Participation, Transparency and Accountability: South Korea, Brazil and the Philippines

1. Participation, Transparency and Accountability:South Korea, Brazil and the Philippines Brian Wampler November 2, 2013 bwampler@boisestate.edu

2. Rebuilding state institutions: incorporating both participation and transparency mechanisms • What is the “PROBLEM” that participation is meant to solve? • Institutional development will vary significantly based on moment of intervention in policy cycle • Policy formulation • Policy implementation • End-of project-Auditing • Carefully linking the political and policy interests of government officials (supply-side) and citizens (demand-side).

3. Supply-side • What types of authority are government officials willing to delegate to citizens? What is the level of risk acceptable to government officials? • Key issues to be considered: • Use of multi-channel forums(in-person, online; consultative, binding) • Engage citizens and CSOs at multiple stages of the budgetary cycle • Cover a range of policy issues (education, basic infrastructure) • Interlocking Institutions (Federal, across policy arenas, multi-channel • Retrain public servants and technical experts to work directly with citizens • Reward local Governments and country-level agencies to work directly with citizens

4. Demand-side • Demand-side: How will citizens and CSOs be able to use newly delegated authority? Can citizens simultaneously pressure and partner with government officials? • Citizens have formal opportunity to exercise some combination • voice, vet, vote and veto • Include citizens and CSOs in discussions about the problems that the new institutions is designed to solve • Build capacity among CSOs • Provide meaningful feedback loops • Auditing and Monitoring can be carried out by citizens and CSOs

5. Range of participation • Voice: The ability of citizens to express ideas, preferences, and opinions within and parallel to formal state-sanctioned bodies. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can also represent citizens’ voice • Vet: The ability of citizens and CSOs to review documents and information provided by government officials. Better quality vetting produces more informed voice • Vote: Citizens vote on policy proposals that emerge from civil society or from the government. A “binding” vote would be the strongest form of vote; it entails a public vote being translated into direct action. A “consultative” vote might be on general policy lines. • Veto: Citizens and citizens have the authority to reject policy proposals, year-end reports, and audits.

6. Open Budget Survey, Participation Indicators

7. South Korea, Brazil, Philippines • South Korea: Institutional Restructuring and Expert-based participation • Brazil: Mass-based participation and multi-channel state-building • South Korea: Rebuilding the state with mixed forms Participation and Oversight

8. Open Budget Survey, 2012Participation

9. Key Similarities

10. Key Differences

11. South Korea: Institutional Restructuring and Expert-based participation Three Plus One Fiscal Reform (2004)

12. South Korea: Distinguishing Features • Digital Brain: Leveraging IT to provide timely and easy to manage information • Extensive formal opportunities for expert-based participation • Participation largely involves policy experts and NGOs appointed by government officials • Local governments, encouraged by President Roh(2003-2008), promote “ordinary citizen” participation. Participatory Budgeting is used by local governments

13. Korea: Key Outcome

14. Brazil: Mass-based participation and multi-channel state-building • Participatory Budgeting (Subnational, mainly municipal) • 100+ cities adopt; billions of US dollars spent on PB projects • Public Policy Management Councils (Federal in structure) • 65,000 with 300,000 elected citizens-volunteers • Policy Conferences (Federal in structure) • 83 since 2003; 6-7 million participants • Multi-year Planning process (Federal, state, municipal) • 19 national councils + 350 civil society

15. Brazil: Distinguishing features • Multi-channel approach; wide diversity of issues • Mirrors Brazil’s Federal structure • Mass-based participation; elections used to select civil society representatives • Limited formal access to federal budgetary processes

16. Brazil: Outcomes • Participatory Budgeting • Increase in spending on health care, sanitation; decrease in infant mortality; Effects grow stronger over time (Touchton and Wampler, forthcoming) • Public Policy Management councils • National-level councilors shape Federal policies, both at proposal and implementation stages (IPEA 2012) • Policy conferences • Holding conferences increases Presidential Decrees is policy arena (Pogrebinschi) • Multiyear Planning Process • Projects proposed by CSOs are included 4-year Planning document (Teixeira)

17. Philippines: Rebuilding the state with mixed forms Participation and Oversight • Cabinet Cluster on Good Governance and Anti-corruption • Seal of Good Housekeeping (Race to the Top for municipalities) • Budget Partnership Agreements (Agency-CSO agreement) • Bottom-up Budgeting Approach (Poverty reduction • Citizens’ Participatory Audits CSOs

18. Philippines:Distinguishing Features • Mix of citizens and policy expert participation • Reform at both local and country-level • Effort to empower citizens and CSOs • Participatory Auditing is important; Extensive effort to limit corruption

19. Philippines: Outcomes • Recent reform efforts: Too new to evaluate Earlier reforms • Community-Driven Development (World Bank) • Increased participation • Empowerment-oriented • Monitoring programs led by CSOs • Reducing corruption • Local level (Naga city) • Increases in Participation

20. Voice, Vet, Vote and Veto

21. 4 Key lessons • Political Will: Election of political reformers to presidency is crucial because it creates necessary political will to implement reform; In all three countries, the president’s political coalition established the contours of reform. • Civil Society: Renewal (increased density + new actors and issues) of civil society increases attention on basic governance issues; Engaged CSOs provides necessary partners for government reformers • State Capacity: The degree of state capacity strongly affects the type of reform undertaken and the pace of reform. We should expect more limited measurable effects when state capacity is weak. • Direction of change: The shape of institutional rebuilding is strongly affected by the political and geographic source of reform. Top-down/Center-periphery reforms are distinct from bottom-up/perhiphary-center reforms.

