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MISSION ANALYSIS TF 1-11 1 BCT 23D ARMORED DIVISION

MISSION ANALYSIS TF 1-11 1 BCT 23D ARMORED DIVISION. Mission: 23d Armored Division defends in sector no later than 180400 February XXXX from ET965140 to ES972585 to prevent any crossing of the Ohio River in order to protect the northern flank of the 25th Armored Division Intent:

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MISSION ANALYSIS TF 1-11 1 BCT 23D ARMORED DIVISION

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  1. MISSION ANALYSIS TF 1-11 1 BCT 23D ARMORED DIVISION

  2. Mission: 23d Armored Division defends in sector no later than 180400 February XXXX from ET965140 to ES972585 to prevent any crossing of the Ohio River in order to protect the northern flank of the 25th Armored Division Intent: Purpose:The purpose of this defense is to set the conditions for the 52d Infantry Division (mechanized) attack Key tasks: To prevent any crossing of the Ohio River IOT protect the northern flank of the 25 AR Div. End State:The endstate of this defense has the 2d OSC defeated north of the Ohio River, the 3d OSC blocked north of WEST POINT, the 10th DTG (IFV) defeated east of Highway 333, and the 23d Armored Division prepared to attack north of the Ohio River. 23d Armored Division

  3. Mission: 1st Brigade, 23rd AD defends in sector NLT 180400 Feb XX to retain key terrain vicinity BEE KNOB HILL in order to protect the southern flank of 2nd Brigade, the division main effort. Intent: Key tasks:Key tasks for this operation include destroying enemy reconnaissance and forward detachment forward of PL CHICAGO, forcing the enemy to commit his second echelon brigade east of BEE KNOB HILL, and retaining BEE KNOB HILL. Endstate: The endstate for this operation has three task forces defending abreast between PL INDY and PL BOSTON, with one task force in reserve; enemy forces have been defeated east of BEE KNOB HILL; and the brigade retains control of BEE KNOB HILL 1st BDE

  4. Concept of the operation: The decisive point of this operation is the crossing site at Brandenburg. Close- the division defends with two brigades defending in sector arrayed abreast along the Ohio River and two brigades defending in sector arrayed abreast along Highway 31W. 133d (KY) Brigade (supporting effort) defends in sector to turn attacking forces north in order to protect the northern flank of the 25th Armored Division. 1st Brigade (supporting effort) defends in sector retain key terrain vicinity BEE KNOB HILL in order to protect the southern flank of 2d Brigade. 3d Brigade, 21st Infantry Division (light) (supporting effort) defends in sector block enemy forces in order to protect the eastern flank of 2d Brigade and the northern flank of 1st Brigade. 2d Brigade (main effort) defends in sector to prevent any crossing of the Ohio River in order to protect the northern flank of the 25th Armored Division. 1-22 CAV screens the along the OHIO RIVER in order to provide early warning to 2d and 3d Brigades. The 4th Brigade reverts to division reserve upon completion of its attack into EA GOLD. Deep - The division uses the 4th Brigade to delay the movement of the remnants of the 24th Tank Division south to the Ohio River by 24 hours. Subsequently, 4th Brigade destroys one battalion of the 2nd echelon brigade of the 10th DTG in EA GOLD. Divisional MLRS assets fire counter-battery to limit the DAGs of the 10th DTG and the 20th DTG. Rear - 133 (KY) Brigade provides one company/team to defeat level III threats in the division rear area. 23d Armored Division

