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Attitudes, Values, and Risk Behaviors

Attitudes, Values, and Risk Behaviors. Safety 4900 Summer 2008. Risky Behaviors?. Risk Behavior Genes. Gene that points to Risky Behavior Type 4 Dopamine Receptor Gene. Definitions:. A learned tendency to act in a consistent way To an object Or situation.

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Attitudes, Values, and Risk Behaviors

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  1. Attitudes, Values, and Risk Behaviors Safety 4900 Summer 2008

  2. Risky Behaviors?

  3. Risk Behavior Genes • Gene that points to Risky Behavior • Type 4 Dopamine Receptor Gene

  4. Definitions: • A learned tendency to act in a consistent way • To an object • Or situation Safety 4900 Attitudes Summer 2008

  5. Features: • Learned through: • Social interactions • Not innate • Tendency to act • Characterized by a degree or consistency • Specific to an object or situation Safe 4900 Section 6.3 Summer 2008

  6. Components: • Feeling • Thinking • Tendency to act

  7. Influences and Factors Hereditary Behaviors Non-Shared

  8. Beliefs • Inherited?

  9. Risky Behaviors Of teens with Alcohol behaviors

  10. Safety Attitude • Attitude Problem • Point of View? • Behavior?

  11. Safety Attitudes • Memory as a safety influencer -

  12. Behavior Models • Basic elements: • Behavior • Attitude • Beliefs • Influence • Perceived Risk • Safety Climate

  13. Basic Form Behavior Attitude Chapter 6.0, page 195

  14. Influences Influence Behavior Attitude

  15. Influence Time Influence Behavior Attitude

  16. Factors • Time • Primacy • Latency The last time? • Closeness 1 2 3 4

  17. Text 6.7 Factors • Action: - activity and object • Target – behavior under scrutiny • Situation – Context of attitude and behavior • Time Frame – Time frame to link behavior and event Chapter 6, Page 199

  18. Perceived Risk Individual Susceptibility Perceive Risk Likelihood of Health influence

  19. Target Time Belief Attitude Behavior Events 1a Social Norms Events Events actions Time scale Notes: as Target approaches Belief, the effectiveness improves. Events such as other actions have two characteristics. Time and location. Events that are recent and geographically close to the individual effect beliefs at a higher rate. Social norms influence behavior but may not influence belief system. The events may also influence social norms.

  20. Behavior Corporate Influence Beliefs Behavior Co-Workers Attitude Social Pressure

  21. Intervention Strategy Provide Safety Information Safety Awareness Campaign Training plus feedback Behavior Change Attitude Change Monitor

  22. Unsafe Acts

  23. The nuclear option: human factors in safety Sue Cox Professor of Safety and Risk Management Dean Lancaster University Management School Blackett Memorial Lecture 14th March 2006

  24. Key questions • Nuclear Power: a problem or the solution? • Can Safety Science help answer this question?

  25. Source: http://www.cogema.com

  26. Current nuclear capacity (UK) NDA Sites British Energy Sites Source: http://www.nda.gov.uk Source: http://www.british-energy.co.uk

  27. ‘First Movers’ Calder Hall, UK Berkeley, UK Source: http://www.google.image.com

  28. FAQ - New reactors • Why is nuclear back on the agenda? Due to alarm over climate change and the security of gas supplies. All but one of the existing nuclear stations will close by 2023 and ministers are anxious to ‘keep the lights on’. • So what’s stopping them? Fears over cost and issues of nuclear waste disposal. • What about safety? The nuclear sector says the new reactor designs are much safer. • How much would we pay for them? Fixed electricity prices, or so-called nuclear tax, is one option for the future. • What happens next? Separate strands of research are due to come together in time for a decision which is due summer 2006. Source: The Guardian, 07.03.2006

  29. TVO Olkiluoto 3, Finland As on 19th January 2006 Source: http://www.tvo.fi/474.htm

  30. The Safety Imperative ‘Defence in depth’ includes consideration of the following: • Preventing incidents and accidents by considering the potential for equipment failure, human error and external factors (for example seismic event, airplane crash, adverse weather conditions, etc) during the design phase - implementing effective systems and procedures • Monitoring facilities during operation to detect and correct deviations • Designing and implementing measures to limit consequences of any accidents that may occur despite the precautions taken. Source: IAEA (1996) Defence-in-Depth in Nuclear Safety. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, INSAG-10, Vienna.

  31. Nuclear Accidents Three Mile Island, 1979 Chernobyl, 1986 Source: http://www.google.image.com

  32. Defence in Depth Human factors have been implicated in the aetiology of many nuclear (and non nuclear) accidents Source: IAEA (2003) Major Accident Summary. http://www.iaea.org/index.html

  33. Human Factors • Human factors is a multidisciplinary activity concerned with peoples’ characteristics and capabilities in relation to the design of jobs, products, workplaces and equipment (Cox & Cox, 1996). • Hollnagel (1993) quotes figures which show a rise in human error rates from 25% of accident causation in the 1960s to 90% in the 1990s. He highlights the enhanced reliability of technology in part explanation. • Whatever the causation, the message is clear: managing the safety, reliability and efficiency of systems requires an understanding of human factors. • However, human factors, as traditionally conceived, is too narrow an approach to ‘people’ related issues in nuclear safety.

  34. People-related Issues: Broader View Wider Environments Organisation Social Environment Job Person The Person as an Information Processor Developed from: Cox and Cox (1996) Safety, Systems and People. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann

  35. Management of Change What are the perceived emerging challenges in the management of nuclear power plants? How do senior managers cope with emerging challenges in the management of nuclear power plants? What improvements could be made in respect to coping with emerging challenges in the management of nuclear power plants? Organisational Learning What kind of features and attributes characterise learning organisations? What are the most common barriers to organisational learning and how can they be removed? How are various national and company cultures influencing organisational learning? LearnSafe http://www.vtt.fi/virtual/learnsafe/

  36. Methodology: MetaFuzz • 800 statements on ‘emerging challenges’ were collected from 300 managers in 10 power plants in 5 countries using a Metaplan method • Data subject to a 3 stage procedure derived from fuzzy set analysis: • Common classification model: 5 dimensions (derived from Competing Values Framework: Cameron and Quinn, 1999) treated as fuzzy sets • Classification of statements on ‘emerging challenges’ in terms of these sets: 0-100 strength of membership • Hierarchical cluster analysis: clustering coefficient showed a large increase from 9 to 10 clusters. K Means Method1 used to create 9 clusters. Named on challenges close to centre of cluster. • Cross tabs by cluster, country and management level (Chi-square) 1Tou JT and Gonzales RC. (1974). Pattern Recognition Principles. Reading, MA: Addison -Wesley. (pp. 94-97).

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