CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS

1. CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS

5. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT • TWO TO THREE ARGS FORWARD DEPLOYED • ONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN / ARABIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN AREA • ONE OR TWO IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA. • ONE ARG/MEU IS FORWARD BASED IN SASEBO AND OKINAWA JAPAN.

19. Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses. BHLiddell Hart

29. CRITICALITIES • TRANSITION FROM SEA TO LAND, INVOLVING NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES MOST DIFFICULT. • COMMANDS AND CONTROL OF MULTI- SERVICE, MULTI ENVIRONMENT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX • CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED WATERS INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE ATTACK, PARTICULARLY DURING EARLY PHASES WHEN SUPPORT OF OWN HEAVY WEAPONS NOT AVAILABLE

30. RECENT EMPLOYMENT • FRENCH AND THEN US FORCES FOR OVER 25 YEARS IN INDOCHINA • ANGLO-FRENCH ASSAULT IN SUEZ, • FALKLANDS CONFLICT • US LANDINGS IN GRENADA • COALITION LANDINGS DURING GULF WAR IN 1992 • AUSTRALIAN LANDINGS IN EAST TIMOR • US/ALLIES OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

31. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS • INTRODUCED SINCE EARLY DAYS OF INCEPTION OF INDIAN NAVY • RECOMMENDATION TO POSSESS A SMALL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING INDIA’S REGIONAL INTERESTS SUGGESTED IN 1946 WHEN INDEPEDENCE ON HORIZON. • CURRENT CAPABILITY BRIGADE MINUS

32. INDIAN NAVAL HISTORY • LST INS MAGAR, OF W W II VINTAGE ACQUIRED IN 1949 • APPROVAL ACCORDED IN 1958 TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN A& N ISLANDS • POST INDO CHINA WAR DEBACLE RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER WAS APPOINTED IN PORT BLAIR. • INCREASED INDONESIAN INTRUSIONS IN NICOBAR ISLANDS IN 1965

33. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS • ORDER PLACED FOR TWO LST (M) FROM RUSSIA IN 1965 • INDONESIAN THREAT AND INDONESIAN – PAK BONDING OF 1965 • BOTCHED UP AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX’S BAZAAR IN OPERATION BEAVER AS A PART OF 1971 OPERATIONS . • LESSONS HOISTED IN IMPORTANCE OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS ESTABLISHED

34. AMPHIBIOUS OPS OF INDIAN NAVY • SRI LANKA IN 1988, SOMALIA IN 1995, • CYCLONE RELIEF IN SAURASHTRA IN 1998 /ORISSA IN 2000. • AS A ‘FORCE IN BEING’ ON WEST COAST’ DURING OP PARAKARAM. • PAKISTAN DIVERTED ONE DIVISION FROM LAND BORDERS TO MAKRAN COAST.

35. SCOPE • CURRENT TRENDS IN US NAVY, ROYAL NAVY, PLA NAVY AND AUSTRALIAN NAVY • FOCUSED ATTENTION ON ‘SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT’ • TASKS OF INDIAN NAVY • ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FORCES • DEFINING CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR INDIAN NAVY

36. ROLES OF US NAVY • SEA CONTROL • MARITIME SUPREMACY • POWER PROJECTION • STRATEGIC DETERRENCE • FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE • STRATEGIC SEALIFT

37. ORGANISATION • AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF) • RANGE FROM A SINGLE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) [ARG/MEU (SOC)], TO A LARGER ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF EMPLOYING A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) OR EVEN A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

39. ROLES/ TASKS • MAINLAND OPERATIONS • MAKRAN COAST • BANGLADESH • ASSAULT LANDINGS TO RETAKE LOST TERRITORY. • AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS • TACTICAL DECEPTION.

40. ROLES/ TASKS • DEFENCE OF ISLAND TERRITORIES -1197 ISLANDS • POACHING, SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GUN RUNNING • PENETRATION BYOF FUNDAMENTALIST IN LAKSWADWEEP ISLANDS WITH THE PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY POPULATION • AIRPORT/PORT/ KEY FACILITY SEIZURE

41. OUT OF AREA CONTIGENCIES • IN SUPPORT OF UN /COALITION OPERATIONS • EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS • SHOW OF FORCE/ REINFORCEMENT

42. OTHER TASKS • CONDUCT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS • LIMITED OFFENSIVE ATTACK • HOSTAGE RECOVERY. • GAS AND OIL PLATFORM OPERATIONS. • HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

43. LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS FORCES • SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT • LST(L), LST(M) AND LCUs LACK SPEED • CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT MINIMAL. • HARD BEACHING TO DISCHARGE ARMOUR • VULNERABLE

44. ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES? • MOUNTAIN BRIGADE MINUS OF THE INDIAN ARMY IS DESIGNATED AS THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE. • BASED IN PORT BLAIR UNDER ANC • BATTALIONS CHANGED/ REPLACED EVERY TWO YEARS ON A STAGGERED BASIS • ANOTHER BRIGADE IS KEPT STAND BY ON THE MAINLAND TO AUGMENT THE PORT BLAIR BRIGADE SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

45. LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LIMITED STAND OFF CAPABILTY 1-2 NM • LCAS/GEMINIS VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE • LIMITED SITES FOR HARD BEACHING BY LST(L) • UNDERLOADING OF ENGINES

46. LIMITATIONS - AAV • AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE-BMP AND BDR FROM MECHANIZED INFANTARY • INADEQUATE SEA KEEPING ABILITY • VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE • LIMITED OTH CAPABILTY • GUN TOO LIGHT • CG HOVERCRAFT – LCAC?

47. ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES? • STRETCHED ARMY - OP PARAKRAM, THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE MOBILIZED TO THE WESTERN COMMAND. • THE TWO YEARLY CHANGES EFFECTS TRAINING. • TIME FOR CHANGE OVER BY THE TIME, INCOMING BATTALION GOES THROUGH THE TRAINING AND BECOMES PROFICIENT

48. AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING • NEED YEAR-ROUND TRAINING. • TRAINING SEASONAL- WEATHER DEPENDENT • HIGH SKILLS- NEGOTIATION OF ‘SURF ZONE’ BY BMPS OR LCA • MUSTERING VARIED ASSETS OF COMPONENTS DIFFICULT. • NEED FOR DEDICATED AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL.

49. INTELLIGENCE • MOST CRITICAL • AIR RECONNAISSANCE BY ARC, IAF, IN, CG RESOURCES INCLUDING UAV • SATELLITE • INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LIKE RAW, IB , DIA AND SBS/NAVAL LIAISON TEAMS • SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE • SIGNIT AND COMINT

50. COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS • SUCCESS DEPENDENT ON C3 • ‘LESSONS LEARNT ‘ FILES OF AMPHEXES • INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION LATERALLY