Ethics of Emerging Technologies Cyberwarfare

1. Ethics of Emerging TechnologiesCyberwarfare University of Notre Dame Spring 2012

2. Additional References • Cayirci and Ghergherehchi, Modeling Cyberattacks and Their Effects on the Decision Making Process, Proceedings of the 2001 Winter Simulation Conference • Rowe, Ethics of CyberWar Attacks, CyberWar and Terrorism • Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyberterrorism • Mulvenon, Toward a Cyberconflict Studies Research Agenda, IEEE Security and Privacy 2005 • Lucas, Permissible, Preventive Cyberwar, Restricting Cyberconflict to Justified Military Targets • Arquilla, Ethics and Information Warfare, 1999

3. Plan • What is it? • Why cyber? • LOAC, Just War implications

4. Cyber________? • Vandalism • Crime • Espionage • Terror • War

7. Examples of Cyber “Attacks” • Denial of Service, Distributed Denial of Service • Viruses, Worms, Trojan Horses • Malicious Code • Corrupt Data • Seize Control • Operations • Estonia • Syria • Georgia • Stuxnet

11. Government Cyber Organization • US Strategic Command • US Cyber Command • National Security Agency • Department of Homeland Security

12. National Academy of Sciences • Must distinguish cyberattack from cyberexploitation • Cyber weapons are uncertain in usage, effects, scope • Attribution is hard, and time consuming, but critical

13. A Critical Point for Any Discussion

14. Framework for CNA as “Use of Force” From NAS report

15. Information Operations • May include • Physical attacks on communications nodes • Electronic warfare • Psychological operations • Deception operations • Cyber operations • … • May be carried out using computer networks or other media

16. DOD Cyber Operations • Defend • Exploit • Attack

19. Categories of Legitimate Military Targets • Command and control, communications • Weapons system • Joint-use infrastructure • GPS, fuel, water, etc • Permitted under international law

20. Cyber-Attacks and Vulnerable Infrastructure:Compromising Critical Systems From Lucas

21. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities • 3 x 107 acre feet stored water • 1.2 x 1016 Joules • 22 Kt • 1 x 1014 Joules • 20 million pounds HE • 2.7 x 107 acre feet stored water • 8.6 x 1015 Joules From Lucas deprive 22 million people of water eliminate 50% electrical power in California destroy irrigation of 1.5 million acres US farmland

22. Water treatment plant, Springfield, IL, Nov 2011 Russian Cyber Attack?

23. Civil and Military Vulnerabilities RQ-170 Galaxy 4

24. Cyber War • Kinetic retaliation for cyber attacks? • Just cause/causus belli • Cyber weapons and tactics (which) target civilians, violate JWT principle of distinction/discrimination • But could be less destructive than conventional war: restore denied services with passwords, rather than rebuilding wrecked infrastructure (Kosovo) • Intelligence/espionage ethics versus warrior ethos From Lucas (my add in red)

26. Ethics?? "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks!”– U.S. military official, quoted May 31, 2011 on new U.S. Cyber Strategy.

27. Caution is Needed • Threat inflation • Confusion • Hysteria • Media hype • Hackers, terrorists are not as capable as they would have to be

30. CSIS Study • Network vulnerability does not equate to infrastructure vulnerability • Threat is overstated • Modern society is more robust and resilient than assumed • Infrastructures are diverse, redundant, and self-healing (partly because they’re old) • Water system failures, power outages, air traffic disruptions, etc. are routinely experienced – without damage to national security • >54,000 separate US water systems • >3000 separate electrical power providers • 90 major FAA computer systems, 9 separate communications nets • 15-20k flights delayed or cancelled each month • Several thousand separate 911 systems • Modernization of the infrastructure could, in fact, make us more vulnerable if it becomes more highly networked without careful planning • The sky is not falling

31. Basic science of cyberweapons • Technology is approaching maturity in weapons design -- not many innovations are possible. • The technology is immature in: • Targeting – Attribution of entities in cyberspace is poor, for both defender and attacker. Collateral damage (like to networking infrastructure) is easy. • Attack control – Cyberweapons need flaws in software, flaws can get fixed unexpectedly, and automated attacks may hard to “turn off”. So attacks are inherently unreliable. • Damage assessment – Damage can be well hidden. So attackers use unnecessary force to get a result, and repair may take a long time. These features are very different from those of nuclear weapons –cyberweapons are more like biological weapons. From Rowe

32. Situating cyberwarfare • Technology for cyberattack is very different from technology for cyberdefense: • Cyberweapons are unlike nuclear weapons, which have few defenses • Cyberweapons are unlike biological weapons, for which the technology for attack and defense is somewhat similar • Most concern is about cyberwarfare-style cyberattacks. There are only three examples: • Estonia in 2007: denial of service – failure, unclear goals • Georgia in 2008: denial of service -- success • STUXNET in 2010: malicious software – short-term success but collateral damage From Rowe

33. Applications of cyberweapons • Most are pretty obvious: Cyberattack another country’s infrastructure to disable it, in much as with bombs. • Is the technology primarily for national security? No, criminals make money from cyberattacks, and they drive technology. Government laboratories are unlikely to discover attack methods that criminals don’t know – but they might find applications of those methods that criminals haven’t tried. From Rowe

34. Ethics for cyberweapons today • Current state: Hardly anyone worries about ethics of cyberwarfare. We’ll just do it and worry later. (difference from nuclear and biological weapons) • Current methods for redress of untoward consequences: Other countries and the news media will grumble. • The primary professional organizations for software engineering, ACM and IEEE, have codes of ethics – but they are vague about public responsibility of software designers. • We are seeing international agreements on criminal cyberattacks, and the U.S. is now willing to negotiate cyberwarfare agreements. From Rowe

