New Nuclear States and the International Order

1. New Nuclear States and the International Order

2. Structure of the Presentation • Differences between New and Old Nuclear Powers • Realities versus Stereotypes: behavior of the New Nuclear States • The Choices of the New Nuclear States • The NPT Bargain • The Absolute Weapons and Order • The International Nuclear Order • Conclusion • Critical Analysis

3. Introduction • Basically the Chapter explains the attitudes and policies of the new nuclear states—Israel, India, and Pakistan. • The Write basic argument is that the characteristics of the international nuclear order are complex and different from what is depicted in the Nonproliferation Regime (NPR). • Kapur argues that NPR the silent difference between the regime and the foundations of the international nuclear order has resulted into a failure of nonproliferation policies to reflect practical wisdom rather than narrow national interests. • Kapur criticizes Western and Especially American nonproliferation policies.

4. Difference between New and Old Nuclear Power There are four differences in the International position and the pattern of nuclear behavior of the new and old nuclear powers. • The international status of the old nuclear states is recognized by the NPT. The Treaty accords special rights, it protects their security and prestige by maintaining their latitudes to act within the nuclear sphere, and it restricts their treaty obligation to a rhetorical declaration about eventual nuclear disarmament.

5. Difference between New and Old Nuclear Power • Second, the old nuclear states are overt nuclear powers. They flaunt their nuclear weapons and justify their value for national defense; and their public opinion supports the military uses of nuclear weapons. • Third, the old nuclear states seek to arrest the emergence of new nuclear states • Finally, the NPT and other nonproliferation measures provide a legal and a political platform to mount pressure against the new states.

6. Realities versus Stereotypes: Behavior of the New Nuclear States • The New nuclear States are portrayed as illegitimate nuclear players even though the modern international system is anarchical, as the realist school of IR argues, and the principle of Self-defence is recognized by UN Charter. • Kapur argues the NPT does have an exit or withdrawal clause, but this withdrawal right seems to be like the old Catholic Marriage. • He argues that NPT lacks mutuality of obligations between the old and new nuclear states and between the nuclear and non-nuclear states.

7. Realities versus Stereotypes: Behavior of the New Nuclear States • The new nuclear states have systematically, secretly, and incrementally acquired nuclear weapons and missile capability, but they have done so without a formal declaratory policy that would require weaponized deterrence. • Undeclared nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities reflect practical domestic and international politics and the national diplomatic and military aims of nuclear states. • He stressed that the new nuclear states do not seek international arrangements to curb horizontal proliferation.

8. Realities versus Stereotypes: Behavior of the New Nuclear States • Finally, he opines that the new nuclear states have developed strategies to escape and contain the pressures of the old states.

9. The Absolute Weapon and Order • The Term order indicates a predictable framework of interstate behavior that results in manageable instability; it does not imply equilibrium or status quo. • Kapur argues that the classic British international relations scholarship does not favor the use of the term order. • Order is a precise idea according to the dictionary, that it is continuous story of manageable instability.

10. The Absolute Weapon and Order • He argues that Indian thought that this international nuclear order is discriminatory. And the Chinese have also taken the view that the present international order is unjust.

11. The Absolute Weapon and Order • The Security Dilemma has been an enduring feature of the modern state system. • Bernard Brodie argued that nuclear proliferation is inevitable because state tries to balance their interest and power. He believed that loss of monopoly must be the basis of international control of atomic energy.

12. The Absolute Weapon and Order • He believe that the value of the deterrence concept to guard against blackmail, the value rests in a reciprocal ability to retaliate in kind if the bomb is used rathat than a reliance on treaty limitation. • Likewise, Arnold Wolfers expected proliferation to occur and predicted the edn of the US atomic monopoly.

13. The International Nuclear Order (INO) • The INO reflects the realities of power struggles in modern international relations. • It responds to changing domestic-political, external-strategic, and nuclear circumstances in international and regional conflicts. • It is realistic because it recognizes the defects of the NPT/IAEA system.

14. The International Nuclear Order (INO) • INO includes NPT/IAEA arrangements, but it has qualities that make it a system with definable units of behavior, patterns of frequent interactions, stabilizing capacity, and an awareness of changes in domestic, regional, and international contexts of proliferation and nonproliferation work.

15. The International Nuclear Order (INO) The INO originated in embryonic form before the superpowers agreed to the provisions of the NPT and before the IAEA received a nonproliferation mandate. • First, The US is determined to maintain its nuclear edge and it officially rejected nuclear disarmament as a basis of its national security. • Second, US nonproliferation policy recognizes the value of the principles of compromise and compensation as ways to accommodate national interests of other great powers.

16. The International Nuclear Order (INO) • Third, Israel, India, and Pakistan took the nuclear path in their quest for security, national development, and autonomy. • Third Important point is the NPT became a symbol of superpower cooperation on a vital issue, from bipolar cooperation to multipolar cooperation to maintain hegemony in the world • The fourth characteristic concerned the tension between nuclear disarmament as a basis of international security and importance of nuclear weaponry as the foundation of international order.

17. The International Nuclear Order (INO) • The fifth Characteristic of the INO shows the contradiction between the nonproliferation norm and the strategic interests of the major powers. • Final characteristic of the INO shows three features in the nuclear behavior of the new nuclear states: • There is an interaction between proliferation and nonproliferation activity in the external conduct and internal debates of the new nuclear states.

18. The International Nuclear Order (INO) • There is policy development in both the proliferation and nonproliferation spheres of these states. • Finally, these states are developing their nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policies in the context of a wider agenda, namely, to become regional centers of power and to acquire an autonomous positions in the international system.

19. Conclusion • He concluded that the view of NPR, however, raises a number of counterpoints. • First Regime building and regime theorizing about NPR fail to examine the hidden agenda of the regime and nonregime players. • Second, has multipolarity restricted the freedom of choice of the most powerful members of the NPT regime? • Third, it is easily argued that the new nuclear states acquired nuclear weapons because of their security dilemmas with regional rivals, because of their insecurity vis-a-via unreliable and/or menacing great powers.

20. Conclusion • Fourth, Controversies about the meaning of proliferation have placed a heavy burden on the regime builders.

21. Critical Analysis • India hardly has a problem with a nuclear Pakistan.” • “Pakistani Generals are inclined towards Low Intensity Proxy Warfare in Kashmir.” • “Indian fears that the instability in Pakistan that could lead to its balkanization and bring outside forces to fill the void.” • Chinese Nuclear and Missile aid to Pakistan, and the pattern of Chinese Activities in the Himalayan region and in Burma. Consideration of military security and diplomatic prestige has led to a loss of Indian interest in nonproliferation and India’s 1996 rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treat (CTBT).”

22. Critical Analysis • “Pakistan’s attitude towards international nonproliferation arrangement is wavered.” • “Pakistan is not a convinced nonproliferator.” • “Pakistan has pursued its aims by mobilizing US pressure for Indian Nuclear Disarmament, by military and subversive action to balkanize India to cut its down to size, and by a conventional and nuclear arms buildup.” • “Pakistan has enjoyed alliance relations with Two nuclear Power (US and China). • “Pakistan also has developed a clever diplomatic stance to help it escape great power pressures to join NPT. • “A strategy of selected proliferation or selective nonproliferation is pursued.