An Evolving Model for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Aceh

1. An Evolving Model for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Aceh Assessing Post-Helsinki Peacebuilding Initiatives in Aceh Presented by Wiratmadinata

2. 4 Stages of Conflict Transformation Aceh • 1976 – 2000 Intractable Conflict/Protracted Social Conflict • 2000-2004 Pre-peace Negotiation • January, 2005 – August 15, 2005 Peace making and Peace Agreement Processes (Helsinki Peace Talks) • August 16, 2005 – Present Peace Keeping and Peacebuilding of Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Implementation)

3. The Helsinki Accord August 15, 2005 Special Autonomy Arrangements Security Arrangements Social, political, legal and economic arrangements ? ? Acehnese Government CMI, EU, GAM, Indonesia BRA • AMM • Aceh Monitoring Mission • Focus on DDR • UUPA • Law on Governing Aceh • 59 Special Regulations • (Qanum) BRA Reintegration and Peace Fund COSA Operated for 18 months ’05-’06 <$21 million ’06-’07 <$21 million ’07-’08 <$25 million ’08-’09 <$68 million General Elections TRC Continuation of DDR Aceh Human Rights Court Amnesty FKK Coordination and Communication Forum Former GAM < $2,700 PETA Militia < $1,000 Reintegration Fund Hydrocarbon Revenues Assistance for Conflict Victims Housing, education, health Local Political Parties Wali Nangroe Hymn, Flag etc CoSPA Commission on the Sustainability of Peace in Aceh

4. The Helsinki Accord August 15, 2005 Special Autonomy Arrangements Security Arrangements Social, political, legal and economic arrangements ? ? Acehnese Government CMI, EU, GAM, Indonesia BRA • AMM • Aceh Monitoring Mission • Focus on DDR • UUPA • Law on Governing Aceh • 59 Special Regulations • (Qanum) BRA Reintegration and Peace Fund COSA Operated for 18 months ’05-’06 <$21 million ’06-’07 <$21 million ’07-’08 <$25 million ’08-’09 <$68 million General Elections TRC Continuation of DDR Aceh Human Rights Court Amnesty FKK Coordination and Communication Forum Former GAM < $2,700 PETA Militia < $1,000 Reintegration Fund Hydrocarbon Revenues Assistance for Conflict Victims Housing, education, health Local Political Parties Wali Nangroe Hymn, Flag etc CoSPA Commission on the Sustainability of Peace in Aceh

5. Special Autonomy Arrangement • UUPA (Act. No. 11/2006) LoGA: • Creates legal basis for autonomy. • Translated into 59 Special Regulations (Qanun) by the Aceh House of Representatives (including Qanun 7/2007) Key aspects of Special Autonomy • Pilkada (provincial election, 2006) • Reintegration Fund Provided (in progress) • Retain 70% of current and future hydrocarbon deposits revenue (in process) • Amnesty for GAM (Not completed) • Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Not yet formed) • Aceh Human Rights Court (Not yet formed) • Economic Facility; Farming Land and Social Security (Not yet formed) • Wali Nanggroe; Aceh Hymn, Flag and Symbol (Not yet resolved) • Significance: • Power sharing, containing grievances and reintegration. • Forced cooperation and trust building.

6. The Helsinki Accord August 15, 2005 Special Autonomy Arrangements Security Arrangements Social, political, legal and economic arrangements ? ? Acehnese Government CMI, EU, GAM, Indonesia BRA • AMM • Aceh Monitoring Mission • Focus on DDR • UUPA • Law on Governing Aceh • 59 Special Regulations • (Qanum) BRA Reintegration and Peace Fund COSA Operated for 18 months ’05-’06 <$21 million ’06-’07 <$21 million ’07-’08 <$25 million ’08-’09 <$68 million General Elections TRC Continuation of DDR Aceh Human Rights Court Amnesty FKK Coordination and Communication Forum Former GAM < $2,700 PETA Militia < $1,000 Reintegration Fund Hydrocarbon Revenues Assistance for Conflict Victims Housing, education, health Local Political Parties Wali Nangroe Hymn, Flag etc CoSPA Commission on the Sustainability of Peace in Aceh

7. Security Arrangement/Peacekeeping • AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission; EU and ASEAN peacekeepers) • DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration) • GAM troops disarmed and dismissed • Indonesian non-organic forces withdrawn • Reintegration • AMM existed for 18 months • Lacked a well-planned exit strategy • Commission of Security Arrangements (CoSA) • Consists of GAM and Indonesian representatives. • Discussed misunderstandings and technical matters regarding Helsinki; communicated during low level clashes. • The continuation: FKK (Coordination and Communication Forum) and CoSPA (Commission on Sustainability Peace).

