Desert Operations

1. DesertOperations Desert Operations

2. Introduction • The desert is probably the most severe of all environments in which aviation units must operate. Standard operating procedures for desert operations are different from areas having an abundance of contrasting terrain and substantial vegetation. This presentation describes some special considerations when employing aircraft in desert operations.

3. Topics of Discussion • Desert Characteristics/Considerations • Accident Statistics • Primary Causes of Night Operations Accidents and procedural solutions. • Visual Illusions • Brownout Landings • Night/NVD Considerations

4. Desert Characteristics • Intense heat (up to 120F). • Extremely low humidity • Large fluctuations in day/night temperatures (up to 70F). • Strong winds (30 mph in p.m./ 75 mph in windstorms). • Sand storms

5. Desert Characteristics • Featureless terrain with poor reference points and minimal contrast • Dust storms deposit a film of dust/sand over varying terrain features, such as mountains, making them difficult to discern at night from the surrounding flat terrain

6. Desert Considerations • Extreme daytime temperatures result in decreased aircraft performance, increased aircrew stress, and limited continuous operational capabilities (PPC, Acclimate, Hydrate) • Featureless terrain with poor reference points and poor contrast makes distances ,altitudes, and rate of closures difficult to estimate accurately, especially at night.

7. Desert Considerations • Dust storms severely restrict visibility. Dust and sand particles may remain suspended for days. • Helicopter rotor wash stirs up dust and sand causing "brownout" conditions. This presents a significant safety hazard to all aviation operations.

8. Sand erodes aircraft seals, rotor blades, engines, and other parts. Aircraft windshields and ALQ 144’s are more susceptible to being damaged by small rocks (Keep them covered while parked on the ramp) Aircraft surfaces become very hot during summer months. Keep skin covered when climbing over rotor-blades or onto tail section. Desert Considerations

9. Personal Protection-Summer • Hydrate often • Sunblock, hats, sleeves down, sunglasses. • Carry water aboard aircraft • Schedule work for coolest part of day (early/late hours) • Ramp temperatures tend be elevated due to heating affect of asphalt absorbing the sun’s heat • Protective goggles for crewmembers connecting external loads or conducting hoist missions.

10. Personal protection- Winter • Hydrate • Temps tend to drop rapidly once the sun sets. Plan day missions as if you are going to spend the night in the desert.

11. Accident Statistics • 80% of OIF FY03 Class A Accidents were attributed to Brownout Conditions (Flight Fax Feb 2004) • Individual/Crew Coordination Failure played a role in 80% of these. • 80% of Desert Storm NVG Accidents were caused by Spatial Disorientation

