Achieving Security & Resilience in Public Buildings: Finding the Right Balance

1. SECURITY & RESILIENCE IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS : HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? SAFETY OF LIFE =LIFE SAFETY SAFETY OF QUALITY OF LIFE = QUALITY OF LIFE SAFETY LIFE SAFETY QUALITY OF LIFE

2. “Right now our public spaces are under surveillance from individuals who are trained to look for vulnerability…….. some structures and spaces can actually assist in their appalling ambitions…….. see the responsibility you have got. Until you do we are back to where we started, back to anxiety, back to fear”(Booth 2008) SECURITY CONFLICT WITH ANY ASPECT THAT MAY POSE A CHALLENGE TO SAFETY OF LIFE OR PROPERTY SECURITY PHYSICAL SECURITY MENTAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INTERNAL SECURITY BUILT ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONS How does one ‘design’ the security in a building? What are the shortcomings of conventional practices of securing buildings as they have been doing for decades? What is the precipitating need for integrating security in architectural design?

3. DEFINITION: it is the quality of a building to sustain a disaster (natural or manmade) and return to its functionality without loss of lives and property. SECURITY PREVENTION – FEAR FOR CRIMINALS SECURITY FOR MOST TO BE SECURE RESILIENCE QUESTIONS: What are Resilient structures and how is their performance different from conventional structures? What are the elements or measures as per available technology that can be used in architectural design to target resilience? Are they incremental , meaning the more the measures used, the higher the resilience achieved or are there other factors to consider? RESILIENCE INSURANCE - SAFETY FOR ALL PHYSICAL RESILIENCE MENTAL RESILIENCE NATURAL DISASTERS MAN-MADE DISASTERS

4. SECURITY: • Counter-terrorism literature based overseas • -indicators on the security programming • -need testing with real life applications • No contemporary material from our country and • -nothing relating to architecture • -structural reports and papers • No documentation of approaches of security agencies within India • -no associated codes or guides within • -knowledge exists undocumented • Global debate on the ‘abstract’ aspects of security and its interpretations. LITERATURE SURVEY: FOCUS 1 UNDERSTANDING SECURITY AND RESILIENCE • RESILIENCE • Disaster resilience guidance • -generic and mostly for disaster relief • - no architectural interpretations. • Structural behaviour • - for previously explored threats like seismic, cyclones, floods, fire etc. is abundant • -aspects like blasts, armed attacks and other contemporary threats raw. • No data on costs, budgeting and sustainability aspects of security found yet.

5. TO BE SECURE • POSSIBLE INDICATORS OF VARYING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE: • THRESHOLD OF PANIC • FEAR PSYHCHOSIS, INFIRNGMENT OF PRIVACY, PHYSICAL INTRUSION. • CONTEXTUAL ISSUES OF GENDER, AGE, CASTE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS & RELIGION • SOCIETY, CULTURE, COUNTRY

6. SECURITY & ARCHITECTURE

7. “…. with it [is] the need to deliver good design that creates a sense of security without a siege mentality. It is important our built environment continues to reflect that we are an open & inclusive society and that in integrating these new requirements our buildings do not convey that we are driven by security measures.” (RIBA 2010, 2) HOW MUCH ? : FOCUS 2 QUALITATIVE QUANTIFICATION QUESTIONS: How do we as Architects quantify the security & resilience quotient of a design at the requirement and completion stages? How much security in a building is just enough – to counter the threats while anything more would border on the ‘BUNKER MENTALITY’ ? How do we achieve the right balance? • PSYCHO-SOCIAL ACTION & REACTION OF SECURITY • IN SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF BUILT ENVIRONMENT • -MAY NOT ALWAYS BE MEASURABLE • -EVER CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES • -COMPLEX MATRIX WITH BUILTSCAPE

8. “Technically we can design bunkers with fool proof security and best known resilience but can we be ‘secure’ at the cost of space aesthetics and freedom? Austin William of National Building specifications believes: “…it is contributing to the death of architecture because aesthetics are being sacrificed for sake of precautions…. Public buildings are becoming ‘fear of public’ buildings”(Willaims 2007) HOW MUCH PHYSICAL SECURITY ? QUALITATIVE QUANTIFICATION ‘Mental security’- what is the relationship with physical security? Can the same frisking and scanning that may convince me of a well secured premises push another to panic and fear? Is this factor a function of the individual, society or culture? Does CCTv surveillance make me feel ‘looked after’ or ‘looked at’? Why is the security in our part of the world so visible and overt