8. The Helsinki Accord August 15, 2005 Special Autonomy Arrangements Security Arrangements Social, political, legal and economic arrangements ? ? Acehnese Government CMI, EU, GAM, Indonesia BRA • AMM • Aceh Monitoring Mission • Focus on DDR • UUPA • Law on Governing Aceh • 59 Special Regulations • (Qanum) BRA Reintegration and Peace Fund COSA Operated for 18 months ’05-’06 <$21 million ’06-’07 <$21 million ’07-’08 <$25 million ’08-’09 <$68 million General Elections TRC Continuation of DDR Aceh Human Rights Court Amnesty FKK Coordination and Communication Forum Former GAM < $2,700 PETA Militia < $1,000 Reintegration Fund Hydrocarbon Revenues Assistance for Conflict Victims Housing, education, health Local Political Parties Wali Nangroe Hymn, Flag etc CoSPA Commission on the Sustainability of Peace in Aceh

9. Reintegration And Peace Arrangement (BRA) • Origins • Formed by Forbes Damai –a multi-stakeholder group initiated by Aceh Civil Society Organization (CSO) • Endorsed by the Governor of Aceh in 2006 • It is both advisory and implementing body with two branches and a Secretariat (funded by USAID) • BRA initiatives include • Economic and social assistance to conflict victims • Assistance to former combatants, political prisoners • Reconstruction help for those who lost houses • Compensation for the families of victims • Spending decided by government budgeting. • BRA focuses on monetary disbursement no deeper transitional justice or reintegration efforts. • BRA is still developing

10. Aceh Reintegration and Peace Agency (BRA) • Aceh Reintegration Fund Budget: • 2005-2006: < $ 21 million • 2006-2007: < $ 21 million • 2007-2008: < $ 25 million • 2008-2009 < $ 68 million • 2009-2010: $ TBD • Social Assistance provided per capita: • Former GAM Combatant- < $ 2,700 • PETA “Militia” (Anti-GAM) < $ 1,000 • Former GAM Combatant (surrender) < $ 1,000 • House Damaged < $ 3,000 • Medical Treatment/Disabilities Varies • Scholarship for the Victims children Varies • Cultural Support

11. Current Challenges to the Peace Process (1of 3)Challenges involving GAM • The growth of the KPA (Aceh Transition Committee) • KPA acts as GAM’s “shadow power” • KPA is falsely presented as an official part of the peace process. • GAM leaders now command KPA • Incomplete Disarmament • Crime increased following Helsinki • The DDR process left weapons in circulation • Former combatants turning to violent crime • GAM’s Transition to Politics • GAM became the Aceh Party (PA) • Still not purely political - intimidation and KPA persist. • GAM is splitting into factions – leadership is losing control

12. Current Challenges to the Peace Process (2 of 3)Challenges for Peace Process Institutions • Bringing Conceptual Politics into everyday Life • Plans difficult to actualize • Aceh government lacks capacity to deliver basic services • Rise in Serious Crime • These details impact society’s support of the peace process and perceptions of the government. • Finding the correct role for the BRA • Now it only disperses funding • BRA has ‘investigation teams’ to look at incidents of abuse but no program to analyze and fix root causes. • Future Involvement of CSO • CSO no sufficiently involved in the peace process • Lack resources • Local organizations cannot access donor funds

13. Current Challenges to the Peace Process (3 of 3)Other Challenges • ABAS-ALA calls for independence from Aceh • Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) and Aceh Barat-Selatan (ABAS) want to separate from Aceh • Gayo peoples desire their own territory • May give rise a new conflict • Performance of International Actors • International actors often lack long term vision • Cooperation with local actors tends to be limited to preliminary consultations • IOs have actually pushed local actors out of the process • Little coordination between different donors

14. Recommendations • BRA must be more than a disbursement organization. • More reintegration, reconciliation and sustainable peace initiatives. • Need a reevaluation of the role of international agencies • More long term approaches • More local involvement • A serious crime reduction strategy is needed. • KPA needs to be reformed • Either break ties with GAM or join in legal politics. • Local CSOs need to be involved more • Community integration into the peace process is vital. • Need to provide basic services • Prevents new grievances