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Secure Friend Discovery in Mobile Social Networks

Secure Friend Discovery in Mobile Social Networks. 张展鹏. Authors. Wei Dong. Vacha Dave. Lili Qiu. Yin Zhang. ( 德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校 ). Abstract. Outline. Problem definition. Potential attacks. Implementation &Evaluation. Approach. Problem definition. Why we need security?

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Secure Friend Discovery in Mobile Social Networks

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  1. Secure Friend Discovery in Mobile Social Networks 张展鹏

  2. Authors Wei Dong Vacha Dave Lili Qiu Yin Zhang (德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校)

  3. Abstract

  4. Outline Problem definition Potential attacks Implementation &Evaluation Approach

  5. Problem definition • Why we need security? • Reluctant to reveal their presence and personal profile(privacy) • Unwise to blindly trust information received from an arbitrary person(trust) www.pptcn.com

  6. Problem definition • Why not central servers? • The need of direct access to the internet. • Privacy of location and personal data. • The problem of bottleneck. www.pptcn.com

  7. Problem definition A B • What is “trust” exactly? • Proximity measure www.pptcn.com

  8. Problem definition Martrix multiplication Dot product How to calculate proximity? P(i,j) : the proximity from users i to j Node i is associated with a pair of vectors U[i,r] and V[i,r]. P(i,j) ≈ U[i,r] . V[j,r] www.pptcn.com

  9. Problem definition Estimate proximity from social coordinates’ dot product “social coordinates” ie., U[i,r], user’s attributes vector www.pptcn.com

  10. Problem definition %^&* *&^% www.pptcn.com

  11. Protential attacks breach a user's location privacy based on her social coordinate

  12. Protential attacks breach a user's location privacy based on her social coordinate

  13. Protential attacks

  14. Protential attacks Percentage of unique dot products as a function of precision.

  15. Protential attacks Percentage of unique dot products as a function of precision.

  16. Protential attacks Other attacks ie., DoS,forgery,tracking users

  17. Apporach Gogals Preserving the privacy of social coordinates. Perserving the privacy of social proximity. Preventing user tracking. Providing authentication and verification. Efficient filtering.

  18. Apporach 3 major components authentication without long-term linability to a trusted server Proximity Pre-fitering Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable)

  19. Apporach authentication without long-term linability to a trusted server virtual ID( time-bound) expiration time encrypted social coordinates server's digital signature

  20. Apporach Proximity Pre-fitering

  21. Apporach Proximity Pre-fitering start Q.X, c’,g a,h β Bob,u Alice, v

  22. Apporach Proximity Pre-fitering start Q.X, c’,g a,h YES/NO Bob,u Alice, v

  23. Apporach

  24. Apporach Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable) Homomorphic encryption（同态加密） 5*B=？ EA（5） EA(5*B) F(EA(5),EA(B)) = EA(5*B) Bob Alice

  25. Apporach Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable)

  26. Apporach Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable) protocol 0 w’ Bob Alice

  27. Apporach Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable) protocol 1 Bob Alice

  28. Apporach Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable) protocol 2 Bob Alice

  29. Apporach Proximity Pre-fitering start Q.X, c’,g a,h β Bob,u Alice, v

  30. Implementation HP IPAQ MOTO Droid PC Windows mobile Android Windows Vista

  31. Implementation 2.Proximity Pre-fitering

  32. Implementation 3.Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable)

  33. Implementation 3.Proximity compuation(Private and Verifiable)

  34. Conclusion 2 existing protocols & modification

  35. Thanks for your attention

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