Bangladesh Governance Reform: Assessing Progress and Future Pathways

1. 40 Years of Bangladesh: Retrospective and Prospective Where are the Drivers of Governance Reform? Pierre Landell-Mills

2. Purposes of Presentation 1.To place Bangladesh’s progress towards better governance in the context of the North paradigm for state building 2. In light of this discussion to explore who might become the drivers of governance reform 3. To examine how donors might contribute constructively to supporting these drivers

3. North-Wallis-Weingast Paradigm for State Building Fragile  basic mature natural state • limited access-> open access Essence of a ‘natural state’: • Competition among factions of the elite for power: outcome depends on access to the means of violence • Rulers need resources -> negotiate with owners and creators of wealth • Resources ->power-> accumulation of resources

4. Limited access state • Institutions are personalized • Means of violence is dispersed  security forces are not fully controlled by the state • Elite enjoy privileges not accessible to ordinary citizens qualified rule of law  corporations not treated equally (monopolies, rigged procurement, etc.)

5. Open access state • Impersonal elite relationships  Perpetually lived institutions • Security forces under full state/civilian control • Impartial rule of law • Privileges converted into rights under the law available to all citizens • Open and fair competition among political parties, corporations, and CSOs • All citizens equal under the law

6. Transition Limited access  open access: • Privileged relationships  open competition • Arbitrary justice  rule of law for all • Dispersed means of violence  state monopoly under civilian control • Increasing transparency and accountability

7. “Doorstep Conditions” • Rule of law for elites • Perpetually lived institutions both public and non-state • Consolidated control of the means of violence (military and police)

8. Good governance • Impartial rule of law • Open and fair competition among political parties, corporations,and CSOs • Impersonal (i.e.meritocratic) bureaucracy • Transparency and accountability of all state institutions -> free press, separation of powers, etc.

9. How does Bangladesh fit the paradigm? • Personalized relations -> competing elite factions • Deficient and partial rule of law • Security forces capable of acting independently + other forms of violence • Weak institutions of accountability • Lack of transparency • Limited access state

10. Why bother? Who would gain? • Steady growth: true that poverty remains severe but improvement in social indicators has been impressive • Progress falls far short of potential: growth/incomes, public services, human rights • Paradox: economic dynamism, but poor governance ->better governance could raise GDP growth 2-3% p.a. (World Bank)

11. State of governance near-universal agreement • Highly politicised institutions, both state and non-state, divided along party lines • Formally, ‘modern’ laws and institutions are in place, but informal realities are what matter: weak accountability, lack of restraints, disregard for rule of law; little access to justice; inefficiency and corruption in judiciary and police; use of violence/criminality in politics • Most citizens are ‘prisoners’ in a neo-patrimonial system based on unaccountable informal power

12. Governanceissues: • Most public transactions involve corruption -> e.g. procurement, contracting, appointments, services, etc. • Systems of accountability are ineffective -> parliament, audit, ACC, etc. • Dysfunctional bureaucracy: not merit-based; highly centralised • Trends: generally considered as mixed, some positive trends (digital Bangladesh); some worsening (judiciary); some uncertain RTI? Media?

13. Why poor governance? Patronage-based systems for securing and exercising power • Socio-cultural and historical: deep structures (prisoners and escapees) • Constitutional: first-past-the-post, winner takes all; elections promote short-termism; institutions of accountability are ineffective • Economic: hamstrung businesses -- politics seen as way to make money • Slow political renewal: low turnover among senior politicians

14. Drivers of governance reform? • Business groups • Independent media • Professional associations • Policy research and advocacy centres • NGOs

15. Business groups • Strong incentives to promote reform • Ample resources • Politically divided and captured • Short term horizons • Global links • Prefer not to rock the boat

16. Independent media • Resource dependent -> risk capture • No strong traditions • Weak investigative skills • Need a lot of support for building capacity

17. Professional associations • Very varied group • Politically divided • Have yet to play a strong role • Potentially highly influential • Need to assistance to build up capacity

18. Policy research and advocacy centres • Less politically aligned than other groups • Important role in promoting awareness and debate • Heavily dependent on external funding • Vulnerable • Potentially key players

19. DevelopmentNGOs • Numerous with wide geographical coverage • Well resourced but heavily donor dependent • NGO have conflicting goals • Internal governance issues • Support role

20. Special casesCSOs that are dedicated to governance reform • TIB • BRAC-IGS • Manusher Jonno • Key players

21. Can donors help? • Is there a role of the donors in governance reform? • Official donors work with and through governments  they accept the rhetoric and pretend to ignore the reality • Governance reform is very politically sensitive  work through 3rd parties

22. Can Donors Help? Major constraints: • An ‘open access state’ mindset • Mixed motives (idealism v. self interest) • Inappropriate timeframe Opportunities: • catalyst  new ideas from outside • money  support non state actors Switch from supply to demand side fromsupporting state agencies to NSA

23. Donors Incentives Incentives : HQ driven priorities , risk avoidance, technical versus political considerations, and quick wins, leading to: • A short term perspective • Blue-print v. learning approach • Preference for technical ,supply side, capacity building interventions, with milestones and measurable value for money • Too little time to learn about local conditions, understand local politics and build personal relationships

24. Conditions for greater donor effectiveness: Donors need to: • Obtain a better understanding of the political economy context • Map and seek ways to support the potential drivers of governance reform • Accept that governance reform is a slow iterative process – needs a 20+ year time frame, a learning approach, dogged persistence, • And hence, staff willing to stay at least 5-7 years in post

25. Thank you.