Migration and security

1. aaw Migration and security

2. people cross borders for a variety of reasons and that statesgenerally devise immigration policies to encourage some forms of bordercrossing and not others. The general impact of migration on national securitytherefore depends on the efficacy of a particular state’s policy to shape migration flows according to its overall national interests.

3. Counter-Terrorism in SEA Thailand Counter-terrorism Intelligence Capabilities3 Size and Resources 3    Expertise and Capabilities 3    Understanding of Threat 3    Sympathies/Orientation 3 Frontier Security2 Border Security 2    Coastal/Port/Airport Security 3 Unregulated Migration 2 Legal Environment 4 International Cooperation 3 Public Cooperation 2 Philippines Counter-terrorism Intelligence Capabilities2.5 Size and Resources 3   Expertise and Capabilities 2 Understanding of Threat 4 Sympathies/Orientation 2 Frontier Security2 Border Security 1 Coastal/Port/Airport Security 2 Unregulated Migration 2 Legal Environment 3 International Cooperation 4 Public Cooperation 2

4. Malaysia Counter-terrorism Intelligence Capabilities3 Size and Resources 2   Expertise and Capabilities 3 Understanding of Threat 3 Sympathies/Orientation 3 Frontier Security2 Border Security 2 Coastal/Port/Airport Security 3 Unregulated Migration 2 Legal Environment 4 International Cooperation 3 Public Cooperation 3 Indonesia Counter-terrorism Intelligence Capabilities3 Size and Resources 3    Expertise and Capabilities 2   Understanding of Threat 3    Sympathies/Orientation 2 Frontier Security1 Border Security 1 Coastal/Port/Airport Security 1 Unregulated Migration 2 Legal Environment 3 International Cooperation 3 Public Cooperation 3

5. Singapore Counter-terrorism Intelligence Capabilities4.5 Size and Resources 5 Expertise and Capabilities 5   Understanding of Threat 5 Sympathies/Orientation 4 Frontier Security4 Border Security 5 Coastal/Port/Airport Security 4 Unregulated Migration 3 Legal Environment 4 International Cooperation 4 Public Cooperation 4

6. Several factors that contributed to increase of international population movements: First, states are increasing their ability to control borders, thus international movement automatically becomes a matter of concern for at least two states; second, world’s population is rapidly increasing; third, communication and transportation revolution increase people’s awareness of opportunities abroad and ease their travel to these areas. Fourth, turmoild and uncertainty motivate people to move for a better life, and the world is indeed becoming more turbulent and unstable. Migration can be economically beneficial to both sending andreceivingcountries and for the migrant.

7. Categorising international migration: Involuntary and voluntary migration. Involuntary or forced migration refers essentially to refugee flows, where forreasons of natural disaster, war, civil war, ethnic, religious or political persecutionpeople are forced to flee their homes. Voluntary migrations can be further subdivided into three main categories. • legal permanent settler migration • legal temporary migration, and includes the bulk of the voluntary migrations. • illegal migration of peoplewhich may be temporary or permanent. There are international regime and norms to deal withinvoluntary or forced migrations, but those dedicated to regulate voluntary migration is completely absent.

8. Conflict scenario I • governments who are refusing refugee population, and thus take steps to their stay will be temporary. • receiving states influencing policies of sending country’s government or even bring about change of government. • receiving states providing arms to refugees and invlove them in sending state’s internal conflict.

9. Conflict Scenario II • Even small number refugees may have security implications for receiving country. • Britain for example, has given refuge to a small number of Islamist clerics who escaped repressive middle eastern regimes who are targeting them for their extreme islamist views. GWoT has revealed how some of these muslim residents and citizens of immigrant origin became involved in terrorist attacks.

10. Conflict Scenario III • Migrant communities tend to maintain a strong connection with theirhome countries, and express their aspirations regarding instability in their home countries.

