The Nuclear Options: Decision Analysis at the Nexus of Engineering and Policy

1. The Nuclear Options: Decision Analysis at the Nexus of Engineering and Policy Jarret Lafleur, Ph.D. Homeland Security & Defense Systems Center Sandia National Laboratories Livermore, California AIAA Society & Aerospace Technology Technical Committee Meeting January 13, 2014

2. Presentation Roadmap • About Sandia • U.S. Nuclear Policy Context • Highlights from Recent Work • Structure for the Nuclear Force Structure Discussion • Diversity and Deterrent Force Reliability • Cost Estimation Office

3. About Sandia

4. U.S. DOE National Laboratories Pacific Northwest Idaho Fermi LawrenceBerkeley Brookhaven NationalRenewableEnergy NationalEnergy Technology Lawrence Livermore Ames Argonne Sandia Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Princeton Thomas Jefferson Los Alamos Oak Ridge Sandia SavannahRiver LEGEND = Environmental Management = NNSA Labs = Fossil Energy = Science = Nuclear Energy = Energy Efficiency & Renewables

5. DOE/NNSA National Security Laboratory Broad mission in developing science and technology applications to meet our rapidly changing, complex national security challenges Safety, security and reliability of our nation’s nuclear weapon stockpile Sandia National LaboratoriesExceptional Service in the National Interest • Sandia began as the Z Division of Los Alamos in 1945, as a single-purpose engineering organization for non-nuclear systems in nuclear weapons. • Became Sandia Laboratory in 1948 and a DOE national lab in 1979. • Today Sandia is a multiprogram lab that engages a broad spectrum of national security issues. Sandia’s Origin

6. Sandia’s People • On-site workforce: 11,200 • FY10 regular employees: 8,400 • FY10 budget: $2.5B Disciplines of Most Technical Hires (FY03 – FY05) Top 3 hire fields comprise approximately 55% of technical hires • CS CE • EE • ME Technical Staff (3,844) by Degree (End of FY08) Top 5 hire fields are approximately 70% of technical hires • Physics • Chemistry Top 11 hire fields represent approximately 90% of technical hires • Chemical Eng • Materials Science • Math • Biology • Nuclear Eng • Aerospace Eng Physics 6% Math 2% Chemistry 4% Computing 16% Other Science 4% Other Fields 17% Electrical Engineering 19% Mechanical Engineering 16% Other Engineering 15%

7. Sandia’s Five Mission Areas • Nuclear Weapons • Defense Systems and Assessments • Energy, Resources and Nonproliferation • Homeland Security and Defense • Science, Technology and Engineering

8. U.S. Nuclear policy context

9. U.S. Nuclear Policy U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2009 Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nm_book_5_11/docs/NMHB2011.pdf 1 • The U.S. will seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons • Reductions in numbers and role in U.S. national security strategy • May not be reached quickly • As long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, to: • Deter potential adversaries • Assure allies and partners they can count on America’s commitments http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf 2

10. U.S. Nuclear Policy U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2009 Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nm_book_5_11/docs/NMHB2011.pdf • One way the U.S. demonstrates commitment to the first goal is through constraints on the second goal: • No nuclear tests • No new warheads or nuclear military capabilities • However, weapons and platforms continue to age. • A number of decisions in the next two decades on warhead and delivery platform life extension and replacement programs will have a long-term impact on the composition and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf

11. The U.S. Nuclear Triad Air Land Sea Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missile B-2 Spirit Source: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82 B-52 Stratofortress Source: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/trident-ii-d5-fleet-ballistic-missile--fbm-.html Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Source http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=83 B61 Bomb B83 Bomb LGM-30G Minuteman III Air LaunchedCruise Missile Source: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/today/ssbn.html Source: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=113

