220 likes | 539 Views
THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION An Analysis of the Egyptian Police Response. Prof. Dr. Mamdooh A. Abdelmottlep Professor of C riminal Justice Sharjah Police Research Centre U.A.E drmamdooh@hotmail.com. On January 25, 2011.
E N D
THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTIONAn Analysis of the Egyptian Police Response Prof. Dr. Mamdooh A. Abdelmottlep Professor of Criminal Justice Sharjah Police Research Centre U.A.E drmamdooh@hotmail.com
On January 25, 2011 • January 25 is the National Egyptian Police Day, Yearly Police celebration with civilians and government officials. • However, on this day, locals gathered at Tahrir (freedom) Square in Cairo to protest against police behavior and treatment. • Communication via Twitter, Facebook, SMS, email, etc. to spread the word to the youth community to protest at Tahrir Square. • 1-2 hours later approximately 2 million citizens appeared at Tahrir square demanding change
Purpose of gathering at Tahrir Square To speak out against: • Police abuse, corruption, behavior and treatment to citizen. • Political corruption and the lack of change in political power. • To make sure that the power wasn’t passed down to Hosni Mubarak’s son. • To seek change in the increasing unemployment rate. But the mean reason is Police abuse of power. (Khaled’s case)
How did the police engage with PEACFUL demonstrations? • The Police confronted these peaceful demonstrations with excessive violence, using tear gas, water cannons, batons, beatings, and K-9. • Demonstration leaders were seized by undercover officers, who also used bullies and the homeless to attack demonstrators. • Armored vehicles were also used to disperse the demonstrators.
Security Vacuum • The Minister of the Interior issued direct orders to suspend all communication venues (internet, telephone calls and the messaging services of Egypt.) • Rubber bullets and live ammunition were authorized resulting in the death and injury of protesters. • The order was not popular with the Minister of Interior, who then ordered the withdrawal of police forces from all sites, vital installations, leaving the Egyptian streets lawless. • President Mubarak ordered the army to protect the protesters and the state.
Assessment of the use of force against the demonstrators The use of force by the Egyptian Police against the demonstrators raised four major questions: • Was it necessary for the Egyptian Police to use force? • Did the police use excessive force? • Was there any order issued that permitted police to use force against the demonstrators? • Was there any use of “outlaws” by the Egyptian police to bully and commit violent acts against the demonstrators?
Was it necessary for the Egyptian Police to use force in confronting the demonstrators? • The Egyptian Police Law stated that a policeman has the right to use force to the extent necessary to perform his duty, if it is the only way to perform this duty. • It is clear from the previous discussion that the demonstrations were peaceful in different parts of Egypt. • The police used water cannons, and when these failed, they fired a hail of rubber bullets, cartridges and live ammunition, injuring and killing many protestors.
Did the police use excessive force to disperse the demonstrators? • The large number of deaths and injuries; the number of the people killed was at least 840. • Most of the fatal injuries were in the head and chest, indicating the focused aiming and the deployment of police snipers. • The bullets that were fired by the police hit some people who were watching the events from the balconies and windows of their houses adjacent to the police stations. These incidents were the result of indiscriminate shootings, or attempts by police personnel to prevent people from taking photographs of the assaults on demonstrators. • Some of the demonstrators were deliberately crushed by police armored vehicles.
Was there any order issued that permitted police to use force against the demonstrators? • The order to use firearms by the police is only issued by a senior officer (Minister of Interior) Such action indicated that: • Police use of firearms occurred in most of the Egyptian cities, specifying that an order had been issued by a central authority in the Ministry of Interior. • The issuance and delivery of firearms and live ammunition to the police forces in all cities in order to disperse the demonstrations can only be authorized through an order issued by a senior authority in the Ministry of Interior.
Was there any use of “outlaws” by the Egyptian police to bully and commit violent acts against the demonstrators? • A group of horses and camel riders gathered and headed for Al Tahrir square, breaking through railings that had been erected by the Army to secure the demonstrators. They attacked and beat the demonstrators, causing injuries and some even led to death. • It also appeared that there were some undercover officers involved in hiring outlaws to attack protesters.
Egyptian Police Reformation • In 1990, my recommendations in my P.h.D thesis was to vindicate that police work should be a "profession" and not a "job". • Seven major themes or stages should be followed in regards to the modernization of the Egyptian police and police reform.
First Stage: Developing Strategies for the Egyptian Police 1. Establishing a strategy for the Ministry of Interior (Homeland Security) 2. Building a culture of excellence in the police service 3. Providing an encouraging environment for creativity
Second Stage: Promoting the concept of civilian role policing The concept of a civilian role in policing consists of two major elements: 1. The way in which the police serve the public. 2. The measurement of police services in terms of public satisfaction, response times to calls for service, and other standard measures of police performance.
Third Stage: Reformation of the internal organizational structure and enhancing the human resources of the police The Ministry of Interior should: • Restructure in order to serve the concept of civilian control, and to establish a system for police personnel that protects the job security • Eradicate the caste system, minimize job and financial differences, and ensure fair distribution of police resources and allocations • Reform unfair salary scale distribution among police structure
Fourth Stage: Reformation of the police education system • Modifying the education and training structure of police academy • Establishing colleges of Criminal Justice
Fifth Stage: Reformation of police training • Specialized training should focus in particular on developing positive relationships with the public, on human rights, police technologies, and public security. • Although the Egyptian Police has experienced police instructors, they must also be educated in the area of developing police training.
Sixth Stage: Technology in police work • Police organizations should increase their reliance on technology, especially in the fields of police management, infrastructure protection, security operations and the sharing of security information. • The use of technology should also be used to improve criminal investigation, resource allocation, traffic control, and crime prevention. • Technology can help develop professionalism and will definitely minimize the use of the traditional policing practices associated with torture, intimidation to obtain confessions or extract information.
Seventh Stage: Privatization of some police services The Egyptian police consists of: • General Services Police • Patrol • Traffic Police • Prisons • Civil Defense and Rescue • Special Forces • Tourism Police • Customs and Immigration Police • General Investigation Police • Prosecution Police This mass responsibility and complexity caused inefficient police work and corruption.
Privatizing the police work through • Authorize civil entities to carry out the work of utilities, licensing, defense, and civil safety, but under the supervision of the police organization • Put the prisons under the total supervision of the Ministry of Justice, and evaluate the employment of private companies to run them • Obligating the big economic establishments such as: jewelry/gold stores, other large stores and companies, and private enterprises to appoint special and well trained guards, under the supervision of the police • Develop legal guidelines and procedures for the issuance of licenses to private guard firms and coordinate organization with economic establishments specialized in security and guarding • Expand the role of the private security sector to carry out some of the traditional tasks that take up the time of the police and do not contribute to public safety
Conclusion Research supports the theory that police violence and abusiveness toward the demonstrators turned them into an angry mob, further exacerbating their hostility toward the government resulting in the fall of the Mubarak regime. Three aspects of police use of force are examined: the police to resort to violence, whether or not the force was excessive, and whether police use of firearms against antigovernment demonstrators was justified. Results of the study support the argument put forth by the demonstrators that the Egyptian police service was in need of drastic reform in order move it from being a mere security tool of government to a professional police force charged with serving the public. To achieve this end, the police service should be placed under the control of elected officials; Police training must also be reformed, and new security and public safety strategies should be adopted.