March 12, 2014

1. Columbia - Verizon Research CollaborationSecure SIP: Scalable DoS and ToS Prevention Mechanisms for SIP-based VoIP Systems, and Validation Test Tools Gaston Ormazabal Verizon Laboratories Sarvesh Nagpal, Eilon Yardeni, Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University March 12, 2014

2. Agenda Discussion: A successful collaboration… Value to Verizon Project Overview Background, Research Focus, and Goals DoS DoS Detection and Mitigation Strategy DoS Validation Methodology - DoS Automated Attack Tool ToS ToS IntegrityVerification Tool and Validation Methodology Intellectual Property Next Steps Conclusions

3. Discussion… A “successful” collaboration 3

4. A Successful Collaboration • Want a realistic perspective on what makes projects succeed and what is unlikely to work • Industry must see value or need to pursue IP • Rapid commercialization/productization “in house” or with an external industry partner • Agreement on fair distribution of rights/obligations • Typical arrangement: GRA + professor • Who typically needs to supervise multiple projects at the same time • Often companies seem to have the illusion that they get the faculty's full attention... • Require full attention of industry SME • Student mentoring/coaching • Industry perspective • Writing/Presentation skills • Manage Deliverables

5. Deliverables Management • Convert collective research insights into industry deliverables • Clear understanding of deliverables • Standards • Reports • Systems/Prototypes • Timelines • Start time and academic calendar • MS GRA vs. PhD

6. Value to Verizon Intellectual Property with SIX Patent Applications Licensing Agreement Taken research quickly into marketplace Five vendors interested Enhanced VoIP security through standards and vendor involvement Worked with Verizon vendors to mitigate exposures Rolled the requirements and lessons learned into the Verizon security architecture and new element requirements database for procurement Columbia requirements valid for VoIP, Presence and Multimedia architectures Setup laboratory facilities for VoIP security evaluations and product development In Columbia, prototype rapid development incubator In Verizon, incorporated Columbia/Verizon collaborative test tools for a more realistic complex IP-routed laboratory environment

7. Verizon Business Impact SIP DoS work impact on Verizon Business Network & Information Security Organization “Better Security Reviews” of Advantage VoIP Service Global Customer Service & Provisioning Organization Sales Engineering – Premier Accounts Team Briefing Global Network Engineering & Planning Organization Support Technology organization to define new security architecture for VoIP Services SIP ToS work impact on Verizon Business Office of Chief Financial Officer Credit&Collections

8. Background & Research Focus SIP is the VoIP protocol of choice for both wireline and wireless telephony Control protocol for the Internet Multimedia Systems (IMS) architecture VoIP services migrating to IP fast becoming attractive DoS and ToS targets DoS attack traffic traversing network perimeter reduces availability of signaling and media for VoIP Theft of Service must be prevented to maintain service integrity Reduces ability to collect revenue and provider’s reputation both are at stake Attack targets SIP infrastructure elements (proxy, softswitch, SBC, CSCF-P/I/S) End-points (SIP phones) Supporting services (e.g., DNS, Directory, DHCP, HSS, DIAMETER, Authorization Servers) Verizon needs to solve security problem for VoIP services Protocol-aware application layer gateway for RTP SIP DoS/DDoS detection and prevention for SIP channel Theft of Service Architectural Integrity Verification Tool Need to verify performance & scalability at carrier class rates Security and Performance are a zero sum game Columbia likes to work in real life problems & analyze large data sets Goal of improving generic architectures and testing methodologies Columbia has world-renowned expertise in SIP

9. Goals Study VoIP DoS and ToS for SIP Definition – define SIP specific threats Detection – how do we detect an attack? Mitigation – defense strategy and implementation Validation – validate our defense strategy Generate requirements for future security network elements and prototypes Share these requirements with vendors Generate the test tools and strategies for their validation Share these tools with vendors

10. VoIP Threat Taxonomy Scope of our research - 2007 Scope of our research - 2006 *- VoIP Security and Privacy Threat Taxonomy, VoIP Security Alliance Report, October, 2005 (http://www.voipsa.org)

11. Denial of Service & Theft of Service Denial of Service – preventing users from effectively using the target services Service degradation to a “not usable” point Complete loss of service Distributed Denial of Service attacks represent the main threat facing network operators* Most attacks involve compromised hosts (bots) botnets sized from a few thousands to over million 25% of all computers on Internet may be botnets Theft of Service – any unlawful taking of an economic benefit of a service provider With intention to deprive of lawful revenue or property *- Worldwide ISP Security Report, September 2005, Arbor Networks *- Criminals 'may overwhelm the web', 25 January, 2007. BBC

12. DoS Mitigation Strategy Implementation flaws are easier to deal with Systems can be tested before used in production Systems can be patched when a new flaw is discovered Attack signatures can be integrated with a firewall Application level and flooding attacks are harder to defend against SIP infrastructure element defense Commercially available solutions for general UDP/SYN flooding but none for SIP  Address application level and flooding attacks specifically for SIP  Identify and address architectural weaknesses before they are exploited to commit ToS