12. Recent Cases for Triad Leg Elimination Johnson et. al., Mitchell Inst. / Northrop Grumman, 2009 Cartwright et. al., Global Zero, 2012 Land Air Sea Source: http://www.globalzero.org/en/us-nuclear-policy-commission-report Jacobs, CSIS, 2012 • Rationale • SSBN-X expected to cost nearly $350 billion over 50 years • Survivability is maintained by the aggregate of the air and land legs • In likely nuclear use scenarios, capable nuclear offense is more important than a survivable defense • Rationale • Of any other diad, ICBM/SLBM is most similar in deterrent value and stability to the triad • The U.S. is already on a path toward such a de facto ICBM/SLBM diad • Rationale • Russia overflight precludes non-Russia ICBM use • ICBMs invite high risks of nuclear use based on rushed decision-making Source: http://www.northropgrumman.com/analysis-center/other-publications/assets/triad-monograph.pdf Source: http://csis.org/blog/should-we-eliminate-nuclear-subs

13. Highlights from Recent Work Structure for the Nuclear force Structure Discussion

14. Triad Analyses: A Typical Approach Brainstormed Force Structure #1 Brainstormed Force Structure #3 Brainstormed Force Structure #2 Broad Objectives Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation Pros Pros Pros Cons Cons Cons ? e.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21st century.” Challenge: How to judge one alternative against another? Here, each evaluation was coupled with an implicit definition of objectives.

15. A Formal Decision Analysis Approach Brainstormed Force Structure #1 Brainstormed Force Structure #3 Brainstormed Force Structure #2 Structured Criteria Note: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance. Broad Objectives e.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21st century.” Evaluation How well does each alternative perform with respect to each criterion?

16. A Formal Decision Analysis Approach Structured Criteria Note: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance. What is an underlying, unifying value hierarchy for U.S nuclear force structure decisions?

17. Literature Value Hierarchy Analysis Note: This work makes no judgements on the validity of authors’ arguments. It examines only the structure of the arguments’ perceivable value hierarchies.

18. A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Costs Risks Capacity to Promote Peace

19. A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Costs Risks Capacity to Promote Peace Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Non-Nuclear Defense and Security “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons… [but] make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary …” President Barack Obama, April 2009

20. A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Costs Risks Capacity to Promote Peace Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Non-Nuclear Defense and Security Means vs. Ends Metrics Denial of Benefits During-Conflict Action Penetrability Means Note: This hierarchy adopts the decomposition of deterrence from the Dec. 2006 DoD Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept. Near-Term Damage Imposition of Costs Command and Control Integration Ends Force Endurance Long-Term Damage Promptness Survivability Accuracy Cross-Cutting Means Resilience Range Number of Deliverable Weapons Third-Country Overflight Avoidance Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement During Crisis Military Capability Destruction Political Leadership Destruction = Additional lower tiers exist Industrial Capacity Destruction Strategic Population Destruction

21. A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Philosophy: Overall deterrence can be considered a “portfolio” of specific deterrences. Costs Risks Capacity to Promote Peace Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Non-Nuclear Defense and Security Scenario #1 Scenario #2 Scenario #3 Scenario #4 Scenario #5 Denial of Benefits During-Conflict Action Penetrability Means Near-Term Damage Imposition of Costs Command and Control Integration Ends Force Endurance Long-Term Damage Promptness Survivability Accuracy Cross-Cutting Means Resilience Range Number of Deliverable Weapons Third-Country Overflight Avoidance Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement During Crisis Military Capability Destruction Political Leadership Destruction = Additional lower tiers exist Industrial Capacity Destruction Strategic Population Destruction

22. How is such a hierarchy useful? For the Policy Advocate For the Policy Analyst • Provides list of criteria to address in a balanced, complete argument • Offers guidance on which criteria are logical components of others • Provides simple mental model of objectives, enhancing communication • Provides a pathway for quantitative, multi-objective decision analysis • Provides list of criteria authors should have addressed in a balanced, complete argument • Offers guidance on whether authors are arguing about competing criteria at the same logical tier • Helps isolate sources of disagreement between arguments • Provides visibility into which objectives the authors valued more highly than others

