The Lessons of Operation Allied Force In Kosovo

1. The Lessons of Operation Allied Force In Kosovo A Model Of Reconstruction and Political Settlement

2. The Purpose:To analyze the International Community’s reconstruction effort in Kosovo • Goals, Roles, Responsibilities of International Effort: • Who is doing what? • Toward what end? • Does that division make sense? • From NATO’s Perspective: • Is NATO involvement in Kosovo reconstruction actually “mission creep?” • Should an “exit strategy” philosophy apply to NATO in this (and future) post-conflict reconstruction? • How could this be done better next time?

3. Overview • Status: Legal and Political • Legal Basis for Involvement • Goals and Objectives of Emergency/Reconstruction Phase • UNMIK Strategy • UNMIK Roles/Responsibilities NATO’s Role and Responsibilities • Key Lessons for NATO

4. Current Legal and Political Status: Stasis and Flux Legal Status UN Protectorate (established by UNSCR 1244, June 10, 1999) “transitional administration to establish and oversee development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self government pending a political settlement…” • United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) • Special Rep Bernard Kouchner (for Int’l Civilian Presence) • NATO-KFOR (Int’l Security Presence) • Reaffirms sovereignty and territorial integrity of Former Republic of Yugoslavia but references Rambouillet Accords (3 years to a vote)

5. Current Legal and Political Status: Stasis and Flux Political Status Moving ahead on self-governance... • Oct 28 Municipal Elections: LDK takes 60% of municipal seats • Kouchner calls for Parliamentary/Presidential elections spring 2001; while Kouchner awaits his replacement • Dec 23 Serbian Parliamentary Elections unlikely to occur within Kosovo With resistant responses from FRY and other internationals • FRY pressuring for return of Serb refugees, judicial reforms, placement for FRY mil (per 1244) • Opposition to recent and future election voiced by Russia, France

6. Legal Basis for International Community Activities Civilian and Reconstruction Activities (UNMIK, EU, OSCE, UNHCR): • UN: • UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (6/10/99) • Establishes UNMIK; requests EU and Stability Pact for economic development • UN Security Council Resolution 1239 (5/14/99): Requests UNHCR help w/refugees and IDPs • OSCE: • Permanent Council Decision 305 (7/1/99): Establishes OSCE mission in Kosovo Military Activities (NATO): • UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (6/10/99) • NATO: • NATO: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (4/23/99) • Military Technical Agreement on the withdrawal of Serb Forces (6/9/99) • NATO OPLAN 10413, Operation Joint Guardian (6/10/99) • Agreement on Russian Participation in KFOR (6/18/99)

7. Goals and Objectives of Emergency and Reconstruction Phase: Stabilization and Transition 1. Stabilize the situation (Militarily and Rule of Law) • Authorization: MTA, UNSCR 1244, NATO OPPLAN 10413 • Withdrawal of FRY police, military, paramilitary • Demobilization KLA • Unconditional and safe return of all refugees and IDPs • Establishment of police, judicial, penal systems Assessment: Post conflict demil feasible,specific. Rule of law activities more challenging given resources 2. Prepare for a transition (Political/Economic/Civil) • Authorization: Rambouillet, 1244, OSCE PCD 305 • Build institutions for democracy, rule of law, human rights • Economic investment and infrastructure development • Develop governance and management structures Assessment: Undefined end state, unrealistic given short time frame

8. UNMIK Strategy • Proceed in phases (Admin/Emergency; Social Services/Legal; Elections/Civilian Institutions; Pending Final Settlement) • Divide responsibilities among pillars • Ensure Human Rights / Resettle Refugees / IDPs • Establish Civil Administration Transition to Self-Government • Establish Rule of Law • Relief and Support Reconstruction • Separate funding (“each tub on its own bottom”) • Erect parallel to “parallel” structures (Provisional KLA and Shadow LDK)

9. Assessment of UNMIK Strategy: Ambitious but too limited resources • Goal: Lack of final settlement (depending on FRY, is all this work for naught?) • Sequencing: Poor prioritization (Legal and Rule of Law should have come first) • Job division: Conflicting turf (HR/minority protection, Rule of Law) led to inefficiencies • Dual governance structures:Installing and legitimating new structures delayed until elections (1.5 years) • Resource allocation: Insufficient staffing and finance led to security problems and delays