11. Conflict scenario IV: • migrant communities’ attempts to recruit their hostgovernments and populations to their cause in their home country depends toa large extent on the nature of the political system in the host country. • Migrant communities may also be used by the government of the homecountry to pursue its own aims, vis-à-vis the host country government.

12. Conflict Scenario V: • migrants challenge traditional notions about membership of a state, themeaning of nationality and citizenship, and the rights and duties of citizenstowards their state and vice versa.

13. Conflict scenario VI: • Social cohesion and stability can be at risk when migrants are perceived as economic burden on society. The perception is usually justified by the country’s allocation of local resources in housing, education, healthcare and transportation for migrants. At the same time, migrants are also potentially perceived as criminals or carriers of infectious dsiseases.

14. Conflict scenario VII: Migrants can also be perceived as threats to culture and way of life of the people in receiving country. Large numbers of refugees can also be a driving force for changewithin the receiving country, particularly if they are ethnically similar to theirhosts, or speak a common language.

15. various ways in which population movements can constitutea threat to the security of states, societies, and the individuals within them: turn civil wars into international conflicts cause the spread of ethnicconflict and civil unrest from one country to another lead to some formof conflict, including full-scale war between countries. playa role in facilitating terrorism. become the cause ofeconomic hardship and the increase in competition for scarce resources ofvarious kinds from jobs to social housing, and weaken existing powerstructures and institutions within countries, threaten cultural identities and social cohesion.

16. It is now widely accepted in many Western states thatthe public policy process should explicitly treat immigration and security asintertwined, and bring a security focus to bear on matters of control and management of population movements.

17. State’s authority to respond to involuntary migration is to some extent limited by 1951 Convention on Status of Refugees. This Convention obliges states to extend asylum and protection to thosefacing persecution, on grounds of religion, race, nationality or politicalopinion. Further, implicit in the meaning of refugee lies an assumption thatthe person concerned is worthy of being and ought to be assisted, and ifnecessary protected from the cause of flight the Convention commits states to ensure that no asylum seeker is sentback to any country where they are likely to face danger to life or liberty,without their application for refugee status being given due consideration.

18. The question of whether someone is a refugee and should be treated as such by astate becomes an issue decided by the government and the courts of the countryin which refuge is sought. For an asylum seeker to be recognized as a refugee is a political decision,and depends to some extent on the relationship between the sending and receiving countries.

19. International population movements create ethnic minority communities in receiving countries. Host countries, especially democracies, invariablu accepts some immigrants as citizens and thus create cultural, linguistic, religious, racially distinct minority within their borders.

20. However, there are governments who are refusing refugee population, and thus take steps to their stay will be temporary. Conflicts may emerge between sending and receiving countries. Receiving states will influence policies of sending country’s government or even bring about change of government. This can lead to conflict. Receiving states may also be involved in sending state’s internal conflict by arming the refugees and deploying their own armed forces.

21. Even small number refugees may have security implications for receiving country. Britain for example, has given refuge to a small number of Islamist clerics who escaped repressive middle eastern regimes who are targeting them for their extreme islamist views. GWoT has revealed how some of these muslim residents and citizens of immigrant origin became involved in terrorist attacks. Most of those involved in the attack on the Twin Towers of the World TradeCenter were temporary migrants, resident in the USA ostensibly for educationor business. A number of those involved in the Madrid bombings, terroristtrials in Germany (where some of the 9/11 bombers were resident) and currently detained in the UK, France and Italy, are Islamist residents of thecountries they are now attacking. The fact that most of them are either refugees,immigrants themselves or of immigrant origin presents Western liberaldemocracies with a significant challenge.

22. Migrants from conflict zones tend to carry the conflict with them. Migrant communities tend to maintain a strong connection with theirhome countries, and express their aspirations regarding instability in their home countries. They will use all means at their disposal to influence eventsat home, which could be in support of, or (more often) against their homegovernments. They take advantage of their unique status, being outside theirhome country and not subject to its jurisdiction, to take those actions thatpeople living in their country of origin cannot, due to fear of arrest, persecution or violence.

