Emergency Capacity Building Project

1. Emergency Capacity Building Project Safety, Security & Civil / Military Relations

2. Civil Military Relations

3. Guidelines • SCHR – Position paper on Humanitarian –Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance • IASC – Civil Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies • Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies • Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys • Guidance for Interaction between UN Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq

4. SCHR Guidelines • SCHR – WCC, CARE, Caritas, IFRC, ICRC, LWF, Oxfam Intl, SCA • Relations with armed forces in situations in armed conflict • Background – recognition that political and military actors are increasingly getting involved in provision of relief beyond obligations under IHL

5. Humanitarian Principles • Independence – We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy • Impartiality – Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. • Neutrality – Aid will not be used to further a political or religious standpoint.

6. SCHR Position (2001) • It is never appropriate for the military to directly implement humanitarian activities in general circumstances • Only in exceptional circumstances, and very rarely is it appropriate for the military to directly implement humanitarian activities, for which there must be specific criteria

7. SCHR Position (2001) Cont. • Humanitarian agencies will only use military armed protection as a last resort in extreme circumstances • Only certain types of information can and should be shared between humanitarian agencies and the military

8. Times Are Changing! • Increasing military involvement in humanitarian assistance to win “hearts and minds” • Nation building by occupying forces, PRTs • Increasing use of Integrated Missions • “Blurring of lines” • between governments and military wings • between NGOs and military forces • Increasing role of private contractors • Need for military logs capacity for large-scale humanitarian response

9. Military Perspective • Increasingly sophisticated doctrine re. how to relate to civilians • Driven by the military mission • Support of civilian population is seen as critical to achieving military goals – “Force Multiplier”

10. Key Implication • Lack of Distinction between civilian agencies (NGOs, national and intl) and the military • How do we continue to abide by our Humanitarian Principles?

11. Types of Armed Groups • UN mandated forces - Chapter VI • UN mandated forces - Chapter VII • Occupying powers • National forces • Non-state armed groups or forces

12. United Nations Mandated Force - Chapter VI • Meant to keep the peace but are allowed to use force in self-defense • Not so common now • Provision of humanitarian assistance should only be a “last resort” and overall control should be of a civilian nature • Ex. Cyprus

13. UN Mandated Force-Chapter VII • Common and difficult scenario • UN forces are allowed to actively engage in combat • Increasing use of Integrated Missions • Many NGOs work closely with UN • If agencies are too closely associated with a party to the conflict, could hinder effectiveness • Provision of humanitarian assistance should only be a “last resort” and overall control should be of a civilian nature • Ex. UNMIL Liberia

14. Occupying Power • 4th Geneva Conventions apply. OP has legal obligations with regard to welfare of the population – free passage of medical items, food, etc. • This does not mean military should fulfill all roles • SCHR agencies should not use assets of OP • Need to distinguish themselves from the OP • Ex. Coalition forces in Iraq

15. National Forces • 4th Geneva Convention obligations – free passage of medical items, food • Moral and legal obligations to care for own people • Should facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies • SCHR agencies should work hard to distinguish themselves from National Governments and their allies • SCHR agencies should not use their assets, esp. armed escorts • Ex. Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000

16. Non-State Armed Groups • Geneva Conventions do not apply as they may not be a recognized force (Common Article 3 which prohibits torture and inhumane treatment has some authority) • Minimal protection obligations placed on such actors • They are often the worst abusers of IHL • Often engage in assistance for areas under their control or key constituencies • SCHR agencies should not use their assets

17. Practical Guidelines • Keep distance where possible • Take steps to be visually different • Cooperate but do not be coordinated • Don’t use military assets unless there is no other alternative • Only use armed escorts in exceptional circumstances – must have senior mgmt approval • Be careful when sharing info – don’t act as proxy intelligence gatherers

18. Practical Guidelines Cont. • Be pragmatic – keep in mind the humanitarian imperative • Use advocacy to hold authorities accountable for providing humanitarian assistance • Try and ensure that military personnel visiting SC compounds leave weapons outside • No weapons in vehicles – vehicles and offices to display “no weapons” signs clearly