13. VoIP Traffic Attack Traffic DoS Mitigation Solution Overview Untrusted Untrusted Trusted Trusted Filter II Filter I Filter I Filter II sipd sipd DPPM DPPM SIP SIP SIP SIP SIP SIP RTP RTP RTP RTP

14. Hardware Platform 10/100/1000 10/100 0 1 2 ASM 1000 1000 Backplane 4 3 Gigabit Ethernet Interconnects D0 D1 D0 D1 P0 P0 DPPM Intel IXP 2800 DPPM Intel IXP 2800 E1 E1 E2 E2 F0 C3 C4 F0 C3 C4 System Level Port Distribution Application Server Module Pentium 1GHz

15. Integrated DDOS and Dynamic Pinhole Filter CAM sipd Dynamic Table SIP SIP DDOS CAM CAM DDOS Table Static Table Outbound Inbound Linux server ASM DPPM FCP/UDP Lookup Switch Drop

16. Integrated Testing and Analysis Environment Legitimate Loaders SIPUA/SIPp Call Handlers SIPUA/SIPp Attack Loaders SIPStone/SIPp GigE Switch GigE Switch Controller secureSIP Firewall SIP Proxy

17. Theft of Service Overview VoIP is different Not a static but a real-time application Direct comparisons with PSTN According to Subex Azure 3% of total revenue is subject to “fraud”* VoIP can be expected to be at least twice as large a proportion of revenue Theft of Service is more daunting problem in VoIP Implications of ToS Lost revenue and bad reputation Abused resources cause monetary losses to network providers Unauthorized usage degrades whole system’s performance Scenarios Using services without paying Illegal Resource Sharing (unlimited-plans) Compromised Systems Call Spoofing and Vishing *Billing World and OSS Magazine: “Top Telco Frauds and How to Stop Them”, January 2007, by Geoff Ibett

18. The Bigger Picture - Columbia VoIP Testbed Columbia VoIP test bed is collection of various open-source, commercial and home-grown SIP components provides a unique platform for validating research Columbia-Verizon Research partnership has addressed major security problems signalling, media and social threats Researched DoS solutions verified against powerful test setup at very high traffic rates ToS successfully validated integrity of different setups of test bed

19. Intellectual Property – Six Patent Applications “Fine Granularity Scalability and Performance of SIP Aware Border Gateways: Methodology and Architecture for Measurements” Inventors: Henning Schulzrinne, Kundan Singh, Eilon Yardeni (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon) “Architectural Design of a High Performance SIP-aware Application Layer Gateway” Inventors: Henning Schulzrinne, Jonathan Lennox, Eilon Yardeni (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon) “Architectural Design of a High Performance SIP-aware DOS Detection and Mitigation System” Inventors: Henning Schulzrinne, Eilon Yardeni, Somdutt Patnaik (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon) “Architectural Design of a High Performance SIP-aware DOS Detection and Mitigation System - Rate Limiting Thresholds” Inventors: Henning Schulzrinne, Somdutt Patnaik (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon) “System and Method for Testing Network Firewall for Denial of Service (DoS) Detection and Prevention in Signaling Channel” Inventors: Henning Schulzrinne, Eilon Yardeni, Sarvesh Nagpal (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon) “Theft of Service Architectural Integrity Validation Tools for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Based Systems” Inventors: Henning Schulzrinne, Sarvesh Nagpal (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon)

20. External – Publications, Presentations, Recognition Presentation at NANOG 38 – Oct. 10 2006 (HS/GO) “Securing SIP: Scalable Mechanisms for Protecting SIP-Based VoIP Systems ” Authors: Henning Schulzrinne, Eilon Yardeni, Somdutt Patnaik (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon) Paper approved for publication in NANOG 38 2006 Proceedings Made a headline in VON Magazine on October 11, 2006: http://www.vonmag.com/webexclusives/2006/10/10_NANOG_Talks_Securing_SIP.asp Presentation to at Global 3G Evolution Forum – Tokyo, Japan, Jan. 2007 (GO) Presentation at IPTComm 2007 – New York City, July, 2007 (GO) Presentation at OSS/BSS Summit – Tucson, AZ, September, 2007 (GO) Paper in development for current work (to be presented at IPTComm 2008) “Secure SIP: A scalable prevention mechanism for DoS attacks on SIP based VoIP systems” Authors: Henning Schulzrinne, Eilon Yardeni, Sarvesh Nagpal (Columbia), Gaston Ormazabal (Verizon) Work incorporated in a new Masters level course on VoIP Security taught at Columbia in Fall 2006 COMS 4995-1: Special Topics in Computer : VoIP Security (HS) CATT Technological Impact Award - 2007

21. Recommended Next Steps Conversion of research into a product that Verizon can use Verizon needs to determine optimal architectural placement of DoS prevention functionality for VoIP and Presence Security Security vs. Performance Hardware vs. Software Implementation Proxy/Softswitch (SW) SBC or New network element (HW/SW) Use internally (protect VZ Network) Use externally (sell new security services to large customers) Need rapid commercialization Licensing Agreement with equipment manufacturers Exclusive vs. Non-exclusive Continue relationship with Columbia Research in related areas Proposal to study SRTP Maintain the testbeds for further research and to assist in product development during product testing cycle Feedback loop of research and product cycle Get other companies interested to synergize resources and share results What can we see doing to make the working relationship even more productive?

