Religion and social order

1. Religion and social order September 1, 2004

2. Many writers believe that religion sustains social order by inculcating morality

3. Exceptions • This is only true of most religions • Most animistic and folk religions have no particular moral content • Greco-Roman gods were morally deficient – did terrible things to one another and to humans, merely for their own amusement • Hence: need for a more inclusive definition

4. Definition • Religion provides answers to questions of the meaning of life by positing the existence of the supernatural • The religions that contribute to social order • Conceive of supernatural beings as deeply concerned about the behavior of humans toward one another • Ex: Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism

5. How moralistic religions contribute to social order • By promulgating prosocial norms that induce people to ‘do the right thing’ • Ex: the Ten Commandmen • By providing an “opiate for the masses”

6. Some empirical evidence • In a comparative study of 27 Christian-dominated societies, the more importance people placed on God, the less they approved of • buying stolen goods • failing to report that they had accidentally damaged a car in a parking lot • smoking marijuana • Similar findings in Islamic- and Hindu-dominated societies • (Stark, “Gods, Rituals and the Moral Order, JSSR, 2001). • But some countries are more religious than others

7. What explains cross-national variations in religiosity? • The concept of ‘religious economies’ • A market (the demand for religion) in which different religious organizations compete for the adherence of a clientele (market share) • A key issue: the degree to which a religious economy is regulated by the state

8. State regulation  subsidy of state churches • Example: • UK: Establishment of the Church of England • Government subsidizes the C of E; this means that tax monies by non Anglicans help to support the Church

9. Why state subsidies matter • Since they are not so reliant on clients, state churches • Need not be very concerned about the quality of their goods • Can afford to be aloof from their clients • Ex: the C of E in Wales • Result • Seekers of religious goods are likely to go elsewhere • Ex: Wales becomes overwhelmingly Methodist

10. Religious monopolies • When a given church is granted a monopoly via state regulation, the situation is exacerbated • result: general religious disaffection (demand is unmet)

11. Competitive religious economies • Breed ‘sects’ in addition to ‘churches’ • Sects • Have emotional services; tend toward mysticism • Fundamentalist • Have local social networks • Churches • Restrain emotionality in their services • Intellectualize religious teachings • Have intense local social networks

12. Theoretical expectation • Other things equal, competition results in more energetic and efficient firms • To the degree that religious economies are unregulated – and therefore competitive – overall levels of religious commitment will be higher

13. Empirical implications • H1: The more pluralistic the religious economy (e.g. the greater the # of independent religious organizations having a significant market share) and the least regulated the greater the religious commitment (e.g. church membership/attendance)

14. Supportive findings from studies of • 942 towns in NY State in 1855 and 1865 • American cities in 1890, 1906, 1926 • Developed Protestant countries • 284 municipalities of Sweden • English and Welsh counties in 1851 • Contrasts between Germans and German-Americans • Countries having religious restrictions lifted • Countries with large Muslim communities • 198 countries of the world (in 1993) • Source: Finke, R. and R. Stark 1998. “Religious Choice and Competition.” ASR 63 (5): 761-766.

15. H 2 • The smaller the market share of a religious organization, the more energetic it is and the higher the religious commitment of its members

16. Supportive evidence in studies of • Catholic dioceses in the USA • All countries where the Catholic Church is active • European Protestants • American Jewish communities • Catholics in Ireland and Northern Ireland • Catholics in Italy

17. Implications for Catholicism in Italy • Since the religious economy of Italy is relatively regulated and monopolistic, this theory suggests that religious commitment in Italy should be low

18. Some Italian data • Attendance at Sunday Mass (Ginsborg 133) • 19.1% of adult population in Milan • 15.2% in Rome and Naples • 7.9% in Florence • 4% in Bologna • Additional explanation (as in Ginsborg) • secularization or religious economies: how can we tell?

19. Implications for non-Catholics in Italy • If the theory of religious economies holds, then • Religious commitment among non-Catholic immigrants should be higher than among Catholic immigrants • (although we haven’t seen any data to this effect)

20. Catholic Church in Italy • Catholic Church in Italy plays a role in social order as a: • Political institution • Religious institution

21. Political institution • Organization based on geographical units (dioceses) • Connected through network of bishops • Pope is • Bishop of Rome • Sovereign ruler of Vatican • Head of College of Bishops

22. Examples of Vatican’s direct rule • Every prayer approved in Rome • Decisions about who leads parishes (e.g., not married clergy or women priests) • Rules for annulments • Selection of bishops • Rules for birth control and abortion

23. Organization • Central legislative bodies: • Nine congregations w/jurisdictional authority • Eleven councils with promotional authority

24. Bureaucratic structure • Extensive bureaucracy (Roman curia) • Occupational structure and ladder Concept: institutional isomorphism

25. Finances • History: unification of Italy meant the end of papal states, and therefore loss of tax revenue and church properties. • Italy agreed, in return, to subsidize the Catholic Church. Last direct payment was in 1988.

26. Financial relationship between Church and State • System of voluntary tax deductions and credits • Voluntary designation of income tax payment up to 0.8% • Vatican salaries are exempt from Italian income tax

27. Religious organization From Ginsborg In relation to civil society – • Encourages democratic participation • Reifies the relationship between families and societies • Contributes to social and charitable work • Participates in debates

28. Conclusions The long shadow of the Church in Rome in particular and Italy in general would seem to suggest its overwhelming importance in social and individual lives. It appears to be less than one might expect. Although religion might seem to unambiguously contribute to social order, in numerous instances there are conflicts between Church and State