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Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime T.V. Paul, Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Kristine Boucher IR 720 Theory and Approaches. Summary.
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Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation RegimeT.V. Paul, Cambridge Review of International Affairs Kristine Boucher IR 720 Theory and Approaches
Summary • The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has remained a sustainable, expanding entity despite the unequal status of its members • Main principle: the spread of nuclear arms is a threat to international security • Underlying norm: non-nuclear members not develop nuclear weapons and all members refrain from helping other nations build such weapons
Question 1:Is self interest or domination a key basis for major power cooperation within the non-nuclear proliferation regime?
Question 2:Is the use of sanctions an effective tool in deterring a state from violating the principles and rules of the international security regime?
Question 3:Are there questions of credibility regarding the nuclear powers provision of a nuclear umbrella over non-nuclear member states?
Question 4:Do regime norms affect the decision of middle power states to join or not join a security regime?
Question 5:Do normative constraints and the idea of nuclear weapons being ‘absolute weapons’ help to ensure that nuclear states will refrain from using them?
Question 6:Are multilateral (opposed to unilateral) sanctions necessary when punishing a nuclear non-proliferation regime violator?
Question 7:Are smaller states generally insignificant players in the international security regime?
Question 8:Are security issues primarily responsible for the emergence of international security regimes?
Question 9:The Non-Proliferation Treaty provides transparency and knowledge about the nuclear activities of other states though safeguards like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Is this safeguard effective?
Question 10:Are the costs high for the states that do not abide by the rules of the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
Question 11:Do the norms of the non-proliferation regime influence the deterrence of nations to acquire nuclear weapons?
Question 11 cont’d:Do the norms of the non-proliferation regime influence the deterrence of nations to acquire nuclear weapons?
Question 12:Does the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime look positive?