  5. Concept of the operation: Close: The brigade initially defends with two task forces abreast. TF 1-91 and TF 1-11 (supporting efforts) defend in sector between PL DETROIT and PL CHICAGO to destroy enemy reconnaissance and forward detachment in order to prevent the enemy from identifying the brigade’s main effort. Upon destruction of the forward detachment, or upon commitment of the two first echelon brigades, TF 1-91 and TF 1-11 withdraw west of PL CHICAGO and defend in sector between PL CHICAGO and PL INDY to attrit the first echelon brigades of the 10th MID to cause the commitment of the 2nd echelon brigade east of PL INDY. Subsequently, TF 1-11 withdraws through TF 1-10 and 2-74 IN and becomes the brigade reserve. TF 1-91 withdraws west of PL INDY and defends in sector between PL INDY and PL BOSTON to destroy enemy forces in order to protect the northern flank of TF 1-10 (brigade main effort). TF 1-10 (main effort) defends in sector between PL INDY and PL BOSTON to retain BEE KNOB HILL in order to protect the southern flank of 2nd Brigade (division main effort). 2-74 IN defends in sector between PL INDY and PL BOSTON to block enemy forces in order to protect the southern flank of TF 1-10 (brigade main effort). The brigade reserve, TF 1-11, is prepared to reinforce TF 1-10 or TF 1-91 with one company, or to counter-attack by fire to block an enemy penetration west of Bee Knob Hill. Deep: The brigade uses CAS to disrupt the second echelon brigade of the 10th MID in order to allow TF 1-91 and TF 1-11 to withdraw west of PL INDY. Rear: The brigade accepts risk by not maintaining a TCF. 1st BDE

  6. Commander’s Intent: Defend and destroy the lead BTG. Purpose: To destroy enemy forces and set the conditions for a Division counterattack. Key Tasks: Identification and destruction of any enemy recon elements that cross PL DETROIT; Destruction of lead enemy MIBNs. Endstate:Two MIBNs destroyed East of PL CHICAGO; follow on BTG(APC) destroyed East of PL INDY. Commander Initial Planning Guidance

  7. Analysis of the Area of Operations Terrain: Terrain favors the attacker. The AO is generally lightly forested providing good concealment with some areas of dense vegetation impassable to mounted forces. There are no major bodies of water in the area of operations, however, some small streams could swell and be rendered impassable with heavy rain. Soil composition is clay that provides adequate traction for vehicles. Numerous intervisibility lines allow an attacker to within 2,000 to 3,000 meters before he can be observed. Several small towns lie within the task force area, and serve to tie in the network of improved roads in this area. Initial IPB

  8. Analysis of the Area of Operations Obstacles: The broken wooded areas in the eastern portion of the sector restrict mechanized movement from the east to west in our zone. Town of RINEYVLLE also restricts mechanized movement. The high ground along the southern and western boundary of the TF sector, BEE KNOB HILL, and SAND RIDGE HILL are severely restrictive obstacles to mechanized movement within our sector. Initial IPB

  9. Analysis of the Area of Operations Avenues of Approach: Several of the high-speed avenues of approach battalion size and higher run along the improved roads. Dismounted avenues of approach can be found in the large forested area in the southern section of the task-force boundary. There are two air avenues of approach: one running southeast to northwest from ES0173 to ES7304 through TF sector and one running east to west from ES9193 to ES7384 toward the BDE reserve ATK POS. Initial IPB

  10. Analysis of the Area of Operations Key Terrain: RINEYVILLE (ES9078) controls high-speed avenues of approach in east of sector. Hill complex at Ridge Spring Church provides 2-3 km observation east into the TF sector. ES7786 and ES7784: Hilltops with 3-4km observation. Controls movement along task-force sized mobility corridor running east-west. Could be used to conceal forces moving into EA TIN. Initial IPB

  11. Analysis of the Area of Operations Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation and fields of fire within the sector are generally limited to 2000 to 2500 meters. This varies widely, however, with the greatest visibility being from the key terrain. Observation posts on these pieces of key terrain such as the the high ground vicinity ES7784 have visibility out to 3-4 km in some areas. The eastern part of our sector is the most limited with visibility around 1500 to 2000 meters. In the western part of the sector near ATK POS OAK, commanders can expect to observe the enemy and begin engaging at about 3000 meters. Initial IPB

  12. Analysis of the Area of Operations Cover and Concealment: The large forested area in the southern boundary of the sector provides excellent dismounted avenues of approach. Additionally, the low rolling hills and intermittently forested terrain in the eastern portion of the TF sector provides cover and concealment to mounted formations. The local high ground along the line of Highway 31W provides cover and concealment from east to west in the eastern portion of the sector. Initial IPB