23. Highlights from Recent Work Diversity and Deterrent Force Reliability

24. Diversity and Technical Risk “[LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead] study will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types.” “As the stockpile ages and becomes both smaller and less diverse … there is inevitably less flexibility to adjust for technical failures that could arise … Mitigating technical risk, therefore, will cause us in the near term to … seek to preserve diversity of warhead types in the overall stockpile.” Available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf Cost Notional Enterprise Risk andCost Enterprise Risk Increased Development & Production Costs Increased Risk of Common Mode Failure Diagram excerpted from McDowell and Walker, “Lifecycle Opportunities and Challenges with an Interoperable Warhead Approach”, Sandia National Laboratories Increased Cost of Surveillance, Maintenance Increased adversary risk Highly Common Highly Diverse Component Diversity

25. Triads, Diads, and Interoperability Warhead Interoperability Decisions influence Risk of Technical Failure Nuclear Force Diversity influences Triad vs. Diad Decisions influence Can quantitative methods further inform these decisions? Reliability engineering encompasses a set of tools and techniques that describe the probability that a system is functional over a given time interval.

26. Deterrent Force Reliability Terminology and Background Symbol Deterrent Force Reliability:The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is functional at a given time. Deterrent Force Unreliability: The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is not functional at a given time. or Deterrent Force Failure Probability (= 1–R) Reliability Block Diagram: A graphical representation of how the components of a system are structured with regards to the system’s state of functionality. S1 S2 Series System Parallel System S1 More difficult to break S2 “Easy” to break

27. Deterrent Force Reliability Today’s Force Structure Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption ALCM B-52 NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NN NN NN NN NN NN NN B61 W80 W88 W87 B83 W78 W76 B-2 ICBM vs. SLBM SSBN (notional)

28. Deterrent Force Reliability Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption ALCM B-52 NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NN NN NN NN NN NN B61 Warhead Warhead W80 B83 Warhead B-2 ICBM vs. SLBM SSBN (notional)

29. Deterrent Force Reliability Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Land) Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption ALCM B-52 NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NN NN NN NN NN NN B61 W80 IW Warhead B83 Warhead B-2 ICBM vs. SLBM SSBN (notional)

30. Deterrent Force Reliability Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Sea) Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption ALCM B-52 NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NN NN NN NN NN NN IW B61 Warhead W80 Warhead B83 B-2 Properly chosen interoperability may maintain the deterrent force reliability of today’s force structure, even with reduced warhead diversity. ICBM vs. SLBM SSBN (notional)

31. Deterrent Force Reliability Leg Elimination Options Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption ALCM B-52 NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NEP NN NN NN NN NN NN NN W88 W80 W87 B61 B83 W76 W78 B-2 Technical risks avoided through warhead interoperability investments may be dwarfed by technical risks accepted in a triad leg elimination decision. ICBM vs. 1,000,000 times higher than baseline triad 1,000 times higher than baseline triad 500 times higher than baseline triad SLBM SSBN (notional)

32. Highlights from Recent Work Cost Estimation Office

33. Cost Estimation Office “A central finding of the book is that government officials [over the past six decades] made little effort to ensure that limited economic resources were used as efficiently as possible so that nuclear deterrence could be achieved at the least cost to taxpayers. While the costs of individual programs were debated from time to time, the near total absence of data documenting either annual or cumulative costs of the overall effort made effective democratic debate and oversight all but impossible …” • Compared to previous decades, constrained federal budgets have produced heightened awareness of cost considerations in weapon system development trade studies. • Sandia is leading development of a parametric cost estimation capability for early-phase weapon life extension program cost trades. Brookings Institution Press, 1998 Sample Modern Parametric Cost Estimation Tools:

34. Aerospace & Defense Interactions January February March April March 26, 2013 Pasadena, CA NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Cost and Risk Analysis Workshop April 24, 2013 Washington, DC DoD Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation Advanced Systems Cost Analysis Organization Jan. 23, 2013 El Segundo, CA Aerospace Corporation Concept Design Center Concurrent Engineering Group Jan. 22, 2013 Pasadena, CA NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Team X Concurrent Engineering Group Jan. 11, 2013 Dallas, TX Lockheed Martin Aeronautics ADP (Skunk Works) Cost Est. Group

35. Questions?