Politics and social (dis)order

1. Politics and social (dis)order September 6, 2004

2. Are norms and values enough? • Despite values and norms, antisocial behavior persists, and people often engage in deviant activities. • Even when norms are followed, they may not contribute to social order (e.g., Mafia)

3. Need for central authority • Most believe that some central authority is required for the emergence and maintenance of social order. • Hobbes: strong central state essential for the attainment of social order. • Emergence of a coercive force able to control self-interested individuals.

4. Marx/Engels Marx/Engels solution also coercive: People who share a relation to the means of production see the world in the same way. Interests of dominant and subordinate classes are at odds; their behavior reflects these opposing interests. Societies are therefore inherently prone to conflict. In The Origin of the State Engels argues that this conflict between classes is responsible for the rise of the coercive state.. In capitalist societies: state is the executive committee of the bourgeoisie

5. State control • How does the state maintain its control? Coercion is simply too expensive. • Marx/Engels: disadvantaged are duped by institutions and ideology of the ruling class: religion, print and broadcast media, education – all serve the interests of the wealthy.

6. Question • In a democracy, where people have the opportunity to vote, and to form political parties, can the disadvantaged pursue their interests in the political system?

7. Michels Roberto Michels, 1876-1836 Political Parties “Iron law of oligarchy”

8. Ideal form of democracy? Before Michels … • The belief in the viability of an ideal form of direct popular democracy (drawing heavily on Rousseau) was still very prevalent, particularly on the left of political spectrum. • Socialist parties aimed to mobilize the working class to take up their democratic rights.

9. Democracy and organization • Organization – • “appears the only means for the creation of a collective will” • “based as it is upon the principle of least effort…upon the greatest possible economy of energy, is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong…” • “…chances of success will depend upon the degree to which this struggle is carried out upon a basis of solidarity between individuals whose interests are identical…” • “organization has become a vital principle of the working class…”

10. Michels’ critique The essence of Michels’ critique • Individuals cannot be mobilized on a large-scale without large-scale organizations. • Such organizations cannot exist effectively without a bureaucracy to administer them • Those at the top of this bureaucracy will inevitably have more influence over the operation of the organization than the rank and file members.

11. Leadership • Demand for leadership, and its perpetuation • Their resources are greatly superior to rank and file members. • They have far greater knowledge of the organization. • They have control over communication within the organization. • As professional leaders, their political skills will exceed those of members.

12. Leadership vs masses • ‘Incompetence of the masses’: why members offer little resistance to their leaders • Attempting to maintain influence within an organization is time consuming. • Unlike those running the organization, rank and file members cannot afford to spend all their time working in the organization so apathy is natural.

13. Power elite • although leaders come from the same social class as the mass membership, once they enter the hierarchy they inevitably join a new ‘power elite’. • primary interest no longer lies in furthering democratic goals, but in maximizing their own influence. • representative leadership is thus impossible; elite will do whatever it takes to further their interests, including restricting the democratic rights of members that the organization was intended to guarantee.

14. Median voter theory • But what about one person, one vote; majority rule? Median voter theory

15. Median voter theory • Weak form: median voter always casts his or her vote for the policy that is adopted. Once the median voter’s preferred outcome is reached, it cannot be defeated by another in a pairwise majoritarian election. • Strong form: median voter always gets her most preferred policy.

16. Median voter theory, cont. Candidate who is closest to the median voter always wins the election. This follows because the candidate closest to the median voter is also closest to the ideal points of more than half of the electorate.

17. Median voter theory, cont. • Candidates will choose policy positions to maximize their share of votes • Major party candidates will both tend to select platforms relatively close to the median voter’s preferred policies. • As the candidates compete, both candidates converge toward policy positions that maximize the median voter’s welfare.

18. Implications Implications: • Public policies will tend to be moderate middle of the road. • Many, maybe most people will be at least partly displeased with chosen policies. • Increases in dispersion over voter preferences (increased radicalism) will have little effect on public policy unless it affects the median. • Properties of median implies that public policies will be relatively stable.

19. Implications, cont. Does not mean that • Public policies will be Pareto-efficient • Every majoritarian policy imposes externalities on the minority • Votes rather than intensity of desire or willingness determine policy • Voter ignorance is unresolved, and opens the door to strategic games of interest groups and bureaucrats who manipulate information rather than policy (in areas where the median voter is unlikely to tbe well informed.”

20. Voting behavior On the matter of voting at all: • Voters have little incentive to vote because they cannot expect to have any impact on the outcome of any given election. (assumes costs to voting) • Individual citizens have no incentive even to learn enough to be able to vote their interests intelligently. More and more difficult as the number of critical policy decisions increases.

21. If no median voter? Sometimes no median voter: absence of an equilibrium results in chaos and indecision. Movement toward a more stable system, therefore?

22. Application to Italy Does this relatively pessimistic view hold in Italy, a political system known for its volatility and instability?