190 likes | 374 Views
The (UNDAC) response to the earthquake in Afghanistan 25 March 2002. Structure of the presentation. E Q facts R esponse The UNDAC team Overall Coordination Handover Success + Problems Suggestions for improvement. 25 March 19:26 GMT 6.2 Richter Scale 39 shocks/quakes in 2 days
E N D
The (UNDAC) response to the earthquake in Afghanistan25 March 2002
Structure of the presentation • EQ facts • Response • The UNDAC team • Overall Coordination • Handover • Success + Problems • Suggestions for improvement
25 March 19:26 GMT • 6.2 Richter Scale • 39 shocks/quakes in 2 days • Nahrin District • 800-1,200 killed • 3 – 4,000 injured • 1,500 homes destroyed • 10,000 homes damaged Maps Afghanistan
Operational Obstacles • Difficult access to the area affected • Bad weather conditions • Mines • Interference by local strongmen • Too much aid - insistence that “our” aid should be • delivered
The response (day after - Tuesday) • IOM, UNOCHA by chance arrived PIK at 11.00 - told of disaster by local officials. • IOM, UNOCHA, ACTED, MSF, UNHCR, Concern arrived Nahrin at about 14.30 • OCC set up immediately - initial contacts w Govt • 16.00-18.00: quick assessments with emergency medical assistance. Main task to get sense of area worst affected & extent of damage in this area. • 2 ISAF helicopters overflew area & returned to Kabul for emergency meeting under Karzai. • In Mazar, RCO called agencies together for quick strategy. Trucks were loaded & sent off • Midnight: RCO, GOAL, DFID, UNICEF & THW had arrived.
The OCHA response (Tuesday) • Sitreps 1-3 on 26 March • Constant information exchange with staff in country- Antonio Donini (alert came from Kabul) • Task Force in OCHA Geneva met twice daily • Alert message sent to UNDAC team
The response (2 to 4 days after) Wednesday • Initial assessments complemented by all day assessment by aid community covering 71 villages during the day. A few inaccessible areas assessed from the air. • Karzai & DSRSG visited area - another tremor (6.2). Difficult to assess further damage, but required repeated assessments of certain areas. • In the morning first distribution began and during day & night about 5,200 families reached with NFIs. Thursday • Govt arriving from Kabul; asked to cover new villages • A further 5,200 families were covered with NFIs. Friday ….
The OCHA response (2 to 4 days after) • SitReps (# 4-6 on 27-28 March) • Deployment of a 4-member UNDAC Team • $100,000 emergency cash grant • Convened I-A meeting (27 March)
What the UNDAC Team faced • Hum programme mechanisms transplanted from Mazar to Nahrin & many people involved in disasters before, not least the EQ 1 month earlier • Emergency response set-up & well underway • No room or need to work as separate entity - wanted “warm bodies” • People too busy dealing with immediate problems, rather than provide an overview of the structure • Never clear when people were leaving, considerably hindering proper planning
The Dream Team • Gul Mohammad Fazli - logistics support; translator; assessments; troubleshooting • Henri-Francois Morand - operations of OCC; directing people; troubleshooting • Ted Pearn - aid verification & assessment; troubleshooting • Christian Skoog - team leader; overall coordinator (day 4 onwards); troubleshooting; investigation of lists, distribution & aid “hijacking”; assessments
Overall Coordination • DSRSG-RRR in Kabul • Onsite Coordination Cell (OCC) in Nahrin • UN Regional Coordination Officer had the lead • High level representatives from the IA • UNAMA, OCHA, IOM, GOAL, DFID, WHO, UNHCR,WFP, CONCERN, …. • Overall coordination meeting three times daily • Sectoral meetings once a day • Initial Division of Labor • Aid community = overall assessment & response • AIA = provision of identified beneficiaries • ISAF = management of helipad • CIMIC = assistance in assessment
Cutting Edge Operations Coordination Cell (OCC) Beautiful yellow OCC sign swept away by storm winds
Handover • To Govt – residual emergency assistance, lists, questions/complaints from beneficiaries, NFIs Setting up of reconstruction programme • To UNCT/RCO - briefing • To OCHA desk (myself) - follow-up issues, OCHA grants, LL • Of equipment - computers, phones, furniture, tents
Main reasons for success 1. Available resources (both staff and stocks of relief items) not far from the earthquake-affected area (because of the return programme) 2. The existing coordination structure in the region 3. A team of 4-5 extremely professional staff from different agencies who undertook coordination at the operational level 4. Excellent cooperation & attitude among orgs 5. Support and cooperation from the Government
Main problems 1. Misapplication - tents next to solid houses 2. Misappropriation - authorities, commanders, aid agencies, prevented legitimate beneficiaries from getting their share No more human suffering but created sense of unfairness & bad precedent 3. No/bad population/beneficiary figures (also different criteria (total or beneficiary))
Main reasons for problems “Problems stemmed from the successes of the response: its speed and wealth of resources at hand. Because truckloads of relief items were seen going into Nahrin, and the call for lists of qualifying families went out from the OCC through local authorities, there was a huge opportunity for abuse of the system”. (follow-up report by UNAMA)
1. Preparedness - Agencies to agree on who will be responsible for what throughout the whole emergency phase. Template assessment forms. 2. Better cataloguing of relief items. - Additional information should have been collected centrally (in the OCC). What’s coming in and what’s going out? 3. ISAF involvement - better tasking 4. Helpdesk in OCC. 5. A dedicated information person in OCC. 6. More/enough dedicated translators. 7. More use of qualified Afghans from other locations. 8. Actual time to get to the disaster area must be assessed prior to putting someone on the UNDAC team 9. More information on UNDAC Room for improvement
What we faced – What we did • Existing hum programme • no need to invent one • Response set-up & underway since 3 days • no need to change much • Wanted “warm bodies” • tone down team concept • People too busy to brief • figure out ourselves • Never clear when people were leaving • best guesses • A team of generalists • warm bodies could be used for “anything”