of perceived affiliation. Constantly changing situation and no assessment of needs, nothing could be ruled out. International military only involved in logistic / indirect assistance (appropriate) Humanitarian organizations bilaterally in contact with US and Thai military. Military bilateral support to Myanmar from Thailand, India and Singapore.