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Introduction to Cognitive Science Philosophy. Nov 2005 :: Lecture #1 :: Joe Lau :: Philosophy HKU. Topics for today. The role of philosophy in cognitive science A brief history of cognitive science Philosophical theories of the mind. Next week. The computer model of the mind
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Introduction to Cognitive SciencePhilosophy Nov 2005 :: Lecture #1 :: Joe Lau :: Philosophy HKU
Topics for today • The role of philosophy in cognitive science • A brief history of cognitive science • Philosophical theories of the mind Next week • The computer model of the mind • Challenges to the computer model
Why philosophy? • Methodology of philosophy - reasoning • Logic and conceptual analysis • Not experimentation. • Cognitive Science is a science. • So why is philosophy relevant to cognitive science?
The relevance of philosophy • Systematic description • Making things clear, systematic, and logical. • Explain the basic concepts and assumptions. • Explaining representation, consciousness, etc. • Describe the big picture. • What is cognitive science? • Critical reflection • Evaluate experiments and arguments. • Constructive speculation • Propose theories and concepts.
Cognitive science again • Cognitive science = Science of the mind • Features • Different areas – perception, language, … • Different levels – task, representation and algorithm, hardware implementation • Inter-disciplinary • Computational explanations of information processing
Before cognitive science • Philosophers • Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, … • The beginning of psychology • Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) • First psychology laboratory • William James (1842-1910) • The Principles of Psychology
Emergence of cognitive science (1950s) • Reaction to behaviorism in psychology • Pavlov, Skinner, Thorndike, Watson, etc. • What is behaviorism? • Scientific psychology shouldfocus only on observable behavior. • Behavior to be explained in terms of conditioning.
The ongoing “cognitive revolution” • Rejection of behaviorism in psychology • Psychological explanations must take into account internal mental states that are not directly observable. • George Miller (1956) “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two” • Chomsky (1957) Syntactic Structures • Chomsky (1959) “A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior” • The start of modern computing and AI • Mathematical definition of computation (Turing, Church, …) • Electronic computers - The beginning of AI • John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, Herbert Simon • Developments in neurophysiology • Brain functions and information processing in neurons • Penfield, Hubel and Wiesel, Sperry, Melzack and Wall
Necessity of interdisciplinary research • Philosophy • Emotions and moods • Emotions and rationality • Psychology • How emotions affect decisions • Linguistics • Emotional words in different cultures • Neurophysiology • Emotions and hormones • The effect of brain damage
Topics for today • The role of philosophy in cognitive science • A brief history of cognitive science • Philosophical theories of the mind
What is the mind? • Mind = the subject of mental states. • What are mental states? • Intentional mental states • Examples: beliefs and desires • Mental states with content. • Emotions • Anger, jealousy, … • Bodily sensations • Pains, itches, … • Perceptions • Seeing a tree, hearing a sound, … • Commonality • Either intentional or conscious.
Substance dualism • The mind = a spiritual substance. • Only a soul can have mental states. • Animals are unconscious machines. • Motivation: immortality & religious beliefs. • Three problems with dualism • Evidential problem • Any evidence for the existence of the soul? • Causal interaction problem • Mental states cause and are caused by physical states. • How does the soul interact with the brain? • Explanatory problem • The soul does not help us explain the nature of the mind.
Materialism / Physicalism • The mind is a physical system. • Mental states are physical states. • Pain = activation of area X of the brain. • Two versions of physicalism • Token physicalism • Every mental state token is a physical state token. • Type physicalism • Every mental state type is a physical state type.
How many letters are there in the box? A A A A A
Type vs. Token physicalism • Token physicalism • Joe’s belief that 1+1=2 at noon = activity of area A of Joe’s brain at noon. • Peter’s belief that 1+1=2 at 3pm= activity of area B of Peter’s brain at 3pm. • Type physicalism • The belief that 1+1=2 = activity of brain area X. • Type physicalism and multiple-realization • Is the identity statement true of every creature with that belief?
Functionalism • Mental state types are defined by functional role. • A mental state token of type T is the physical state that is the occupant of role T. • Role and occupant • The winning ticket = (Roughly) A ticket whose owner is entitled to obtain a prize in some competition, draw, or game. • Pain in humans can be physically different from pain in other animals belief even though they play the same role. • Defined by typical causes and effects.
Functionalism applied to pain • X has pain = X is in a state that is typically caused by bodily injury or disturbances, which causes avoidance behavior and the belief that one is in pain, and the desire to eliminate the pain.
The computer model of the mind • How is it related to functionalism?
The computer model of the mind • Weak version - Computations are necessary for explaining mental processes. • The mind has a computational level of description. • Strong version - Computations are necessary and sufficient for explaining mental processes. • Implication - The right kind of computation will be sufficient for the existence of a mind.
A cruise missile • Computations necessary • For self-guided navigation. • Computations sufficient?
Functionalism about the mind • Strong version of the computer model • Computations are necessary and sufficient for having a mind. • Mental state types are defined by their role in a program / functional organization. • Program • For F = 1 to 10 • Print F • Next F
Implications of functionalism • Computational copying is sufficient for mental duplication. • If X is computationally the same as Y, and X has a mind, then Y also has a mind. • Material implementation is not directly relevant for having a mind. • It does not matter what Y is made of, as long as the computations can be implemented in the hardware.
Chinese Nation exampleNed Block (1978) “Troubles with Functionalism”