23. The success of migrant communities’ attempts to recruit their hostgovernments and populations to their cause in their home country depends toa large extent on the nature of the political system in the host country. Themore open the system and the more susceptible to lobbying it is, the more likelyit is that minority communities will succeed in getting their concerns on the agenda. Migrant communities may also be used by the government of the homecountry to pursue its own aims, vis-à-vis the host country government. Therelationship between successive Israeli governments and American Jewsillustrates this point. Host governments too will try to use their ethnic minoritycommunities to achieve their own goals, particularly those in relation to eventsin the country of origin of that community.

24. Migrants raise social concerns because they potentially threaten to undermine the popularity and strength ofthe nation-state. At the moment nation-states remain the dominant unit ofsocial organization across the globe with each state ostensibly forming a‘territorially based self-reproducing cultural and social system’ Their members are seen to share a common history, language, religion andculture that binds them into a cohesive integrated unit with a shared sense ofnationhood. As citizens of one state moving to live and work in another,migrants clearly challenge traditional notions about membership of a state, themeaning of nationality and citizenship, and the rights and duties of citizenstowards their state and vice versa. The fact that very few states fit the idealizedpicture of the homogeneous nation-state, and that most states are cultural andsocial products of earlier movements of peoples, fails to register in the popular consciousness.

25. Social cohesion and stability can be at risk when migrants are perceived as economic burden on society. The perception is usually justified by the country’s allocation of local resources in housing, education, healthcare and transportation for migrants. At the same time, migrants are also potentially perceived as criminals or carriers of infectious dsiseases. Validity of the welfare state model in many of advanced industrial countriesis threatened if the public begin to feelthat their taxes are being used to subsidise foreigners’ living expensesand healthcare, rather than taking care of those in need within the home society.

26. Migrants can also be perceived as threats to culture and way of life of the people in receiving country. This tends tohappen when large numbers arrive in a short period of time or when migrantsare seen as holding themselves apart and being reluctant to make any efforts tointegrate into the host country’s way of life. Large long-term refugee populations can bring about significant changes inthe social cohesion and stability of the host country. Large numbers of refugees can also be a driving force for changewithin the receiving country, particularly if they are ethnically similar to theirhosts, or speak a common language. The gradual ‘talibanization’ of partsof Pakistan, and the growing support attracted by the Islamic political parties,is at least in part a result of playing host, for nearly 20 years, to millions ofPashtunsfrom across the Durand line that separates Afghanistan from Pakistan.

27. Further, migration can affect political and social conditions, and even, inrare instances, fundamentally alter the nature of society in receiving countries,many years after the actual movement of people has ceased.

28. The securitisation of illegal migration in the Asia-Pacific is best manifested inthe increasing criminalisation of migratory movements. Thecountries of the Asia-Pacific deal with the phenomena of illegal migration andmigrant smuggling as an issue of national security and try to curb these problemswith defensive strategies developed predominantly at the national level.

29. Migrant smuggling refers to ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly orindirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a personinto a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident’. Migrantsmuggling involves voluntary illegal movements, that is situations in which thedecision to migrate is based on a free choice and not the result of force, coercion or threats.

30. The securitisation of any strategy against illegal migration and the smugglingof migrants must balance the sovereignty and security interests of the nationstateagainst the rights of individuals. A comprehensive response to illegalmigration and migrant smuggling must combine achievable long-term goals,which offer real solutions to the political, demographic and socio-economicdimensions of illegal migration and organised crime, with short-term measuresthat address the immediate needs of asylum seekers and the current threat posed by ruthless criminals.

31. Rather than alienating unauthorised arrivals, local authorities along with immigration and law enforcementagencies, international and non-governmental organisations should cooperateclosely with asylum seekers in a fair and open manner. In line with the provisionsunder the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, special protectionshould be provided to those who are victims and witnesses of migrantsmuggling and their collaboration with authorities should be facilitated as much as practicable.

