270 likes | 534 Views
Consequences of consensus democracy. Structure. The impact of consensus and majoritarian democracies Lijphart Patterns of Democracy Yale 1999 The effects of electoral systems Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering CUP 2004 Next class Monday : discussion exercise:
E N D
Structure • The impact of consensus and majoritarian democracies • Lijphart Patterns of Democracy Yale 1999 • The effects of electoral systems • Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering CUP 2004 • Next class Monday: discussion exercise: • Use Lijphart’s theory to evaluate the new constitution and electoral system in Afghanistan.
I: Impact of consensus v. majoritarian democracies Is majoritarian democracy better at government and consensus democracy better at representation? Lijphart’s indicators… • Performance (Table 15.1) • Macroeconomic performance • Control of violence/riots/deaths • Representation (Table 16.1) • Women’s inclusion • Voter Turnout • Satisfaction with democracy • Public policy outcomes
II. Impact of electoral systems • Proportionality of votes to seats (fair outcomes) • Party competition • Electoral turnout • Parliamentary representation • Women & ethno-political minorities • Strength of cleavage politics • Constituency service • What criteria do you regard as most important? Why?
Recap: Classification of systems Adversarial Majoritarian
Evidence • Aggregate effects • Classify electoral systems worldwide • Analyze results in elections for lower house 1995-2000 in 143 nations • Individual-level effects • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems • 30 nations 1996-2001 – survey battery
1. Impact on proportionality Proportionality of votes to seats Winning party Perfect proportionality 20% 2nd party, 3rd etc Seat share 20% Vote share
Measures of proportionality Loosemore-Hanby Index (D) D =__1__ Σ (vi – si) 2 Sums absolute difference between Vote percentage (vi) Seat percentage (si) Divided by 2 (Slightly exaggerates disproportionality of systems with many small parties) (Index was standardized to 100-point scale by Rose)
Proportionality influenced by: • Number of parties in the electorate • Geographical distribution of the vote • District magnitude (members per district) • Legal vote thresholds • The type of electoral formulae eg d’Hondt etc
2. Impact on parties:Duverger’s laws (1) “The plurality single-ballot rule tends to party dualism.” (2)“The double-ballot system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism.” Maurice Duverger. 1954. Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.
Mean N of parl parties (1 seat) Mean N of relevant parl parties (3%+ seats) % Vote for party 1st % Seats for party 1st Number of countries All Majoritarian 5.22 3.33 54.5 56.8 83 Alternative Vote 9.00 3.00 40.3 45.3 1 Block vote 5.60 4.57 52.9 56.2 10 2nd Ballot 6.00 3.20 54.8 57.8 23 FPTP 4.78 3.09 55.1 57.8 49 All Combined 8.85 4.52 46.8 49.5 26 Independent 8.89 3.94 51.7 53.9 19 Dependent 8.71 6.17 33.9 36.9 7 ALL Proportional 9.52 4.74 45.3 43.8 61 STV 5.00 2.50 45.3 50.1 2 Party List 9.68 4.82 44.5 43.6 59 TOTAL 7.05 4.12 48.7 50.0 143 Effect on parties Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Institutions Matter’ CUP 2003
ENPP by Electoral System Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Electoral Engineering’ CUP 2004
“A 5% increase in disproportionality reduces the ENPP by half a party”Lijphart p168
Type of Electoral System Mean Vote/VAP 1990s N. MAJORITARIAN Alternative Vote 65.5 2 2nd Ballot 58.5 21 First-Past-The-Post 61.2 43 Single Non-Transferable Vote 52.6 2 Block Vote 56.5 9 All majoritarian 60.4 77 COMBINED Combined-Dependent 66.6 7 Combined-Independent 63.5 19 All combined 64.0 26 PROPORTIONAL List PR 70.0 59 Single Transferable Vote 83.4 2 All PR Systems 70.0 68 All 65.0 164 3. Effect on TurnoutRef: Pippa Norris 2002. Democratic Phoenix Ch 4.
