Workshop Information

1. IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Safety Objectives and Requirements, Regulation, Guides and Standards Lecturer Lesson II 1_1 Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City , CountryXX - XX Month, Year

2. SafetyFundamentals SafetyRequirements Safety Guides Safety Practices Safety Objectives and Requirements IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme Safety Fundamentals - objectives & principles  requirements (mandatory, “shall”) IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

3. Safety Objectives(1/3) • General nuclear safety objective - to protect individuals, society and the environment from harm by establishing and maintaining in nuclear installations effective defences against radiological hazards. • Radiation protection objective - to ensure that in all operational states radiation exposure within the installation or due to any planned release of radioactive material from the installation is kept below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable, and to ensure mitigation of the radiological consequences of any accidents. IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

4. Safety Objectives (2/3) • Technical safety objective - to take all reasonably practicable measures to prevent accidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate their consequences should they occur; to ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all possible accidents taken into account in the design of the installation, including those of very low probability, any radiological consequences would be minor and below prescribed limits; and to ensure that the likelihood of accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely low. IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

5. Safety Objectives (3/3) Measures necessary • To prevent accidents • To mitigateconsequences Groups of safety measures • Legal basis and regulatory framework • Safety management • Technical aspects IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

6. Legal Basis and Regulatory Framework Governments’ responsibilities • to adopt legislation • to establish regulatory body which • sets safety objectives and standards and monitors and enforces then • must be independent from promoters of nuclear energy • is provided with resources The prime responsibility for the safety of the installation rests with the operating organisation. In the Convention on Nuclear Safety 53 States have agreed until now to take necessary measures to ensure adequate safety level of their nuclear facilities. Two review meetings have been held (in 1999 and 2002) until now. IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

7. Safety Management • Measures to ensure acceptable level of safety by • Establishment of safety policy • Clear division of responsibilities inside the organization • Development of procedures • Review of safety related matters • High level of commitment to safety - safety culture • Learning attitude • Open exchange of information • No complacency IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

8. Areas covered by the IAEA safety standards for the design of nuclear power plants (Det.: deterministic: Prob.: probabilistic) IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

9. Safety Culture(1/2) Definition:Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. Features: • Attitudinal (personal) • Structural (style) • Relates both organisations and individuals • Generally intangible IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

10. Safety Culture(2/2) Be careful: not to misuse safety culture by attributing to it as cause of every human failure made in nuclear safety actions. SC has two major components: • Framework determined by organizational policy and managerial action • Response of individuals to the framework IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

11. Other Factors of Safety Management • Quality assurance and management • QA programme • Its implementation • Verification of quality • Human factors • Accident management and emergency preparedness • AM procedures for prevention and mitigation • On-site emergency plans • Off-site emergency plans • Exercises IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

12. Design & construction • Prevention of accidents vs. Mitigation of consequences • Need for • High reliability of SSCs • Proven technology, safety margin • Appropriate inherent and engineered safety features • Design principles • Conservatism if lack of knowledge • Single failure criteria/multiple failures • redundancy and diversity • Fail safe solutions • Human failure forgiveness • Defence-in-depth as a result using the principles above Technical Aspects (1/3) (Selected items only) IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

13. Technical Aspects (2/3) (Selected items only) • Accident analysis - deterministic & probabilistic • Submitted by the operating organization to regulatory body approval • Operation and maintenance • Operational limits and conditions • Derived from safety analysis • Revised in light of operational experiences • Minimum requirements for availability of staff and equipment • Trained personnel and validated procedures • Regular inspection, testing and maintenance activities in accordance with approved procedures IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

14. Technical Aspects (3/3) (Selected items only) • Procedures for • Normal operation • Accident management - restore prime safety functions, to facilitate long term recovery, to mitigate radiological consequences • Collection and analysis of operating experiences • Dissemination of information • Lessons learned, modifications if necessary IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

15. Process-oriented Regulatory Approaches (Licensing vs. Inspection)(1/2) Variation in wide range exist One approach: • To grant license/permission to almost every actions of licensee is required by law/regulation • To inspect whether conditions of the regulatory license have been complied with Strong assessment in licensing process needed Simple - rather formal - inspection process enough IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

16. Process-oriented Regulatory Approaches (Licensing vs. Inspection) (2/2) Another approach: • Regulatory approval is not required to most of the actions of licensee (e.g. Modifications, subcontractors, refuelling, etc.) • Comprehensive inspection is carried out Strong inspection relied mostly on FSAR and on inspector’s experiences; enforcement practice has to be effective (“inspectorate”). Licensing activity only for large projects (e.g. New plant, PSR with operational license renewal, lifetime extension, etc.) sometimes made by different authority involving TSOs. Note: reactive inspection and safety performance evaluation does not differ at both approaches. IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

17. Regulation, Guides and Standards(Example: Hungarian Practice) (1/3) How safety objectives and requirements has been implemented in practice of Hungary demonstrated • New legal basis was established and put into force in 1997 • Legal pyramid (Fig. 1) • Act on Atomic Energy • Executive Orders - Governmental and ministerial Decrees • Regulations as attachments of Gov’t Decree issued in 5 Volumes (mandatory) 1) Regulatory Procedures for NPPs 2) QA 3) Design Requirements for NPPs 4) Operational Requirements for NPPs 5) Regulatory Requirements for Small Reactors IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

18. Regulation, Guides and Standards(Example: Hungarian Practice) (2/3) • The Vol. No. 6 (Requirements for Spent Fuel Storage Facilities) under preparation • Guides (not mandatory, but recommended) • Issued by DG of HAEA (at present 52 completed and issued, list of them see attached) • In consensus with licensees • Continuous upgrading • New guides according to needs • Iterative process until publication IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

19. Regulation, Guides and Standards(Example: Hungarian Practice) (3/3) • For new nuclear installations used only as a whole, exemptions for old facilities (connection with PSR regulatory assessment and decision) • Non-prescriptive regulatory system • Basic principles of operation of regulatory body as safety policy issued in 1996 (basic document of internal QA-system) • Distributed system for regulation • HAEA’s organizational structure • On basis of self - assessment some modifications carried out in Jun. 2000. IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

20. Figure 1 Structure of Regulations for Nuclear Safety IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

21. Regulatory and Control System for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy in Hungary IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

22. Functional Structure of the Regulatory Body IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

23. Organisational Structure of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

24. Authorities Participating in the Licensing Procedure of a New Nuclear Power Plant and Licenses Issued by Authorities IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

25. Legal Provision regulating the Life Cycle Phases of a Nuclear Facility IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment

26. Legal Provision regulating the Life Cycle Phases of a Nuclear Facility IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment