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Democracy after Secession?: Institutions and External Threats to the Political Regime in De Facto Abkhazia. David Szakonyi Columbia University ASCN Annual Conference June 24-25, 2011. Research Specifics. Joint project with Oleh Protsyk , Senior Research Associate, ECMI Abkhazia Moldova
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Democracy after Secession?:Institutions and External Threats to the Political Regime in De Facto Abkhazia David Szakonyi Columbia University ASCN Annual Conference June 24-25, 2011
Research Specifics • Joint project with OlehProtsyk, Senior Research Associate, ECMI • Abkhazia • Moldova • Draws upon research conducted from 2007-2011 • 70 in-country interviews • Primary and secondary source analysis • Theoretical development and preliminary findings Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Research Questions • How do de facto independent states manage political development and ethnic diversity? • How credible are claims that democratization is occurring in unrecognized regions? • What explains conflicting interpretations of democratic progress in Abkhazia? Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Existing Literature: First Generation • Information scarcity and political upheaval of late 1990s and early 2000s • Negative assessments of level of democratization • Deficient political, economic, and judicial development (Lynch 2002) • Numerous impediments to state-building process in de facto states (Kolsto 2006) • Emergent state capacity due to ethnic conflict, but only relative to neighbors (King 2001) Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Existing Literature: Second Generation • Optimistic portrayals based on past decade of development (Popescu 2008) • Dual incentives to democratize (Caspersen 2010, 2011; Broers 2005) • External: International norms and drive towards independence • Internal: Preserve popular legitimacy, prevent emigration, and allow for further military mobilization • Ethnic democracy and imitation democratic statehood • Declining need for recognition leads to deteriorating democracy Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Deficiencies in Current Approaches • Strong assumptions about elite preferences through period of de facto independence as well as reliance on official statements and rhetoric • Little to no discussion of institutions and their effect on elite and mass behavior • Selective interpretation of the effect of the international environment Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Argument • External environment (measured by level of security threat) profoundly influenced both elite preferences for and choices of initial institutions in the post-conflict period. • The specific institutions chosen purposively constrained democratizing tendencies, such as the development of political parties and integration of ethnic minorities. • As the security threat diminished following the August war, Abkhaz elites undertook efforts to change institutions to fit new governance reality. Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Formulating Elite Preferences • Perceived security threat can help produce consensus among elites for strong, consolidated structures (Fendius-Elman 2004) • Increased bargaining position for hardliners • Cloak self-interested proposals in impartial language • Preserve the new state’s right to self-determination (not synonymous with independence) • Maximize hold on power against challenges from rival groups, including other ethnic minorities Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Initial Choices of Institutions • Centralized power structures for “national unity” • Dominant executive branch • Single-member district electoral rules • Restrictive laws covering political parties and organizations • Informal regulation governing minority participation • Influence of Soviet legacy and post-conflict resource scarcity • Constitution passed in 1995; independence clause in 1999 • Defeat of U.S. / Netherlands version Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Consequences of Constitution-Making:Weak Political Party Development • Weak, election-centered coalitions of individual candidates with few ideological commitments and connections with identifiable constituencies • Use of administrative resources to skew the competition • Regulatory and law enforcement agencies • Undermining ability of regime opponents to be effective in political process through use of rhetoric devices • Accusation of betrayal of nation • Problem of succession and executive turnover Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Consequences of Constitution-Making: Stunted Ethnic Integration • Effective management of ethnic cleavages through gentleman’s agreement and quotas • Disproportionately skewed in favor of Abkhaz elites • Paramount position for clientelism and informal networks in distributing public goods and creating economic opportunities • Cooptation by ruling authorities Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Example of the People’s Assembly • Highly contested – averaged roughly 70% for Abkhaz, 30% for non-Abkhaz in the three parliaments of 1996, 2001, and 2007 • 2007 – 3 Russian, 3 Armenian, 2 Georgians, and 2 Turks (one Georgian died) • Gentleman’s Agreement and geographic enclaves • 10 districts that saw ethnic minority candidates, 6 of these ethnic minorities were at least 50% of the candidates, 9 districts saw ethnic minorities being elected. • 17/35 Runoffs (roughly 50%), seats contested by ethnic minorities, 3/10 in ethnic districts saw runoffs (less competitive)
Diminished Threat, Altered Institutions • Russia-Georgia War of 2008 and arrival of security guarantees and military hardware • Partial recognition of independence • Changes to institutional set-up • 2009: Law on Political Parties • 2011: Deliberation over switch to proportional representation • Growing status and consolidation of United Abkhazia • Influence of Russia on internal development: diffusion Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Policy Relevance • International engagement, security environment and the push towards democratization • Democracy promotion efforts • Countering Russian influence • Providing security guarantees • Effect of internal dynamics on potential approaches to conflict resolution Szakonyi - ASCN Conference
Summary Remarks and Further Questions • External security environment as key explanatory variable: mechanism runs through preferences for specific institutions • Reappraisal of evaluations of democracy within Abkhazia • How does the death of Sergei Bagapsh affect the internal balancing of elite groups within Abkhazia? • Do the histories of other cases of de facto independence fit this framework? How can we better map out variation in the evidence available? Szakonyi - ASCN Conference