  13. Initial IPB Effects of Weather: The weather during this operation favors the defender. Weather will be clear and cold (20-35 F) with a slow wind west to east. The recent precipitation prevents obscuration in engagement areas. The winds out of the west blow enemy smoke and chemical strikes back toward enemy positions. Clear skies allow friendly forces to detect enemy forces advancing from about 3-4 kilometers from heights on key terrain. • Analysis of the Area of Operations

  14. Analysis of the Area of Operations Wind: Favors defender. Prevailing winds are from west to east at five to eight (5-8) knots. This will prevent the enemy from using smoke to obscure movement and degrade the effectiveness of his chemical weapons. Precipitation: Favors defender. Chance of precipitation through 23 February XX is zero percent (0%). A high-pressure system moving in from the west continues to dominate the weather for the next several days. Cloud cover: Favors defender. The lack of cloud cover will maximize observations throughout the defensive sector. Humidity and temperature: Favors attacker. Temperatures vary from twenty degrees at night to thirty-five degrees during the daylight hours. Sub-freezing temperatures will make it harder to dig friendly positions. Initial IPB

  15. Initial IPB • Analysis of the Area of Operations • Visibility:

  16. Overview of the Situation Over the next 36-60 hours the 10th DTG (IFV) atks W-NW along the line VINE GROVE – BEE KNOB HILL – BRANDENBURG to turn US forces currently defending along the OHIO river. 10th DTG (IFV) is a supporting effort and its immediate OBJ is seizure of BEE KNOB HILL (ET7905); its subsequent OBJ is to secure BRANDENBURG, allowing the 2nd OSC to cross the OHIO river at BRANDENBURG and continue its attack south. 10th DTG is expected to attack 1st BDE with one BTG (APC) in the North sector initially to seize VINE GROVE, then two BTGs (IFV) abreast followed by a TB subsequently to seize BEE KNOB HILL. In our sector, the 101st BTG (IFV) attacks in sector to seize southern half of BEE KNOB HILL, allowing 104th BTG (TK) to continue the attack to BRANDENBURG. Initial IPB

  17. Initial IPB • Enemy composition 101st BTG (IFV) is estimated at 80% strength, and is composed of three MIBNs (IFV) and one TBN (T80U). In addition, the BTG has both organic and division support assets in FS, Eng, AT, ADA, Recon, EW, CSS.

  18. Enemy composition Initial IPB MIC Composition: 3 PLTs, 10 BMP total 1 PLT 3x T-80U (Assumes tanks attached to MICs) HVTs include: Breach (ENG) assets, C2 vehicles Mobility assets: 1x MICLIC equiv.; 1x ACE equiv, 1x dozer equiv; 1x mine detector; assault force also has 3x plow; 1x roller; 1x extra ACE equiv.

  19. High Value: Reconnaissance: As the enemy pushes West, he will rely on reconnaissance assets to identify weak points in our defense and attempt to exploit them. Artillery: Threat commander will rely on artillery to disrupt and degrade our fighting ability. High Payoff: 1. Command and control: Because the enemy is attacking, his movements require coordination and supervision. Eliminating C2 targets will disrupt his attack and ensure the success of our defensive COA. Targets

  20. Enemy capabilities Enemy can begin recon as early as 162200 Feb, and has extensive recon assets. Enemy has CAS support and chemical weapons (persistent and non-persistent). Enemy can disrupt commo and direct fires on C2 nodes using EW. Enemy has extensive FS assets. Enemy can quickly breach complex obstacles including wire and mine composition. Initial IPB

  21. Enemy most probable course of action Objectives: The 101st BTG attacks in zone to seize the southern half of BEE KNOB HILL, staying abreast of the 100th BTG to our north. Initial IPB

  22. Enemy most probable course of action Pattern of the Attack: The BTG attacks with two reinforced MIBNs in the first echelon, and one in the second. The second echelon MIBN follows in the north of the sector, while the AT battery protects its southern flank. They will attack on a line RINEYVILLE – SAND RIDGE – BEE KNOB HILL – BRANDENBURG. The BTG commits the second echelon MIBN when the first echelon MIBNs have been reduced to 50% strength. Initial IPB