22. Conclusions Research Results Demonstrated SIP vulnerabilities for VoIP resulting in new DoS and ToS susceptibility Work is fully reusable to secure a “Presence” infrastructure Implemented some “carrier-class” mitigation strategies Developed generic requirements Remove SIP DoS traffic at carrier class rates Prototype is first of its kind in the world Built a validation testbed to measure performance Developed customized test tools Built a high powered SIP-specific Dos Attack tool in a parallel computing distributed testbed Crashed a SIP Proxy in seconds Built a Theft of Service Architectural Integrity Validation Tool using parallel computing Intellectual Property Worked resulted in six patent applications Commercialization Licensing agreements currently under negotiation Revenue both to Columba and Verizon Need to socialize new requirements and test tools with vendor community to address rapid field deployment Vendors generally very interested in new requirements Rapid implementation is now expected

23. Thank You Thank you Questions?

24. Backup Slides…

25. SIP Security Overview Application Layer Security SIP RFC 2543 – little security SIP RFC 3261 – security enhancements Digest Authentication TLS IPSec SRTP/ZRTP (RFC 3711) Perimeter Protection SIP aware Filtering Mechanisms SIP aware DOS Protection Detection and Mitigation

26. SIP Security Overview - ?? Application layer security Digest Authentication, TLS, S/MIME, IPSec, certificates SRTP/ZRTP for media Convergence leads to converged attacks Data network attacks DDoS, spoofing, content alteration, platform attacks Voice over IP network attacks Toll fraud, session hijacking, theft of service, spam/spit Most security problems are due to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) instead of TCP/TLS Plain text instead of S/MIME Message/Method vulnerability Flexible grammar --> syntax-based attacks 26

27. Dynamic Pinhole Filtering INVITE sip:user1@proxy.com SIP/2.0 200 OK From: <sip:user2@loader> From: <sip:user1@handler> c=IN IP4 128.59.19.163 m=audio 43564 RTP/AVP 0 c=IN IP4 128.59.19.162 m=audio 56432 RTP/AVP 0 SIPUA User1 SIPUA User2 CAM Table 128.59.19.163:43564 128.59.19.163:56432 27

28. SIP DoS and ToS Attack Taxonomy DoS Implementation flaws Application level Flooding ToS Billing Threats Authorization Threats Service Threats

29. Strategy Focus VULNERABILITY : Most security problems are due to: flexible grammar  syntax-based attacks Plain text  interception and modification SIP over UDP  ability to spoof SIP requests Registration/Call Hijacking Modification of Media sessions SIP ‘Method’ vulnerabilities Session teardown Request flooding Error Message flooding RTP flooding STRATEGY: Two DoS detection and mitigation filters and ToS tools SIP: Two types of rule-based detection and mitigation filters Media: SIP-aware dynamic pinhole filtering ToS Architectural Integrity Verification Tool Application Level Flooding

30. SIP Detection and Mitigation Filters Authentication Based - Return Routability Check Require SIP built-in digest authentication mechanism Null-authentication (no shared secret) Filter out spoofed sources Method Specific Based – Rate Limiting Transaction based Thresholding of message rates INVITE Errors State Machine sequencing Filter “out-of-state” messages Allow “in-state” messages Dialog based Only useful in BYE and CANCEL messages Dynamic Pinhole Filtering for RTP Only signaled RTP media channels can traverse perimeter Obtain from SDP interception End systems are protected against flooding of random RTP

31. Test Tools SIPp, SIPStone, and SIPUA are benchmarking tools for SIP proxy and redirect servers Establish calls using SIP in Loader/Handler mode A controller software module (secureSIP) wrapped over SIPp/SIPUA/SIPStone launches legitimate and illegitimate calls at a pre-configured workload SIPp Robust open-source test tool / traffic generator for SIP Customizable XML scenarios for traffic generation 5 inbuilt timers to provide accurate statistics Customized to launch attack (SIP DoS) traffic designed to cause proxy to fail SIPStone continuously launches spoofed calls which the proxy is expected to filter For this project enhanced with: Null Digest Authentication Optional spoofed source IP address SIP requests SIPUA Test Suite Has built-in Digest Authentication functionality Sends 160 byte RTP packets every 20ms Settable to shorter interval (10ms) if needed for granularity Starts RTP sequence numbers from zero Dumps call number, sequence number, current timestamp and port numbers to a file

32. secureSIP Control Architecture

33. secureSIP Test Results for DoS SIP DoS Measurements(showing max supported call rates) Dynamic Pinhole