‘From 1947 to 26/11: Tracing the Pakistan-Terrorism Nexus in Indian National Security’

1. ‘From 1947 to 26/11: Tracing the Pakistan-Terrorism Nexus in Indian National Security’ DR SYED HUSSAIN SHAHEED SOHERWORDI INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS University of Peshawar

2. paper outline • introduction • condensing perceptions: norm construction and continuance in IR • origins and repetition: the 1947-8 and 1965 Kashmir wars • India’s self-validation: the 1971 East Pakistan war • Pakistan invests in India’s insurgencies: Kashmir and beyond • the nexus becomes entrenched: the BJP-led NDA and Kargil • conclusions: 26/11 and the future

3. perceptions: norm construction and continuance in IR (1) • analysing norms => constructivism; • norms shape interests • history & memory for their construction • ‘norms, like genes, are instructional units’ (Florini, 1999) • norms also affect ‘the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices’ (Kowert and Legro, 1996) • an engrained norm becomes a culture; a ‘collectively held prescription about the right way to think and act’ (Legro, 1997) • India-Pakistan interaction -> norms

4. perceptions: norm construction and continuance in IR (2) • ‘preferences of agents are largely shaped by historically constructed identity norms’ (Checkel, 1999); • Germany, Japan: defeat / behaviour • states / elites ‘interpret historical experience through the lens of their own analytical assumptions & worldviews’ (Levy, 1994), psychology • an evolutionary process / learning • codification, durability, concordance • ‘diffusion pathways’ (Checkel, 1998); • developing interaction between India and Pakistan, punctuated by conflict

5. origins and repetition: the 1947-8 and 1965 Kashmir wars • post-Partition, K’s status contested; • 1947: Muslim peasants rebel against their Dogra Rajput (Hindu) landowners • Operation Gulmarg: state-sponsored irregulars, then regular soldiers + denial • modus operandi established • 1965: 3,000 ceasefire violations, Rann of Kutch, Operation Gibraltar; • a ‘”spontaneous war of liberation against Indian Imperialism”’ (quoted in Wolpert, 1997) • a repetition of 1947-8, same approach • for Indian elites = a solidification of Pakistan’s preferred strategic method

6. India’s self-validation:the 1971 East Pakistan war • 1971 background; • E / W Pakistan inequalities, polarisation • Dec. 1970: Awami League win election • March 1971: martial law declared • demographic, food, health and separatist pressures on India; • train Mukti Bahini (“liberation forces”) • attack first followed by Indian forces • replicates Pakistan modus operandi; • liberation forces then regular troops • BUT carried out successfully • validated Indian perceptions that if optimally carried out -> optimum results

7. Pakistan invests in India’s insurgencies: Kashmir and beyond • 1980s: Kashmir insurgency begins; • electoral malfeasance, unemployment and discrimination, crude nationalism • Pakistan takes advantage; • had already materially helped support secessionists in Punjab and Assam • USSR’s 1989 collapse / demonstration • ‘Afghanistan-seasoned’ (Wirsing, 1994) Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) • Operation Topac launched; • training camps established • a market for Pakistani arms producers • entrenches Indian elite mindsets

8. the nexus becomes entrenched: the BJP-led NDA and Kargil • BJP: Indian Muslims disloyal, linked to Pakistan, + by extension, terrorism • Gujarat 2002: argued that the violence was instigated by terrorists • Kargil 1999 confirms the association; • Operation Badr, Kashmiri militants and Pakistani soldiers infiltrate the LoC • limited conflict (plus Pakistani denial) • post-Kargil domestic terrorism rises; • IC814, then Agra talks fail, Indian Parliament attacks, Operation Parakram

9. conclusions: 26/11 and the future • repeated modus operandi; • infiltration by Pakistani-sponsored irregulars, then regular Pakistani troops • aided by India’s 1971 self-validation • + insurgency deepens the correlation • ‘historical legacies are interpreted, recovered and constituted within the limits set by contemporary interests and constraints’ (Bajpai, 1998); • a “cultural syndrome” (Hudson) • ‘“historical confrontations of power and truth … recur and generate parallel sets of mediatory rules and practices”’ (Campbell, 1992) • an essential part of Indian security

10. references • Bajpai, K. (1998) ‘India: Modified Structuralism’ in Alagappa, M. (ed.) Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press). • Checkel, J.T. (1998) ‘Review Article: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, 50, January: 324-348. • Checkel, J.T. (1999) ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’, International Studies Quarterly, 43, 1: 83-114. • Florini, A. (1996) ‘The Evolution of International Norms’, International Studies Quarterly, 40, 3: 363-389. • Kowert, P.; Legro, J. (1996) ‘Norms, Identity and their Limits; A Theoretical Reprise’ in Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia UP), 451-497. • Legro, J.W. (1997) ‘Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism’, International Organization, 51, 1: 31-63. • Levy, J.S. (1994) ‘Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield’, International Organization, 48, 2: 279-312. • Wirsing, R.G. (1994) India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press). • Wolpert, S. (1997) A New History of India (Oxford: Oxford UP).

11. thanks