  23. Enemy Most Probable Course of Action Indirect:DAG P1 against observers/radars; P2 against maneuver forces; DAG & BAG P3 on BEE KNOB; P4 against forces west of BEE KNOB Direct: MIBN CRP’s engage friendly forces after LD at PL DETROIT with 30MM and MG to fix friendly forces 5 to 10KM ahead of first echelon MIC’s. MIC’s engage with 30MM, 125MM, ATGM to fix and destroy friendly forces after LD at PL DETROIT. 1MIBN SBF at ES9875 for 2MIBN atk on RINEYVILLE with 3MIBN follow and assume. 1&3MIBN atk to clear zone, 2MIBN follow and support; 1&3MIBN SBF at SAND RIDGE 2MIBN assault BEE KNOB; BTG SBF from BEE KNOB 104th BTG atack. Observation: BTG and elems of DTG recon LD at PL DETROIT and move through TF sector to report friendly positions toward the objective of observing BEE KNOB HILL; MIBN recon PLTS maneuver 5-10 km forward of formations. Obstacles:1st echelon MIBN’s use artillery delivered FASCAM to fix friendly forces in defensive positions. Chemical: 10th DTG emplys persistent chem at ES 8675 on TF south boundary to protect S. flank Air: 1-2 sorties of SU 24-25 against C2 in our sector; AN-12 CUB transport can spray chem; HINDs to support strike sector (assumption). Reserves: 101st BTG uses 1 Tk Co as BTG reserve to exploit success EW: Jamming on FS and CAS nets; 10th DTG uses DF and intercept to ID and target C2 nodes in P2 fires. Initial IPB

  24. Enemy Most Dangerous Course of Action .Pattern of the attack. Enemy determines southern AA is more easily maneuvered and attempts to bypass RINEYVILLE to south and seize it from flank. Essentially mirror image of MP COA. 1MIBN SBF to fix defending companies in north, 2MIBN attacks to penetrate southern companies, supported by 3MIBN. 2MIBN seizes RINEYVILLE from southern flank to secure high-speed AA. Attack continues as in MPCOA to BEE KNOB HILL. Initial IPB

  25. Enemy Most Dangerous Course of Action Indirect:Same. Direct: MIBN CRP’s engage friendly forces after LD at PL DETROIT with 30MM and MG to fix friendly forces 5 to 10KM ahead of first echelon MIC’s. MIC’s engage with 30MM, 125MM, ATGM to fix and destroy friendly forces after LD at PL DETROIT. 1MIBN SBF at ES9880 for 2MIBN atk on South AA with 3MIBN follow and assume. 1&3MIBN atk to clear zone, 2MIBN follow and support; 1&3MIBN SBF at SAND RIDGE 2MIBN assault BEE KNOB; BTG SBF from BEE KNOB 104th BTG atack. Observation: Same Obstacles: Same Chemical: Same Air: Same Reserves: Same EW: Same Initial IPB

  26. Specified Secure PL DETROIT Defend in sector between PL DETROIT to PL CHICAGO Defend in sector between PL CHICAGO to PL INDY Attrit 1st echelon BTG east of PL CHICAGO Assume the role of BDE reserve OPCON one mech company to TF 1-10 during ATTK OAK BPT reinforce TF 1-10 or TF 1-91 with 1 company BPT destroy enemy forces in EA COPPER (AXIS SWORD to ABF A) or EA TIN (AXIS GUN to ABF B) NAI’s -         1C -         1D TAI’s -         3B -         3C Tasks

  27. Implied: Coordinate with TF 1-10 - Obstacles and minefield -  Passage of lines -  TRP Plan Indirect Fire Plan -  TRP -  Coordinate with units on left and right Individual Replacement Plan POW Plan Engineer Plan Obstacle digging priorities Assign priority of survivability and counter mobility Assign priority of ADA Assign priority of class III and V Modify evac plan based on available assets (reduced air assets) Confirm bore sight and zero of weapons systems Pre-Combat Inspections Develop R and S plan Tasks

