Goal:

1. How comparatively to map changing capitalist va-rieties in emerging economies? Uwe Becker, University of Ams-terdam, Lecture at the Central European University, February 28, 2011 • Goal: • To get analytical order into the knowledge of emerging po-li-tical economies, e.g. the BRICs, in comparative perspective • Specifically, to be able to map diversity and change, to identify the trajectory of change from T1 to T2 • This goal is an analytical one, but not an explanatory one. Neither institutional change nor economic perfor-mance is intended to be explained

2. In search for an adequate typology • We need a typology that is: • Suitable for mapping change, particularly gradual change • And for covering peculiarities of both advanced and emerging capitalisms • For other goals a different typology might be required or simply suffice; typologies are methodic devices • For the typology we need criteria • The criteria depend on the overall approach

3. State-of-the-art • Two types: LME and CME (= two roads to competitive-ness); sometimes ‘mixed type’ added • National capitalisms classified as either/or • VoCs have 7 complementary components: • Industrial, intra- and inter-firm relations, corporate gover-nance, training systems, social protection, market regulation • Components functional; sort of systems theory

4. S-o-t-a continued:typologies of emerging capitalisms • Types and Typologies for emerging/rising capitalisms • The mixed type applied to Eastern Europe by Mykhnenko (2007) and to China by Wai-Chung Yeung (2004) • A partially geographic typology is used by Lane (2006) for Eas-tern Europe and Boschi /Gaitan (2009) for Brazil • Nölke/Vliegenhart (2009) add dependent capitalism • Bohle/Greskovits (2007/08) see developments into liberal, em-bedded liberal and corporatist directions in Eastern Europe • King (2007) classifies Russia as patrimonial • Schneider (2009) Latin American countries as hierarchical (HME) • Nee/Opper (2007) Chinese capitalism as politicized patrimonial • Drahokoupil/Myant (2010) see five types in Central & Eastern Europe: FDI-based, peripheral, oligarchic, statist and remittance- and aid-based. • They all (B/G less) classify cases as belonging to types; ei-ther/or constructions again (as in Table 1)

6. State-of-the-art: critics • Critics: Complementarities render VoC theory rigid & functionalist • Gradual change so impossible; only intelligible as com-plete overhaul, from one complementary set to another one (e.g. from CME to LME) • (Alternatives – loosely couples or open, to some degree func-tional configurations, not the topic of this presentation) • More than two types needed, CME too broad • Proposals: liberal + statist, corporatist, geographic types • A (very) few critics against classifications: • Unsensitive for change, static (as in Table 1) • Rigorous distinction ideal types - empirical cases required

7. Constructing a typology to map change • Point of departure: • Distinction of ideal types – fixed, constructed entities – and ca-ses – empirical, historically moving, entities • General principles: • The typologydoesnot have to construct idealroutestocompe-titiveness, but to idealize empirical realities • The more criteria are used the more rigid the typology is • Therefore, typologies should leave space for openness and change • Criteria should have a fundamental and overarching character • In a typology, all types have to be based on the same criteria • ‘Idealization’ is not normative but analytical! • Typologies have to simplify; keep limited their number, not everything needs to be covered; sub-types possible

8. Ideal-type typologies instead of classifications: the principal construction • Main feature: clear distinction types – cases • Empirical cases only more or less approximate ideal types • So, the US has an approximately liberal political economy • or China is less democratic than Japan • Empirical cases are located in the space in-between the types (examplified by a simple continuum in Figure 1 and in a five-type typology in Figure 2) • In the course of time cases may change their location

9. Dichotomous typology with empirical cases in the continuum in-between Figure 1: Continuum between ideal types A and B with imaginary empirical cases (e.g. national political economies or national democracies....) located in-between A (e.g. liberal) │ ▀ ▀ ▀ ▀ ▀ ▀ _ │B (e.g. embedded)

10. A E B D C Types and Cases in a multi-type typology Figure 2: Illustration of a typology with five ideal types where two fictitious cases are, in the form of a sort of spider web, located in the field in-bet­ween the ideal types* * Each of the five rays starts at a value of 0 at the centre of the web and has a maximum value of 100. The total of the spider web must also add up to 100 (per­cent). So, the case illustrated by the fat web would roughly be 30% C, 25 E, 20% each A and B, and 5% D.

