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ASAS Operational Improvements -Dream or Reality:- The Impact on the Controller Anthony Smoker - IFATCA ASAS-TN First Workshop Rome April 2003. ASAS Thematic Network. ATCEUC.
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ASAS Operational Improvements -Dream or Reality:- The Impact on the Controller Anthony Smoker - IFATCA ASAS-TN First Workshop Rome April 2003 ASAS Thematic Network ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
ATCEUC The contents of this presentation also represent the views of the ATCEUC, whose representative is unable to attend this seminar. ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
Dream or Reality? • For many controllers, ASAS has the potential to be a “bad dream” – why? • What will be the effect of ASAS on controllers? – technical concerns and practical considerations ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
Controllers and ASAS • History: “ASAS” style concepts have been around for many years – IEE 1961 etc • Generally there is a poor record of implementation of advanced technical systems into ATC - leads to concern and a legacy • The needs of the controller are often secondary to implementation – compromise and understanding of the controller task – “Cinderella effect” • Human in the system used as fallback for poor system design or technical shortcomings • Differing interpretations of procedures ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
The IFATCA View • “It is arguable that the concepts have a potential to improve the safety and productivity of the ATM system” • IFATCA welcomes the change from “assurance” to “assistance” • Several areas of concern: many that involve the “impact” on the controller ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
IFATCA – Procedural and technical Concerns • Visual Separation: ICAO rule changes • Responsibility for separation – there remain uncertainties in certain situations • Workload impact of “new tasks” - negative or positive effects, task scheduling etc • Airspace organisation and: design – rigid discrimination to achieve full ASAS benefits? • ASSAP – identification of traffic • Intent information ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
IFATCA Concerns –Practical considerations - 1 • How many aircraft can be transferred for ASAS ops at anyone time, and retain system resilience to perturbation? • Will flight-deck workload limit the extent of tactical instructions or the controllers tactical freedom? • Complexity of multiple clearances to achieve system goals • System failure More ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
IFATCA Concerns –Practical considerations - 2 • Military traffic • Transfer of traffic from sector to sector operating on “ASAS” type clearances • Practical application – common pilot understanding ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
Wider Issues • Don’t forget that controllers have other tasks than separation to fulfil • There are lots of other ”tools” e.g. MTCD, AMAN, DMAN, all competing for controller workload resources! • What are the limitations of ASAS – in a control sense? • ASAS concepts must be embedded into a holistic concept of operations ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
Conclusions • ASAS is here, but then it has been a long time in coming! • There is a long way to go. • There is much that we simply do not know about ASAS in operation • THE IFATCA vision, might perhaps be that ASAS should be just another tool in the controller “box of tools” – please ask us ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003
Conclusions – cont’d • Please try to appreciate that controllers are system users as well, not just system providers, and that we have our own set of user requirements to make ASAS work. • Moreover, many controllers simply do not understand why there is a need for ASAS, and there is a need to ensure that they are engaged fully in it’s development ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003