  28. T: Destroy 1st echelon BTG P: Causing the commitment of the 2nd echelon BDE east of PL Indy Essential Task

  29. Constraints and Limitations Loss of combat force with BPT with OPCON one company to 1-10 BPT reinforce TF 1-10 or TF 1-91 with 1 company Terrain restricts visibility from 1500 to 2500 meters BDE retains authority for short duration FASCAM Provide proposed girds for FASCAM to ABE NLT 171600FEBXX for approval Long duration FASCAM is not authorized No priority targets in phase 3 Limited low density personnel replacements available One armor, infantry, engineer and artillery package platoons per day Brigade assigns replacements with stated priorities Class III (6) 5000 G JP8 Fuel Tankers Class VII M1A1s are critically short (Min 72 hour replacement) Class IX Shortages exist with M1A1 engines, M2 transmissions and M113 road wheels. Point distribution in the BSA Class VIII: Limited air evuac, litter urgent priority Water: Local sources considered contaminated Priority of effort in the main battle area is to counter-mobility, then to survivability. Priority of Support.   Countermobility: TF 1-11 is 4th after TF 1-91. Survivability: TF 1-11 is 3rd after TF 1-91.

  30. Facts • Terrain: • BEE KNOB HILL controls north-south movements between VINE GROVE and BRANDENBURG and allows north-east observation for 4-5 kilos. • SAND HILL RIDGE blocks east-west movement by mech forces. It allows observation east to about four (4) kilometers • Observation and fields of fire within the brigade sector are generally limited to 2000 to 2500 meters. • Weather: • Enemy: • 2x AN-12 CUB medium Transport aircraft can deliver aerosol-sprayed chemical agents into sector.

  31. Assumptions • Terrain: • Favored enemy avenue of approach is SAND RIDGE HILL to BEE KNOB HILL • The eastern part of the brigade’s sector is the most limited with visibility around 1500 to 2000 meters. • In the western part of the sector, commanders can expect to observe the enemy and begin engaging at about 3000 meters. • Bee Knob Hill and SAND RIDGE HILL (ES8185) provide excellent cover and concealment.

  32. Assumptions • Weather: • Weather forecast is correct

  33. Assumptions • Enemy: • The 10th DTG is 80% strength • The 10th DTG is composed of three Brigade Tactical Groups (BTG), 100th BTG (BMP2), 101st BTG (BMP2), 102nd BTG (BTR 80), and 1 Tank Brigade (TB), 104th TB (T80U). The 100th BTG has formed a Brigade Tactical Groups (BTG). • The 100th BTG is in its assembly areas vicinity of HAYS FLATS and prepares to continue the attack west within 36-60 hours. • The Brigade Artillery (BAGs) of the 101st and 102nd BTGs consist of 1 battalion of 2S1s. The BAG of the 100th BTG is reinforced with the artillery of the 104th BTG (Tank), giving the strike sector BTG 2 battalions of 2S1s. • Each Mobility Support Detachment (MSD) consists of one MTK (MCLIC equivalent), two IMRs (ACE equivalent), one BAT (dozer equivalent) and one DIM (mine detector). • The ASSAULT FORCE and the northern BTG task organizes three KMT-4s (mine plows) one KMT-5 (mine roller), one and IMR (ACE equivalent) with their assault force MICs. • Special Purpose Forces (SPF) teams provide terminal CAS guidance for enemy CAS attacks on C2 and LOG nodes.

  34. Assumptions • Enemy (cont): • The 10th DTG uses its radio intercept and direction finding equipment to identify and target C2 nodes for destruction. It employs jammers to disrupt communication on fire support and CAS nets • The enemy main effort will attempt to seize a second bridgehead in preparation for an attack toward NASHVILLE. • Within the next 36-60 hours, the 10th DTG (IFV) attacks west-northwest along the line VINEGROVE-BEE KNOB HILL-BRANDENBURG • The 10th DTG (IFV) is a supporting effort and its immediate objective is the seizure of BEE KNOB HILL (ET7905); its subsequent objective is to secure BRANDENBURG, allowing the 2d OSC to cross the Ohio River at BRANDENBURG • At A-hour (162200 Feb XX), the 10th DTG reconnaissance battalion LDs and conducts reconnaissance of the division’s initial and subsequent objectives. • Reconnaissance companies of the 100th and 101st BTGs LD at A+24 (172200 Feb XX) and conduct reconnaissance of the BTG objectives vicinity BEE KNOB HILL. • At A+33 (180700 Feb XX) the division will attack with two BTGs (IFV) abreast to seize the terrain vicinity BEE KNOB HILL. • At BEE KNOB HILL, the 104th BTG (Tank) and the AT battalion will pass through the 1st echelon BTGs and attack in zone to secure BRANDENBURG. • The DAG will fire phase I fires to destroy our observers and radars east of BEE KNOB HILL.