22. Key Lessons: Demand-side • Elite-based model • Improves quality of debate; produces more equal negotiating partners; Allows government and civil society to check power of entrenched business groups and bureaucrats • Key problem: Selection of policy experts; Independence of policy experts • Mass-based model • Expands public debate and range of issues discussed; Promotes empowerment but CSOs remain at information and knowledge deficit • Key problem: General debate rather than specific details • Mixed model • Empowers citizens and CSOs; allows for a variety of venues to participate; promotes a wide-range of actors • Key problem: What is the basis for different types of representation?

23. Key Lessons: Supply-Side • Governments and CSOs need to first identify the “so-what” problem that participation and transparency-oriented reforms would solve. • Country-level government can incentivize improvements in governance by rewarding local governments and agencies that introduce new programs and policies • Establishing formal institutions is first step; ensuring CSOs and citizens can make meaningful use voice, vet, vote and veto is step two. • Participation can included at multiple stages depending on the problem that government

24. Other Participation Reforms • Community-Driven Development (World Bank): • “An approach to local development that gives control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups (including local governments).” CCD core course • International Labor Organization Convention 169 (UN agency • Establishes Prior, informed consent for Tribal and Indigenous Populations over local development issues • 22 countries have ratified • Audits: Participatory and Social • Participatory Budgeting: Thousands of cities and districts across world • Citizens directly engage each other and government officials in the allocation of a small percentage of the government’s local budget.

25. Community-Driven Development • Indonesia (KDP)-:Villagers submit proposals to community coalitions of nominated village facilitators. Participants vote for specific projects. All transactions public with citizen engagement from planning to implementation. • Benin: Projects selected by elected management committees and tied to ministries to direct in policy and information-sharing. • Azerbaijan: Sub-projects proposed by local CSOs, community selects for implementation. Regional coordination is half CSO and half government for information, expertise, monitoring

26. Scaling-Up: Expanding CDD inIndonesia • Original Kecamatan Development Program expanded in 2007 National Program for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas • Nation-wide coverage with over 5,000 kecamatans and over 34 million beneficiaries • Since the first KDP has “financed over 109,000km of small roads, 17,000 bridges, 40,000 clean water systems • Increased upward mobility in PNPM areas (2.1%), real per capita consumption gains in PNPM areas (9.1%),

27. Participatory Budgeting Peru • Project Context • 2003 national Participatory Budgeting Law requires all municipal-level districts (1821) to use participatory budgeting processes • Methodology • National government spearheading PB well-positioned to innovate at local level • All districts form local coordination councils to implement participatory budgeting programs; All Districts form Oversight committees, which is geared toward enhancing social accountability over the implementation phrase • Results • A few key districts (municipalities) have produced robust results. Most districts have produced limited results due to limited civil society participation; Most participation involves CSO representatives rather than individual citizens Source: A New Social Contract for Peru: An Agenda for Improving Education, Health Care, and the Social Safety Net

28. India’s 100-Day Work Plan • 100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for minimum wage. • Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly paid for their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public works. Project methodologySocial Audits: Local governments are required to post worksite boards that list the activities being undertaken and the daily wage rate; List of employees is included

29. India’s 100-day Work Campaign • Project Context • 100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for minimum wage. • Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly paid for their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public works. • Methodology • Social Audits: CSOs trained to monitor implementation, Local governments are required to post worksite boards that list the activities being undertaken, the daily wage rate, and list of contracted employees • Results • Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption • Limited CSO capacity

30. Participatory Budgeting Uganda • Project Context • Decentralization initiated in 1995 • DFGG Intervention and Methodology • National government initiates three levels of citizen engagement • Municipal officials meet with national government; • Municipal governments meet with citizens; • Municipal governments meet again with national government • Projects must meet national development guidelines • Results • Initial results are reported as minimal, but mot important change is opening budget to public scrutiny. Source: Africa Good Governance Programme on the Radio Waves

31. Right to Information Campaign Rajasthan, India • Project Context • Local governments have control over resources to implement small and medium-sized public works projects; perceptions of corruption • Methodology • CSO MazdoorKisan Shakti Sangathan organized demonstrations to pressure local government officials to release information on public works programs due to wide-spread perceptions of corruption • CSO obtained copies of publicly available contacts, bill, receipts pertaining to project, which they then compared to actual practices • Public meetings are held to show to the community the extent to which the implementation matches formal contracts • Results • Scaling-up as program moved from local to state level; • Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption Source: Community Oversight of Construction

32. Final lessons • Key opportunities • Link type of participatory venue to so-what problem • Elite involvement • Empowerment • Expanding participation • asd