12. The PI had been flying for almost an hour doing dust landing qualifications. The highly experienced The PI had been flying for almost an hour doing dust landing qualifications. The highly experienced demonstrate a crosswind approach and takeoff. demonstrate a crosswind approach and takeoff. He executed the approach without any problems and began the takeoff with a stiff right crosswind. He executed the approach without any problems and began the takeoff with a stiff right crosswind. began the takeoff. This put the aircraft in a tailwind began the takeoff. This put the aircraft in a tailwind to continue a climb. The aircraft never cleared the to continue a climb. The aircraft never cleared the came to rest on its side. The IP and one of the crew came to rest on its side. The IP and one of the crew Interviews revealed that the PI and both crew Interviews revealed that the PI and both crew left turn, but none of them said anything to the IP. left turn, but none of them said anything to the IP. in his flying ability. They in his flying ability. They intentional even though he had not announced it. This intentional even though he had not announced it. This FAILURE is commonly referred to as excessive FAILURE is commonly referred to as excessive this case, the PI and the two CEs trusted the IP this case, the PI and the two CEs trusted the IP him to crash the aircraft.No one said a word as an him to crash the aircraft.No one said a word as an the accident. the accident. The PI had been flying for almost an hour doing dust landing qualifications.The highly experienced IP told him to take a break and decided to demonstrate a crosswind approach and takeoff.He executed the approach without any problems and began the takeoff with a stiff right crosswind. Several factors led him into a shallow left turn as he began the takeoff. This put the aircraft in a tailwind condition and the power applied was insufficient to continue a climb. The aircraft never cleared the dust cloud, struck the ground, bounced, rolled, and came to rest on its side. The IP and one of the crew chiefs were hospitalized for significant injuries. Interviews revealed that the PI and both crew chiefs knew that the aircraft was in the shallow left turn, but none of them said anything to the IP. They all knew him very well and had complete faith in his flying ability. They assumed that the turn was intentional even though he had not announced it. This CREW COORDINATION FAILURE is commonly referred to as excessive professional courtesy. In this case, the PI and the two CE’s trusted the IP to the point of allowing him to crash the aircraft. UH-60L Accident Synopsis, FY-2000 Several factors led him into a shallow left turn as he Several factors led him into a shallow left turn as he condition and the power applied was insufficient condition and the power applied was insufficient dust cloud, struck the ground, bounced, rolled, and dust cloud, struck the ground, bounced, rolled, and chiefs were hospitalized for significant injuries. chiefs were hospitalized for significant injuries. chiefs knew that the aircraft was in the shallow chiefs knew that the aircraft was in the shallow They all knew him very well and had complete faith They all knew him very well and had complete faith assumed that the turn was assumed that the turn was CREW COORDINATION CREW COORDINATION professional courtesy. In professional courtesy. In to the point of allowing to the point of allowing unannounced left turn led to unannounced left turn led to IP told him to take a break and decided to IP told him to take a break and decided to

13. Learn from the mistakes of others. You will not live long enough to make all of them yourself.

14. Primary Causes for Night Operations Accidents • The US Army Safety Center has studied crew error accidents occurring in night operations during the past years and have found that eight types of crew errors are repeatedly causing night accidents. As simple and basic as they appear, these kinds of errors show up persistently in accident reports year after year.

15. Improper scan • Improper direction of visual attention inside or outside the aircraft; i.e., too much or too little time on one object / area; scan pattern not thorough or systematic.

16. Proper Scan Techniques • Assign scan sectors/responsibilities • Crewmembers should rotate their eyes and head slowly and continuously. Stop to identify objects but avoid fixating. (fixation is most likely to occur during periods of high anxiety) • Announce when inside (PC should acknowledge all in/out calls) • All crewmembers should be outside during critical tasks

17. Improper distance estimation • Inaccurate estimation of distance between objects and rate of closure with objects

18. Distance estimation • Reduce airspeed • Map/route recon. Pilot not on controls should announce upcoming terrain features. • NVG approaches- Recommend airspeed be reduced to approx 50 KIAS until apparent ground speed and rate of closure appear to increase. Progressively decrease rate of descent and airspeed until termination.

19. Failure to detect hazards • Not identifying obstacles or recognizing other hazardous conditions (e.g., obstacles in landing area, unsecured equipment and improper control / switch position).

20. Keep looking around. There's always something you have missed.

21. Detecting Hazards • On Ground-Locate and announce hazards prior to A/C movement. • In Flight- Continuous scanning, all crewmembers outside during critical phases, landing zone recon should also include hazards along departure axis in case go-around is needed. • Crewmembers announce unannounced deviations from altitudes and headings (Turns).

22. Improper coordination • Failure of crewmembers to properly interact and act (sequence and timing) with each other and / or others outside the aircraft performing flight tasks.

23. Aircrew Coordination • Battle roster crews for first couple of months. Match experienced with less experienced. • Thorough initial briefings on all aspects of flight to include, emergency landings, taking fire calls, un-secure LZ procedures (I.e., protection, hasty departure, NRCM call for departure ready).