11. Criteria for the typology of capitalist varieties, and proposal of types for advanced capitalisms • Criteria: • The relationship between capital and labour • The relationship between politics and economy • (addional, when adding up: norms of fairness & justice) • These criteria are very basic and also suitable roughly to distinguish historical modes of production such as feudalism, capitalism and state socialism • Thecriteriadonot fundamentallydiffer from those of H/S • My proposal of types to cover advanced political econo-mies: liberal and embedded liberal to be split into statist, corporatist and meso-communitarian

12. Which additional types for analyzing emerging capitalisms? • Already chosen: liberal, statist, corporatist, meso-communitarian • Nölke/Vliegenthart’s autonomy –dependency dichotomy: Im-portant, but based on additional criteria; possibly an additional continuum. Could also be used as sub-types • Schneider’s hierarchical variety: Only one criterion - rather a thin basis for constructing a type; hierarchy included in statism, per-haps a sub-type of it therefore • Bohle/Greskovits: ‘Directions’; move away from rigid labelling, implicit distinction of types and cases; distinction of forms of li-beralism in fact: liberalism combined with non-liberal features • Nee/Opper (also a bit King): No typological intentions, but they provide an empirical basis for the construction of a (politicized) patrimonial type of capitalism • Myant/Drahokoupil: Oligarchic-clientelist type resmbles patrimoni-al type, order states type resembles statist type; peripheral, FDI- & air-based types selected by additional critieria; could be sub-types • Proposal: Patrimonial capitalism as fifth ideal type

13. Complete proposal of a five-type typology • Five ideal-typical Varieties of Capitalism: 1) Liberal: Market-governed economy; individualized capital-labour relationships; state facilitates market 2) Statist: Politics restricts market, tries to determine overall eco-nomic direction; hierarchy principal; limited worker rights 3) Corporatist: Institutionalized cooperation capital –labour at peak level; together with state some macro-economic coordi-nation and regulation 4) Meso-communitarian: Networks of firms as communities (incl. welfare tasks); group common interest; state distant 5) Patrimonial: Political leadership in economy based on patron-client relations; implications for capital/employer - labour

14. Indicators of the capital-labour and state-economy relation-ships for the location of cases in the space between the types Quantive, for example: • Unemployment benefits, level and duration • Extent of temporary work • Collective bargaining coverage • Public expenditures • Percentage of GDP produced by nationalized firms and public sector • Total market capitalization Qualitative, already qunatified by the OECD, for example: • Strictness of employment protection • Strictness of product market regulation Other possible indicators (of which comparative data are often lacking ): • Co-determination; regulationfinancial markets, easiness of hostile takeover; im-pact hedge & private equity funds, existence of 5- or 10-year plans... Institutional (qualitative) indicators are for example: • Interaction patterns, the (non-)presence of the institutional structures of corpo-ratism and meso-communitarianism, character of the political regime, level of corruption..

15. Measurement problems/imprecision in the de-termination of locations and change of cases To some degree arbitrary selection of criteria Imprecision in statistical sources Transformation of quality into quantity Missing data, data heterogeneity… Different meaning concepts in different countries → Impossibility exactly to locate countries in field between ideal types, though this is easier on the axis of the liberal – embedded/coordinated continuum than in the field between more than two ideal types → Impossibility exactly to determine institutional change, though ... same story as previously So, mapping changing capitalist varieties is to give an impression of change in one look – as exact as possible Figure 3 draws a spider web comparing three countries within this typology, Figure 4 locates an imaginary Central European case within the field between at two moments of time.

16. Figures to illustrate locations of cases in the field between ideal types as well as change within this field • Figure 3 draws a spider web comparing three countries within this typology; • Figure 4 locates an imaginary Central European case within the field between at two moments of time; • Figure 5 does the same with Russia and • Figure 6 with Brazil

17. Figure 3: National political economies (NL, CN, US) in the field between the ideal types Corporatist Liberal Statist Meso-communitarian Patrimonial 17

18. Corporatist Liberal Statist Corporatist Liberal Statist Meso-communitarian Patrimonial Meso-communitarian Patrimonial Political Economy X at T1 Political Economy X at T2 Process of change

19. Figure 5: Change of the Russian political economy, 1990s to 2000s(source:Alexandra Vasileva:ContinuityandChange inRussianCapitalism;paper presented at the conference on Revival of Political Economy, Coimbra, October 2010; based on institutional changes only) Patrimonial Patrimonial Liberal Statist Liberal Statist Mapping the institutional change of China 1980s - 2000s would be similar; there has also been a shift from liberalization to re-etatization; patrimonialism is weaker and meso-communitarianism also slightly present, however

20. Figure 6: Institutional Change in Brazil, 1990s to 2000s; based on Renato Boschi, Politics and Trajectory in Brazilian capitalist development: recent trends, pa-per presented at the conference on the Revival of Political Economy, Coimbra, October 22, 1010 Patrimonial 1990s 2000s Liberal Statist Corporatist