Post-2012 Summit Nuclear Security Process

1. Post-2012 SummitNuclear Security Process Man-Sung Yim Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering KAIST

2. Trends in the Future Continuing “the rise of the rest” Continuing “the rise of nationalism” Continuing Jasmine Revolution? Continuing interest in nuclear power? Continuing evolution and spread of technology Continuing deeper and closer connection of the world.

3. Nuclear Security Risk • Threat • Material • Construction • Transportation • Detonation • Vulnerability • Consequence

4. Nuclear Security Process Assess Risk Identify Countermeasures Weigh Cost/Benefit Implement Evaluate Impact (Adaptation)

5. Future of Nuclear Security • The system/threat changes over time. • Nuclear security can only be achieved through global alliance. • Existing commitments should be follow-up. • Effective coordination among the responsible agencies between countries need to be established. • Countries of strategic importance need be included in the process (e.g., N Korea, Iran, Syria, Myanmar, Afghanistan, etc.) • Non-governmental institutions of importance (e.g., financial institutions, industry, etc.) should be involved.

6. Future of Nuclear Security • Alternate materials, related technologies and expertise should be protected. • Life cycle of special nuclear materials should be better guarded.

7. Other Policy Considerations • Redefine the role of IAEA, its funding needs and revenue mechanism. • Provide incentives to implement existing commitments. • Reduce impact from global economic crisis. • Reduce impact from possible spread of Jasmine Revolution. • Encourage multiple/multilaterial Second-Line of Defense agreements. • Encourage broader participation in Proliferation Security Initiative. • Encourage global implementation of the state-of-the-art technologies (e.g., remote-sensing technologies) • Empower the public. • Develop global nuclear safety/security standards (e.g., culture standards, global vulnerability standards).

8. Regional Accountability Groups • Shared governance of nuclear security • State vs. State(s) accountability • Inspection/Information sharing • Shared financial burden • Implementation of regional institutional measures (e.g., regional safety/security standards, HEUFZ, neighbor compensation, etc.) • Annual regional meetings • National/regional/global reports • Public information exchange (e.g., through the web).

9. Final Thoughts • Only few groups may be interested in nuclear terrorism. • Consequence of failure could be catastrophic. • World leaders must work together to diffuse/resolve the underlying conflicts. • Cross cultural human resource development should be emphasized for threat reduction.