24. Aircrew Coordination-Continued • Rehearse Brownout Landing Actions (crewmember duties/calls to include Go-Around calls/procedures) • Frequent Altitude callouts during flight over featureless terrain • Divide radio duties • Train frequently/strive for proficiency. • Conduct constructive mission debriefs.

25. Failure to properly plan preflight • Failure to choose appropriate flight options for known conditions and contingencies and develop these into a course of action that will maximize the probability of mission accomplishment.

26. Preflight Planning • Review your route/ familiarize yourself with needed GPS checkpoints before takeoff. • Troops in contact- Find out friendly and enemy troop locations and plan ingress/egress routes accordingly. • Preset radio frequencies before takeoff.

27. Failure to properly plan in-flight • Improper in-flight modification of flight plan or failure to properly modify flight plan in response to unanticipated events or conditions.

28. Never let an aircraft take you somewhere your brain didn't get to five minutes earlier.

29. In-flight planning • Deviate from routes/altitudes as necessary to accomplish mission. • Slow down during periods of reduced visibility, contrast, or illumination. • Abort mission if successful completion is unlikely. • Use available time enroute to discuss action plan on arrival/assign responsibilties (i.e., crewchief stays at A/C while medic goes to patient, etc.) • Use Blue Force Tracker while en route for enemy situation or patient updates.

30. Failure to properly diagnose or respond to emergency • - improper identification of, or response to an actual, simulated or perceived emergency

31. Emergency Response • P*- Fly the A/C. • Correctly identify the emergency (NRCM should assist as necessary, i.e., checklist available, confirm correct PCL identification, especially at night, assist with obstacle avoidance.

32. Failure to execute proper procedure for flight • - failure to properly execute procedures necessary to maintain or recover orientation in flight environments known to restrict visibility; e.g., snow, dust, IMC, black hole, and over black water.

33. Executing proper procedure for flight • Frequent Altitude callouts • Airspeed/rate of closure calls during landing (recommend 50Kias @ 80’ AGL) • ATM NVG terrain flight max speeds may be too fast. Example- No restriction above 80’ AGL • Maneuver around mountains,if able, rather than over them • Proficiency in NVG and Instrument skills to include Unusual Attitude and IIMC recovery. • Slow down during periods of reduced visibility or low illumination.

34. Visual Illusions

35. False Horizon or lack of horizon.

36. False Horizons or lack of horizon • Sloping terrain or areas of differing contrast may create a false horizon. Sand and dust may obscure the horizon.

37. Height Perception Illusion

38. Height Perception Illusion • Sensation of being higher or lower than you actually are is due to poor contrast and visual references. It may result in a tendency to descend in order to acquire visual cues.

39. Ground light misinterpretation

40. Ground light misinterpretation • Confusing ground lights with stars. The pilot may place the aircraft in an unusual attitude to keep the perceived “star” lights above the aircraft.

41. Fixation

42. Fixation • Aviator fixes attention on high interest object and stops scanning. This may result in an aircraft being flown into the ground. Most likely to occur during periods of high anxiety.

43. Crater Illusion

44. Crater Illusion • Viewing the periphery of the IR searchlight gives the illusion that what is actually flat terrain slopes upward.

45. Lack of motion perception/parallax

46. Lack of motion perception/parallax • A lack of contrast or discernable terrain features make judging aircraft movement difficult to estimate.

47. Orientation Recovery • Trust/scan instruments • 2 Challenge Rule • Train Frequently (NVG’s/Instruments) • Practice Unusual Attitude recoveries • Practice/know VHIRP/Inadvertent IMC procedures

48. Brownout Landings

49. Brownout Landings Expect every landing to result in a brownout. • Three types of brownout landings • Roll-On • Landing to a reference point • No reference point/minimal rollout on landing

50. Roll-On Landings • Landing to a flat surface while touching down ahead of the dust cloud. • Safest of all 3 landing types provided area is free of unexploded ordinance, mines, ruts, or other hazards.