35. Ethical and social issues of cyberweapons • Attacking first with a cyberattack is unethical, just as with conventional attacks. (Is it? Subject of debate) • Is it ethical to attack when identity of parties is uncertain? (similar with lethal autonomous systems) • Is it ethical to use poorly-controllable technology? • How do we ensure proportional attacks when damage assessment is difficult? • Aren’t cyberattacks perfidy, since they generally attack operating systems, necessary neutral services? • A cyberweapon can only be used once in the world, so using it is wasteful. • How do we repair damage thoroughly? From Rowe

36. Ethical and social issues, continued • We can make cyberweapons more ethical by adding design transparency (as with lethal autonomous systems), attribution, and reversibility. • Why use cyberweapons when there are plenty of other weapons? (Why indeed?) • Ethical and social issues in research related to cyberweapons: Few, since most technology is dual-use. Exceptions: some hacker tools like code obfuscators. (A difference from nuclear weapons) • Trends in ethical and social issues: People are starting to see them. As soon as the U.S. receives a major cyberattack, there will be an overreaction. (We have had plenty of cyberespionage, but no cyberattacks.) From Rowe

37. Just War Theory and Cyberwarfare: Jus ad bellum • Just Cause • Right Intention • Proper Authority • Public Declaration • Likelihood of success • Proportionality—instance of a policy likely to minimize harm to all in the long run • Last Resort R. Dipert, National Academy, of Sciences, Jan. 12 2012

38. Just War Theory and Cyberwarfare: Jus ad bellum • Likelihood of success • Last Resort Importance in JWT is because of nature of conventional war. If cyberwarfare is discriminating, likely not to result in deaths.... "last" resort doesn't apply. Use cyberweapons before using any conventional weapons. R. Dipert, National Academy, of Sciences, Jan. 12 2012

39. Problems with "Just Cause" condition in JWT with Cyberwarfare • "Ontological problem" 1. Does not conform to paradigm of physical invasion by soldiers, weapon systems, projectiles. 2. Often (if carefully engineered) malware will not cause the death and destruction typical of past wars. Harm: to functioning of information systems Harm: could be a large amount of harm but diffuse (such as stock market crash and subsequent recession) R. Dipert, National Academy, of Sciences, Jan. 12 2012

40. Problems with "Just Cause" condition in Cyberwarfare (continued) 3. Can one attack before an enemy attacks? Imminent enemy attack: Majority of theorists agree this is morally permissable. ="Preemptive war" Future but (very) likely enemy attack? ="Preventive war" Majority say this is not morally permissable. Minority (Walzer, Posner, Dipert) it is permissable if enemy's future attack is very likely and the about- to-be-unjustly-attacked country will suffer moreharm by waiting. (Walzer) R. Dipert, National Academy, of Sciences, Jan. 12 2012

41. The Attribution/Epistemic Problem in Cyberwarfare for the permissability of Counterattack • Epistemic Problem for preemptive and preventive wars is similar to the Attribution Problem • There have been almost no recent philosophical or legal contributions to epistemic conditions for justified war. • With what degree of certainty must we know that a country has attacked us or will attack us, before we may attack them? (Game theory) R. Dipert, National Academy, of Sciences, Jan. 12 2012

42. The Attribution/Epistemic Problem in Cyberwarfare for the permissability of Counterattack • Uncertainty in identifying a cyberattacker is mostly limited to the ultimate source (computer, LAN, ISP address) of an attacker because of spoofing, pivoting, proxy attacks. Can this be overcome? • Clues in the malware (language, software tools used, etc.) • Less uncertainty about: Who has these capabilities? Who has motive? R. Dipert, National Academy, of Sciences, Jan. 12 2012

43. Just War Theory and Cyberwarfare: Jus in bello, i.e. justice in war, after a war has begun • Proportionality • Discrimination. Should not target civilians or "civilian objects." Cyberweapons produced by nation states are not inherently indiscriminate. Amateur cyberattacks often have been. Acts of cyberwarfare have not (Estonia, Georgia, Stuxnet) R. Dipert, National Academy, of Sciences, Jan. 12 2012

44. International Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) (i) a general prohibition on the employment of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (ii) military necessity (iii) proportionality (iv) discrimination (v) command responsibility. These principles impose legal (and ethical) restraints on at least some forms of cyber conflict From Lucas

45. Ethics & Cyber Strategy Whose smokestack(s)? [Attribution] How many missiles? [proportionality] Does a cyber attack even constitute grounds for a kinetic response? [military necessity] Must due care be exercised not to harm civilians or civilian infrastructure? [discrimination] From Lucas

46. Russian Attack on Georgia Cyber attacks employed as part of a larger coordinated military operation Attacked only militarily important targets, communications, etc

47. Israeli Attack on Syrian Nuclear Facility 2007 Preceded by ample warning, diplomatic efforts Cyberattacks used to disable air defense radar, command and control

48. Stuxnet Contrary to popular thinking, very specifically targeted, exceedingly discriminate Required detailed and extensive intelligence, and domain knowledge Legitimate use of cyberattackby one adversary on another

49. Is Just War Theory Adequate? • Must separate cyber warfare from other forms of cyber activity (terror, crime, etc) • Some form of international governance and conventions are needed (attribution, much like nuclear forensics) • When applied to legitimate military targets, Just war and LOAC principles apply • Cyber war is permissible (Lucas) if it • Aims at harming military infrastructure • Degrades an adversary’s ability for kinetic operations • Little or no harm to civilian life or property • Undertaken as last resort • (pre-emptive is permissible if further delay only worsens the situation)