32. Regional and international responses to refugee exoduses are particularly problematic as they entail statementsabout the political circumstances in the sending country. In many instances, receivingcountries as well as the international community have been reluctant to protectrefugees in order to prevent confrontation with the country of origin, especially ifthe sending country is a global political or economic player. Moreover, individuallyor collectively, governments have very few rights and tools to intervene againstnations that experience large outflows of people.

33. The countries of the region must work towards harmonised protectionregimes to share the burden between nations and recognise the needs of asylumseekers as well as the security concerns of individual nations. Australia and theUnited States, along with the other Parties to the Refugee Convention and Protocoland UNHCR need actively to promote broader accession to the Conventionand the Protocol and facilitate ratification for those nations that are concernedabout the financial burden the ratification may entail. Countries that have access to greater economicresources, such as Australia, or that are less affected by refugee flows shouldassist those nations that are disproportionately affected by large numbers ofasylum seekers in order to alleviate their burden.

34. Ever larger ºows of people across borders; • increasingly multicultural populations; and the emergence of informal, • migration-based, transnational networks that circulate capital, goods, and • ideas—all challenge notions of the territorial state as a bounded entity with a • clearly demarcated territory and population. This in turn calls into question • traditional models of national security, which assume a unitary national identity • from which a set of national interests can be derived. Yet this does not necessarily • mean, as some more sensational accounts claim, that large migration • ºows are causing states to lose control.35 As Gary Freeman has argued, “Anyone • who thinks differently should try landing at Sydney airport without an entry • visa or go to France and apply for a job without a work permit.

35. Two areas in which migration inºuences state • capacity and autonomy are border control and national identity. The ability of • states to maintain control over their borders and to formulate a coherent national • identity are arguably necessary preconditions for the maintenance of • state security in other areas.

36. The world’s poorest states host • most of its refugees, and the uncontrolled ºow of refugees or other migrants • across borders produces additional stresses on already weak state institutions, • heightens competition over scarce resources, and exacerbates ethnic and sectarian • tensions.

37. nonstate actors access to territory and population groups that can be used for • political mobilization, which in turn can lead to the emergence of “refugeewarrior • communities.”42 Examples include the mobilization activities of the • Palestine Liberation Organization in refugee camps in Lebanon in the 1970s, • the role played by refugee camps in Pakistan as sites of mobilization • for Taliban-related groups in the 1980s, and the emergence of the Rwandan • Patriotic Front in Ugandan refugee camps in the 1990s

38. The emergence of organized criminal networks around illegal migration can • also pose a signiªcant challenge to state authority and control. • If migration pressures on states increase without the state adapting, • then the capacity of states is indeed under threat. The record shows, however, • that many states are adjusting to these pressures. As Peter Andreas • argues, “Globalization may be about tearing down economic borders, as globalists • emphasize, but it has also created more border policing work for the • state. At the same time as globalization is about mobility and territorial access, • states are attempting to selectively reinforce border controls.”

39. State migration policies generally have two main objectives: regulating who • enters (e.g., controlling borders), and deciding who is entitled to membership • in a polity (e.g., conferring citizenship or political membership in a community).

40. The challenge that migration flowspose to unitaryconceptions of national identity has deep historical roots and continues to provokepolitical debate. • Many states have historically incorporated national, ethnic,or racial criteria into their migration policies; examples include racialrestrictions on immigrants to the United States during the nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries, the favoring of ethnic Germans (or Aussiedler) byGermany in its post–World War II immigration policy, the “White Australia”policies that deniedAustralian migration policies for much of the twentiethcentury, and the automatic right to immigrate to Israel that is granted to Jewsin the 1950 Law of Return.

41. Migration and human mobility inºuence three core areas of state power: • economic, military, and diplomatic. Here, again, the intervening variable between • migration and national security is policy: if states have the capacity to • design and implement effective policies that “harness the power of migration,” • international migration ºows can enhance, rather than detract from or • compromise, state power.