10. Division of Responsibilities:UNMIK Pillars of Reconstruction • Pillar 1. UNHCR: Ensure Human Rights/Resettle Refugees/IDPs(UNSCR 1244, 1160): • Return all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. • Protect and assists minority groups. • Coordinates humanitarian assistance with INGOs. • Pillar 2. UNMIK: Establish Civil Administration Transition to Self-Government (UNSCR 1244): • Conducts Civil Administration. • Establish Police Commissioner, office for civil affairs (public health, education, transportation, communications), office for judicial affairs. • Pillar 3. OSCE: Establish Rule of Law (OSCE Decision No. 305): • Facilitate Democratization and Institution Building (Elections, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Civil Society, Media Development) • Pillar 4. EU: Relief and Support Reconstruction(UNSCR 1244): • Rebuild physical, economic, and social infrastructure. • Support Economic Reconstruction

11. Assessment of Reconstruction Activities:Some successes, some failures • Pillar 1. UNHCR: Ensure Human Rights/Resettle Refugees/IDPs • 1.3 million Kosovar Albanian refugees/IDPs resettled • But 200,000 Serb/Roma refugees/IDPs remain • 20,000 houses roofed but 150,000 to go • Pillar 2. UNMIK: Establish Civil Administration Transition to Self-Government • Poor management, slow progress, wasted resources • HR Watch / OSCE critique of judicial systems; lack of Serb judicial reps • Pillar 3. OSCE: Establish Rule of Law • Successful nonviolent elections but continuing insecurity for minorities • Kosovo Police Force graduating 10th class (up to 2500 local police) • Pillar 4. EU: Relief and Support Reconstruction • Failure to consistently provide basic services (trash, electricity, water).

12. Division of Responsibilities:NATO’s Role Structure and Force: • 50,000 troops (42,500 in Kosovo; remaining in Albania, Greece, Macedonia) • Grouped regionally in five multinational brigades led by UK, France, Germany, Italy, US • 18 Non NATO Nations: e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Morocco, Jordan, Lithuania

13. NATO’s Role and Achievements Kosovo Force (KFOR) UNSCR 1244: requested international security presence NATO OP PLAN 10413 (Operation Joint Guardian): authorized NATO-led involvement • Mission: Maintain secure environment in Kosovo • Withdrawal of FRY (verification and compliance) [Completed] • KLA into Kosovo Protection Corps [Completed/Monitoring] • Ensure public safety during UNMIK activities [In Process] • Assist UNMIK, including core tasks [In Process]

14. NATO’s Role in UNMIK Mission:Broader Post Conflict Security Role • Pillar 1: UNHCR -- Refugee returns and minority protection • Refugee camp establishment and logistics (completed) • Pillar 2: UNMIK -- Support transition to Self-Government • Protection of UN Staff • Pillar 3: OSCE -- Establish Rule of LawCreating both the perception of law and the reality of law • Weapons raids and collections; Assist with criminal arrests • Minority protection throughescorts, checkpoints/enclave guards, religious sites • Provide detention facilities • Pillar 4: EU -- Provide Relief/Support Reconstruction • Supported shelter/fuel distribution in winter 1999-00 (completed)

15. Key Lessons for NATO:Define end state and focus on “strategy” over “exit” • Exit Strategy versus End State: • No explicit NATO “exit strategy”But intervention’s strategy was built around assumption of an existing “exit strategy” • But should there be one? Dilemma: managing public opinion / alliance vs. running intervention successfully on the ground • Creates bias towards short term, low gear action • Limits credibility and deterrence of action • Underestimates reality and complexity of the challenge at hand • Downplays responsibility of NATO created by intervention in sovereign country • Focus planning and involvement on tasks and results, not time • Be prepared to extend time and resources if necessary

16. Key Lessons for NATO:Plan for violence after conflict’s end 2. Planning/Preparation for NATO Action: • Plan for use of refugees/IDP/in asymmetric warfare. • Prepare for post-conflict civilian violence in ethnically-based situations. • Prepare adequately-sized rapidly deployable forces for post-conflict insertion. • Initiate early joint planning with international humanitarian orgs around clear strategic objectives for conflict related activities.

17. Key Lessons for NATO:Prepare to assume broader post-conflict responsibilities 3. Implementation of NATO Post-Conflict Action: Mission creep vs. determined strategy? • NATO should expand its capabilities to compensate for shortcomings in humanitarian and emergency phase operations • Improve Command and Control: develop unity of effort, communications, coordination, contact, jointness with non-NATO actors 4. Prevent rather than cure: Emphasis on conflict prevention