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CARE-ASAS Activity 3: ASM Autonomous Aircraft OHA

This workshop aims to assess operational hazards in Autonomous Aircraft (AA) operations, identify safety-influencing factors, and propose risk mitigation measures through qualitative analysis of failure scenarios.

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CARE-ASAS Activity 3: ASM Autonomous Aircraft OHA

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  1. CARE-ASAS Activity 3: ASMAutonomous Aircraft OHA CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  2. Objectives and tasks • Objectives: • Qualitative assessment of operational hazards related to Autonomous Aircraft (AA) operations • Identification of “safety-influencing factors” • R&D work, not definitive results • Tasks: • High-level description of operational procedures and CNS/ASAS functions based on AA-OSED • Analysis of operational failure scenarios • Consolidation of risk mitigation measures CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  3. Customised OHA method Customised OHA method to facilitate identification of factors that may directly or indirectly impact the Airborne Separation Minima CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  4. Phase Next phase Condition Title Functions P0 Surrounding traffic surveillance and monitoring (air-air) CNS, CD, ASAS display P0 P1 C0 Conflict detected ASAS operations description CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  5. Operational failure scenarios • Failure conditions related to system functional characteristics and operational procedures: • Various failure modes either related to system functions or human operations: • Detected/undetected loss, incorrect/misleading (erroneous detected/ undetected) function (or information) • Lack of (or inability), incorrect/misleading operation (or human action) • Operational failure scenarios assessment: • Effects on operations, detection and correction means (with associated (ASS, SR, REC) • Resulting operational consequences (OHs) CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  6. Effects on flight deck, air traffic control and operations Possible cause with environmental factors Safety influencing factors Operational hazard description CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  7. Identified operational hazards • During normal evolution in FFAS: • Aircraft flying in FFAS without or with degraded CNS capabilities (OH 1 to OH 6) • During normal CD&R in FFAS: • Missing, delayed or incorrect CD&R by aircraft that has (or does not have) priority during conflict in FFAS (OH 7 to OH 12) • Induced conflict by aircraft manoeuvring in FFAS (OH 13,14) • During abnormal operations in FFAS: • Multiple OHs in FFAS (OH 15) or during abnormal exit of FFAS (OH 16,17) CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  8. Main OSED mitigations (1/2) • Aircraft flying in FFAS without RNAV/ASAS capability: • Segregated FFAS airspace with only suitably equipped aircraft with qualified flight crew (ASS/ENV 1 ) • Including 4D RNAV, ADS-B transmitter/receiver, ASAS based on ADS-B only, and CDTI equipment • Including priorities rules defining which aircraft in conflict has to manoeuvre (ASS/OPS 1 ) • Emergency procedure in case of an ADS-B/ASAS, or navigation, system failure (ASS/OPS 9, ASS/OPS 10) • Aircraft in emergency situation has right of way over interfering traffic in FFAS (ASS/OPS 11) CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  9. Main OSED mitigations (2/2) • Aircraft co-operation during CD&R process in FFAS: • Flight crews’ monitoring of conflict resolution (ASS/OPS 7 ): • Assisted by both aural and visual alarms at TLow minutes before potential loss of separation (ASS/SYS 1) • Increasing alarm levels (respectively at TMedium and THigh minutes) before potential loss of separation (ASS/SYS 2 ) • Flight crews’ agreement on a common resolution strategy: • In case of incompatible aircraft priorities during a conflict (ASS/OPS 3) • If the conflict is not solved TMedium minutes before loss of separation(ASS/OPS 5) CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  10. Additional OHA mitigations (1/3) • Aircraft flying in FFAS with degraded ASAS capability: • Independent ADS-B emission and reception capabilities (SR/SYS 1) • To allow the “see or being seen” principle even in case of one aircraft failure • Alerting mechanism in case of ASAS system failure (SR/SYS 6) • Additional recommendations even in conflict-free situations: • Flight crews’ monitoring of surrounding traffic (REC/OPS 1 ) • ASAS alerting when an aircraft in proximity is suddenly no more detected(REC/SYS 4 ) CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  11. Additional OHA mitigations (2/3) • Aircraft flying in FFAS with degraded navigation capability: • Different separation minima depending on Actual Navigation Performances (ANP) of the aircraft (SR/ENV 2) • Emergency procedure applied in case of inappropriate ANP within FFAS (SR/OPS 3) • Alerting mechanism in case of 4D RNAV navigation system failure (SR/SYS 5) • Display of uncertainty associated with ADS-B traffic position on CDTI (REC/SYS 5 ) CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  12. Additional OHA mitigations (3/3) • Potential loss of separation in FFAS: • At that THigh minutes before potential loss of separation: • Additional rules of flight applicable within FFAS (SR/ENV 1) • Flight crews manoeuvring of their aircraft independently from their assigned priority using applicable rules of flight in FFAS (SR/OPS 8) • Based on independent surveillance: • Alerting mechanism in case of any (imminent) loss of separation (SR/SYS 7) • Conflict information to the flight crew in case of (imminent) loss of separation (SR/SYS 8) CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

  13. Main OHA results OHs (17) with severity assignment&Safety influencing factors including OPS (27), SYS (22), ENV (6) with ASS (28), SR (20), REC (7) • Mainly related to “airborne self-separation” inside FFAS • More in-depth analysis of aircraft system failure scenarios than human-related errors CARE/ASAS Activity 3: ASM workshop Brétigny, 19 December 2001

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