Vote/VAP Vote/Reg N. of Nations Older democracies Compulsory 79.4 86.9 7 Non-Compulsory 71.7 72.7 32 Difference +7.7 +14.2 39 Newer democracies Compulsory 67.7 75.8 9 Non-Compulsory 69.3 73.9 31 Difference -1.6 +1.9 40 Semi-democracies Compulsory 53.9 60.6 5 Non-Compulsory 56.6 67.0 40 Difference -2.7 -6.4 45 Non-democracies Compulsory 40.9 70.6 2 Non-Compulsory 61.8 67.8 38 Difference -20.9 +2.8 40 All Compulsory 65.9 75.4 23 Non-Compulsory 64.2 70.0 140 Difference +1.9 +5.4 163 But also impact of compulsory voting
4. Impact on women “As a simple rule, women proved twice as likely to be elected under PR than majoritarian electoral systems. Women were 10.8 percent of MPs in majoritarian systems, 15.1 percent in mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 19.8 percent of members in PR systems.” P.Norris in R.Rose Encyclopedia of Elections (CQ 2001)
FPTP Mixed PR
But also other rules matter… Political culture & societal development Demand by selectors Demand by voters Electoral laws 1.Electoral system 2.Legal gender quotas 3.Reserved seats Candidate selection process within parties 4.Voluntary gender quotas Pool of parliamentary candidates Elected members Supply of candidates Equal opportunities in education, home and work
Country Date % Quota % Before % After Change Argentina 1991 30 6 27 +21 Ecuador 1997 20 4 15 +11 Paraguay 1996 20 11 18 +7 Peru 1997 30 11 18 +7 Venezuela 1998 30 6 13 +7 Belgium 1994 33 18 23 +5 Costa Rica 1997 40 14 19 +5 Dominican Rep 1997 25 12 16 +4 Panama 1997 30 8 10 +2 Venezuela 1998 30 8 9 +2 France 1999 50 11 12 +1 Bolivia 1997 30 11 12 +1 Mexico 1996 30 15 16 +1 Bolivia 1997 30 4 4 0 Paraguay 1996 20 3 3 0 Brazil 1997 30 7 6 -1 Mexico 1996 30 17 16 -1 Average 30 10 14 +4 Legal gender quotas Note: Legal gender quotas for the lower house of national parliaments: laws which specify that each party must include a minimum proportion of women on party lists of candidates.Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.5
5. Impact on cleavage politics Majoritarian Combined PR Pippa Norris ‘Electoral Engineering’ CUP 2004
% With contact Type of Districts Iceland 31 PR New Zealand 24 Combined Canada 22 Majoritarian Denmark 20 Open PR Switzerland 20 Open PR Thailand 17 Combined Australia 16 Majoritarian Israel 16 Closed PR Korean Rep 16 Combined Lithuania 15 Combined Norway 15 Closed PR Britain 13 Majoritarian Chile 12 PR USA 12 Majoritarian Germany 11 Combined Sweden 11 Open PR Mexico 10 Combined Belarus 9 Peru 9 Open PR Czech Republic 8 Open PR Japan 8 Combined Taiwan 8 Combined Taiwan 8 Combined Ukraine 8 Combined Hungary 7 Combined Romania 7 Closed PR Poland 6 Open PR Portugal 6 Closed PR Netherlands 5 Closed PR Russia 3 Combined Spain 3 Closed PR ALL 12 6. Impact on constituency service? % With contact with elected member in last 12 months Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Electoral engineering’ CUP 2004
Effects of electoral systems • Proportionality of votes to seats • Party competition • Electoral turnout • Parliamentary representation • Women • Ethno-political minorities (?) • Strength of cleavage politics • Constituency service ?
Next class Monday • Case study application • Apply Lijphart’s theory to evaluate the new Afghanistan electoral system • What evaluative criteria are most important in this case? Stability? Policy effectiveness? Gender? Ethnicity? • What does the new constitution propose? • How has the electoral system worked? • What are the consequences of the constitutional choices?