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Solo terrorists and the threat they represent

Solo terrorists and the threat they represent. Research fellow / senior advisor Cato Hemmingby Norwegian Police University College / Norwegian Government Security and Service Organization. Conducted attacks in W-Europe 1991-2013. Cato Hemmingby 2013. Lethality.

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Solo terrorists and the threat they represent

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  1. Solo terrorists and the threat they represent Research fellow / senior advisor Cato Hemmingby Norwegian Police University College / Norwegian Government Security and Service Organization

  2. Conductedattacks in W-Europe 1991-2013 Cato Hemmingby 2013

  3. Lethality • A few individualsconducted many attacks, but many attacks do not necessarily mean many people killed. • Limited lethality: • 14 perpertratorskilled 91 persons in 94 attacks: 0,968 • ABB ex.: 13 perp. killed 14 persons in 92 attacks: 0,152 • Oneincident may have great impact on statistics. • Attacks where a numberofpeoplegetkilledoccur from time to time. .

  4. Solo terrorists as a challenge Solo terrorists represent a constant, butveryunclear and unpredictablethreat. • The onlycertainthing is that it willhappenagain. • Probablythe most difficult terrorist threatto detect. • Police and security services are in many cases dependingonthe first indication from theoutside- typically from theperson’sclosesurroundings. .

  5. Plots and attacks in Scandinavia 2008-2013 Cato Hemmingby 2014

  6. Scandinavia 2008-13, not detected in time Cato Hemmingby 2014

  7. Scandinavia 2008-13, ”successful” Cato Hemmingby 2014

  8. Conclusion from Scandinavia 2008-2013 • Thirteen plots and attacks in all. • All sevengroup plots disrupted, none loneattackersdetected. • The onlyones «successful» wereMangs and Breivik - the pure solo terrorists. Also: • Eightoutofthirteen plots and attacksweredirectlylinked to Mohammed cartoons. • Only one attack was of an indiscriminate nature.

  9. How advanced do solo terrorists operate? Photo: Cato Hemmingby

  10. Innovative, creative and sophisticated • Innovation: Featuringnewmethods or original ideas so there is a change to somethingestablished. • Creative: Relating to or involvingimagination or original ideas in order to create or achievesomething. • Sophisticated: Awareof and able to interpret complexissues.

  11. How to measurethis? Cato Hemmingby 2013

  12. Conductedattacks in W-Europe 1991-2013 Cato Hemmingby 2013

  13. Not innovative, oftensophisticatedenough • Solo terrorists are not innovative. • A fewarecreative and sophisticated to a lowdegree, most areon an intermediateleveland veryfewareon a highlevel. • A certaindegreeofsophistication is enough. • Theytend to do some smart things, but most also do elementarymistakes.

  14. PETER MANGS – The Malmö shooter • Right-wingideology • A numberofattacks in 2003, 2009 and 2010 • Targeted immigrants • Convicted for twomurders and eightattemptedmurders.

  15. Background and targetinglogic • Background: • Somepsychologicalissues. • Averageperformance in primary and secondaryschool. • No militaryservice. Expressedinterest for the Home Guard. • Interests: Music, taekwondo and pistol shooting. • Former Left Party member. • Targetinglogic: • Immigrants • Criminals

  16. Weaponsand methodofattack • LicensedGlock 9mm, two x-trabarrels++ • Combat vest and disguises • Close quarter attacks • Shooting at buildings Photo: Swedishpolice

  17. Pre-attackconduct • Smart set-up withextraGlock pistol barrels. • Lots ofmapping and researchonInternet. • Retrievedinformation from courtdocuments. • Poorreconnaissance. Shotintowrongapartmentsontwooccasions. On severaloccasionshelooked up theresidenceof a man whowas in prison.

  18. Executionofattack • Used cartridgeshellcollector. • Leftcartridgeshells from otherweaponsonthe scene. • Leftcartridgeshells in other spots thanthe firing position. • However, hedid not always do a goodjobof it. Photo: Swedishpolice

  19. Post-attackconduct • False tip-offcall to police in 2003. • He talkedaboutattacksto a fewfriends. • Incriminating data oncomputers and phones. • Twoitemsfrom themurder in 2003 found in 2010. • He didnot hideweaponparts and equipmentwell. .

  20. Timeline and patterns • Shotboth men and women. • Operated in a limited area. • No attacks in theperiod from 2004 to 2008. • High frequency in 2009/2010. • Targetedbothonchance and by choice. • Attempted some individuals more than once. • On two occasions he conducted two attacks within hours. .

  21. SummaryonMangs • Rathertypicalbackground. • Close surroundingsknewof his extremistviews. • Creative set-up with two unlicensed barrels. • Variable performance as heexecutedattacks. • It waseasy to link him to a series ofattackswhensuspicion first wasraised.

  22. Conclusion • In general, solo terrorism is a low-frequency and low-lethalityphenomenon. • From time to time, single incidentstakemany lives. • Solo terrorists arevery hard to detect. • Most display creativity and sophisticationon an intermediatelevel, but most also do basicmistakes. Solo terrorists willcontinue to representa constant, butveryunclearand unpredictablethreat.

  23. Research fellow Cato Hemmingby Email: cathem@phs.no

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