  35. Assumptions • Enemy (cont): • The DAG will fire phase II fires to suppress and destroy maneuver forces and C2 nodes between his LD and BEE KNOB HILL • DAG and brigade artillery groups (BAGs) mass phase III fires on the northern half of BEE KNOB HILL and any U.S. forces that can affect the planned passage lanes for the 104th BTG (Tank) at BEE KNOB HILL. • DAG and BAGs fire phase IV fires to destroy U.S forces west of BEE KNOB HILL or any counterattacking force that threatens the 104th BTG’s (Tank) passage at BEE KNOB HILL. • The 100th BTG (IFV) (strike sector BTG) passes through the 102nd BTG vicinity VINE GROVE and attacks in zone to seize the northern half of BEE KNOB HILL • The DTG commits the second echelon MIBN when the first echelon MIBNs have been reduced to 50% strength. • The 101st BTG attacks in zone to seize the southern half of BEE KNOB HILL, staying abreast of the 100th BTG. • The second echelon MIBN follows in the north of the sector, while the AT battery protects its southern flank. • The MIBN commits the second echelon MIBN when the first echelon MIBNs have been reduced to 50% strength.

  36. Assumptions • Enemy (cont): • The tank brigade passes through the 100th BTG and assumes the attack when the first echelon BTGs have seized BEE KNOB HILL or when the first echelon BTGs have been reduced to 50% strength. • If committed at BEE KNOB HILL, the 104th BTG (Tank) attacks to secure BRANDENBURG. • If committed prior to BEE KNOB HILL, the 104th BTG (Tank) attacks to seize BEE KNOB HILL • The BTG establishes two mobility support detachments (MSD) to support the ASSAULT FORCE and the southern BTG of the exploitation force • The 100th BTG Reconnaissance Company infiltrates the sector. Expect Special Purpose Forces (SPF) through the BDE Zone. • Division employs the remainder of its reconnaissance battalion (-) to conduct reconnaissance of the division's immediate objective, BEE KNOB HILL • The division employs its counter-battery radars to support the first echelon attack. • The SNAR-10 supports the 100th BTG and the ARK-1 supports the entire first echelon. The DTG employs air defense target acquisition and height determination radars behind the first echelon BTGs’ rear boundary to acquire threat air. • Hind attack helicopters will operate within 5-8 kilometers forward of the DTG main body, targeting U.S. maneuver forces. • The enemy employs non-persistent chemicals during phase III fires on the northern half of BEE KNOB HILL to disrupt the defending forces at the strike sector.

  37. Assumptions • Friendly Forces: • Complete UBL with FLE B available during fight

  38. Hazard Initial Probability Initial Effect Initial Risk Level Controls Residual Probability Residual Effect Residual Risk Level Direct Fire Frequent Critical Extremely High - Recon - Cover and Concealment - Effective counter-fires Likely Critical High Indirect Fire Frequent Critical Extremely High - Air Support - Effective counter-fires Likely Critical High Chemical Agents Frequent Catastrophic Extremely High - Early detection - MOPP Likely Critical High Tactical Risk Assessment

  39. Hazard Initial Probability Initial Effect Initial Risk Level Controls Residual Probability Residual Effect Residual Risk Level AT Mines / Obstacles Likely Critical High - Recon - Counter mine devices - Engineer Support Occasional Marginal Medium Air Attack Likely Critical High - ADA - Observation - Early Warning Occasional Marginal Medium Enemy Observation / Recon Frequent Critical High - Counter recon - CAS - Direct Fire - Indirect Fire Likely Critical High Tactical Risk Assessment Cont.

