V-22 Osprey Development to Deployment

1. V-22 OspreyDevelopment to Deployment LtCol Gregg Skinner, USMC Michael Belcher PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM

2. Intro • Michael Belcher • V-22 RM&A Lead • PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM • Michael.S.Belcher@Navy.mil • LtCol Gregg Skinner • MV-22 Chief Engineer • PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM • Gregg.Skinner@Navy.mil

4. Outline Program Overview Capabilities Acquisition Road Map V-22 Reliability Past / Present / Future Reliability Improvement Process FRACAS Database Corrective Action Projection Models Validation Strategic Nacelle Initiative Summary 4 4 4

5. Delivering Innovation

6. V-22 Osprey System Description • Mission: • Provide operating forces with a supportable, reliable advanced Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft weapon system capable of satisfying Marine Corps assault vertical lift; Navy fleet logistics, special warfare, combat search and rescue; and SOCOM long-range special operations lift. • Description: • The V-22 tiltrotor aircraft combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. It is powered by two turboshaft engines. • Platforms: • The V-22 aircraft is able to operate from air capable ships and unimproved landing sites throughout the world. It is capable of in-flight refueling. • Employment: • In addition to the Marine Corps assault vertical lift mission, the special operations aircraft (CV-22) consists of the baseline V-22 aircraft (MV-22) configuration plus a terrain following radar, additional fuel tanks, radios, flare/chaff dispensers, radar jammer and warning receiver.

7. V-22 Osprey Program Summary Program Summary Prime Contractor: Joint Bell Boeing Customer: USMC, USAF, USN POR Configuration: MV – Marines (360) CV – Air Force (50) MV – Navy (48) Contracted/Plan: 288/459 FRP Decision: September 2005 IOC: MV – Complete (2007) CV – Complete (2009) Fuselage: Ridley Park, PA Final Assembly: Amarillo, TX Current Status MYP I: FY08-FY12 (Executing) MYP II: FY13-FY17 (Planning) Fielded: 133 (115 MVs/18 CVs) Block Status: MV: Blk A/B – fielded Blk C – on contract CV: Blk 0/10 – fielded Blk 20 – Increment 3 on contract

8. Effective and Survivable MV Deployment at Sea MV Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments • Deployed • 16 OCONUS deployments since 2007 • In the Fight • Raids, assaults, direct action, CASEVAC, long-range logistics support • Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief CV Deployments HQMC cleared for public release

9. V-22 Defines Capability Leap Unprecedented agility and operational reach Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Enduring Freedom MV-22B Combat Radius 325 nm / 24 pax CH-46E Combat Radius 75 nm / 12 pax Effective and Survivable – Executing Full Array of Missions HQMC cleared for public release

10. MV-22 Safety HQMC cleared for public release

11. Most Survivable Rotorcraft Ever Built VULNERABILITY SUSCEPTIBILITY DETECTION & ACQUISITION AVOIDANCE ENGAGEMENT & HIT AVOIDANCE I N T E L L I G E N T M I S S I O N P L A N N I N G THREAT & KILL TOLERANCE THREAT SUPPRESSION RANGE SPEED SIGNATURE CONTROL Radar Infrared Visual Acoustic Electronic Emissions COUNTERMEASURES & SIGNATURE CONTROL Radar Warning System Missile Launch Warning Countermeasures DIRCM (CV Only) SIRFC (CV Only) VULNERABILITY REDUCTION Fire Suppression Broom Straw Controlled Wing Failure Ballistic Tolerance CBR&N Component Redundancy (with Separation) SURVIVABILITY • Battle damage in OIF/OEF due to enemy fire • Every instance the aircraft returned safely to base with no injuries HQMC cleared for public release

12. V-22 Osprey Location / Operational Inventory

13. Strategy Development- Philosophy MS I MS II+ MS III MS II S Cost Readiness Capability Cost Readiness Win Win Trust • Objectives • Measures • Actions Trust Safety Reliability Logistics Investing in Resources #1 - People

14. Acquisition & Lifecycle Management HQMC cleared for public release

15. RCM Failure Management Process Actual Method Analogy/Parametric/Engineering Methods

16. Reliability Past / Present / Future • In Service - Reliability Performance • Actual • Environment • Usage 16 16 16

17. Reliability Past / Present / Future Mean Flight Hour Between Failure Growth 3.0 Hours 2.0 1.5 hrs 1.3 hrs 1.0 Threshold: 0.9 hrs 0.9 hrs 0.37 hrs Block A (Present) Block B (Present) Block C (Jan 2012) LRIP (2000) 17 17 17

18. MV-22 Incremental AcquisitionMission and R&M Improvements Block D Block C P3I Block B TBD ECS Upgrade Wx Radar Troop Commander Station Forward ALE 47 Crash Position Indicator Enhanced Stby Flt Instruments Improved Engine Starter Valve Improved engine starter valve Capabilities Enhanced R & M Block A Safe and Operational Wing Aux Tanks Clam shell doors Retractable ARP Icing Clearance Hoist / Fast Rope DAMA SATCOM Dual DIGMAP Line Clearance Flight Control Software IETM / NATOPS Standdown 12/00 - 5/02 FY 01 - 05 FY 06 - 08 FY 09 - ?

19. Reliability Improvement Process Validate CA Effectiveness Fleet Operational Data MV and CV Aircraft Monitor Fleet Operations Identify Reliability Readiness Degraders Implement CA into Fleet Aircraft • Root Cause • Component • System Establish Aircraft Validation Plan • Corrective Action • Material • Non-Material Corrective Action Off Aircraft Testing Implementation

20. TMS Team FST Readiness Degraders PMA-275 Reliability Degraders V-22 Critical Item Logistics Review (CILR) Process • Multiple Criteria used in determining Degraders • Individual criteria ranked • Establish Composite Score • Analyze degraders • Supply • Maintenance • Reliability • Develop Goals • Implementation Plan • Validate Mission Dependability Operational Supportability Identify Readiness Degraders CILR Composite Score

21. V-22 FRACAS Database • V-22 CARTS database • Production • Suppliers • MV Fleet • CV Fleet • R&M Tool Kit • R&M Metric reports • Failure Mode Identification • Corrective Action Plans • AMSAA Projection

22. Root Cause & Corrective Action • Root Cause • Integrated Product Team (IPT) • Engineering Investigation • Supplier Findings • Repair Data • Corrective Action • Addresses Root Cause Findings • Target Corrective Actions • Safety • Impact to readiness & Cost

23. CA Implementation Strategy Fielded Aircraft Production Aircraft Attrition When old part fails, replace with new configuration part Production Aircraft Affectivity is Identified Force Retrofit Old configuration part is forced off the targeted fielded aircraft

24. Validate Corrective Action • Establish Validation Goals • Failure Mode or Component • Characteristic Life • Mean Time To Remove • Establish Test Profile • Operational Aircraft • Sets Expectations to PM • Establishes Plan Line • Staggered Introduction • Monitor aircraft progress

25. Validate Corrective Action Upper Threshold Target Threshold Jan 2011 Crosses Upper Threshold Successful Validation Point Nov 2009 Mean Time To Remove 0 Failures, T = 27,128 FH Flight Hours Completed Hydraulic Actuator Validation TPM

26. Corrective Action Validation Summary March 2011

27. Corrective Action Validation Summary March 2011

28. Strategic Nacelle Initiative

29. Single Assessment POA&M POA&M repeated for each of 8 assessments

30. Summary • Educate your PMs • Test • Document your assumptions • Leave breadcrumbs • Alignment • Educate your PMs • Tell stories…they travel better than facts

31. Thank you for your time. Questions?