  40. Hazard Initial Probability Initial Effect Initial Risk Level Controls Residual Probability Residual Effect Residual Risk Level Fratricide - Direct Remote Critical Medium - SOP - Fire Control - IFF - Communication Remote Critical Low Fratricide - Indirect Remote Critical Medium - SOP - Communication Remote Critical Medium Fratricide - Air Remote Critical Medium - SOP - Visible / IR Marking - Communication Remote Critical Medium Tactical Risk Assessment Cont.

  41. Hazard Initial Probability Initial Effect Initial Risk Level Controls Residual Probability Residual Effect Residual Risk Level Vehicle Accidents Occasional Marginal Medium - SOP - Driver Training - Sleep plans - Leader Assessment Remote Negligible Low Accidental Discharge Occational Critical High - SOP - Safety Reinforcement (leader) Cold Weather Injury Remote Marginal Low - SOP - PCI’s - Leader Assessment Unlikely Negligible Low Personal Injury Mishaps Remote Marginal Low - SOP - Leader Assessment Unlikely Negligible Low Accidental Risk Assessment Remote Negligible Low

  42. E MI MI E E COLT COLT COLT TACP Assets Available TF 1-11 TASK ORG. B/1-91 IN (MECH) (M2A2) D/1-91 IN (MECH) (M2A2) C/1-93 IN (MECH) (M2A2) A/1-11 AR (M1A1) C/1-11 AR (M1A1) C/23 EN (DS) 2/2/A/1-440 ADA (BSFV) (DS) 2/1/B/23 MI (GSR) (DS) 3/1/B/23 MI (GSR) (DS) COLT 4, 5, 6 (OPCON) TAC-P MST 1/B/323 MSB • One Military Police Squad • 1 Platoon (1/23 Chem) (DECON). • MED EVAC-One Medical evac squad • TREATMENT-One treatment squad

  43. Capabilities: • COLT team 4,5,6 provides target ranging and/or designation for both standard and laser guided weapons • 1-50 FA provides fire support coordination and indirect fires • One priority target allocated to TF1-11 for phases 1 and 2 • One section ADA (BSFV) in direct support Fire Support Estimate

  44. Counter-MobilitySurvivability Estimate • Engineer. • Assets: •  C/23rd EN provides survivability and countermobility support to 1-11th • Overview • 6 Engineer Squads • 7 VRC-87’s ACE, • 4 Grizzly's Breaching Vehicles • 4 Wolverine Bridging Vehicles • 2 PRC 119F SEE’s • 2 VRC 87C Volcano • 4 Control Remote Landmine System • 2 M139 Mine Dispenser • 4 MICLIC • Class IV supplies: UBL is at 100%. • Task force S4s provide grid for Class IV distribution point to brigade S4 NLT 162200 Feb XX.

  45. BELT UNIT PRIORITY INTENT # MINES REMARKS A2 1-11 5 Disrupt 6000 These mine numbers do not include Volcano mines. Counter-MobilitySurvivability Estimate

  46. Personnel STRENGTH-currently at 100% MED EVAC-One Medical evac squad TREATMENT-One treatment squad Logistics 1st Brigade establishes two forward logistics elements (FLE A/B) TF-11 is not priority for support(Phase 1-2 TF 1-91), ( Phase 3 TF 1-10) Maintenance Platoon BDE FLE B Class IV Brigade UBL is 100% A Class V section with one armor task force Combined configured load (CCL). FLE A/B serve as Class V distribution points throughout operation One recovery section One Military Police Squad 1 Platoon (1/23 Chem) (DECON). Personnel/Logistics Estimate

  47. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) Identification of enemy recon elements and FD Destruction of recon and FD When 2nd echelon crosses PL Chicago (# & types of vehicles) Recommended Initial CCIR

  48. Friendly forces information requirements (FFIR) Loss of one company team or more than 14 combat vehicles Recommended Initial CCIR

  49. Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) Friendly unit strength and disposition Location and identification of Friendly Main Effort Recommended Initial CCIR

  50. Recommended Time Line

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