9. “Economy supports security and security supports economy.” Meenakshi Lekhi , MP, BJP, (India 2015) HOW MUCH COST IS JUSTIFIED? • MACRO LEVEL: • 3RD WORLD COUNTRY – WORRIES OF HUNGER & POVERTY • FASTEST GROWING ECONOMY • FOREIGN INVESTMENTS TO • FUEL GROWTH • PUMP ECONOMY • GENERATE JOBS • SOLUTION TO HUNGER AND POVERTY • RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH & ECONOMIC RESILIENCE • MICRO LEVEL: • TO ATTRACT FDI & INVESTOR CONFIDENCE • DEVELOPMENTAL FUNDAMENTAL • SMART CITY PRE-REQUISITE • SMART INVESTMENT & RETURNS • INNATE VULNERABILTIES ADDRESSAL- NATURAL & MANMADE • ENHANCED LIFE SPAN & USER PSYCHE ECONOMIC Are security and resilience really a luxury meant only for rich countries? What are the budgetary implications of security and resilience in buildings? What are the financial or economic gains? What is the net impact of security and resilience in the net lifespan of a built environment being designed? What is the net impact on the overall economy? What is the net impact taking into consideration investor sentiments & economic resilience?

10. IMPACT OF SECURITY ASPECTS ON GREENNESS: BUILDING MATERIALS CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES EQUIPMENT CONSUMPTION PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT CLIMATE CONTROL SECURITY = IMMEDIATE SURVIVAL RESILIENCE = LONGTERM INSURANCE HOW MUCH IS SUSTAINABLE? SUSTAINABILITY What are the energy requirements for security equipment and resilience measures including the embodied energies? Can architecture contribute towards the reduction of the energy consumption or even the equipment or personnel requirement? Is there a chance that heavily secured or resilient structures could actually be climatically more ‘green’? Is it possible that life span enhancement of resilient structures actually enhances their sustainability while reducing the carbon footprint

11. MAXIMUM HUMAN IMPETUS= MAX LIFE SAFETY & PSYCHE SECURITY. • LARGE NUMBERS, VOLUMES = EXAGGERATION OF CHALLENGE • HIGHEST HTREAT PROFILE & SECUITY NEED • CRITICALITY OF FUNCTION & CONTINUITY • ECONOMIC & INFRASTRUCTURAL REQUIREMENT FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS “Public buildings are designated so mostly on the basis of their occupancy levels which can range from few hundreds in religious places to several thousands in stadia.”(RIBA 2010) PUBLIC BUILDINGS QUESTIONS What all building types are included in Public buildings? Can we categorize buildings based on their requirements for security and resilience inputs? What are the special challenges of making public buildings secure and resilient?

12. DUE TO PAUCITY OF LITERATURE AVAILABLE FOR INDIAN CONTEXT, OTHER AVENUES OF KNOWLEDGE COLLECTION: • PRIVATE SECURITY CONSULTANTS • SECURITY CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS • SECURITY EXPERTS & ADVISORS- DISCUSSIONS & INTERVIEWS. RESEARCH PROGRESS: RESEARCH LAYOUT The green cells above indicate the parts of research which are well advanced while the pink ones indicate the ones still in infancy. The balance chart the way forward . The scope will be followed as per the limitations listed by the research.

13. How does an architect approach the task of designing-in the security and resilience of a building when taking up a new design problem? What is the methodical approach to coordination with Client, security team and the local context? What are various ways and means to secure buildings? How can we design and construct resilient buildings? RESEARCH QUESTIONS Do the security and resilience measures enhance fear or security? To what extent can buildings and people be secured through architectural design? What other factors influence the efficacy ? What are the financial, environmental and psycho-social costs involved? How do we justify them and decide what is optimum? Can we categorize the measures in terms of their multi-dimensional costs and develop an optimization mechanism for ease of application?

14. Architecture can integrate all aspects of security and resilience at the conception of a design to create a sustainable ‘built environment’ that makes its occupants truly secure and resilient , physically and mentally at a negligible cost justifiable by the economic gains. EXPECTED OUTCOME GREEN COST SECURITY RESILIENCE FEEL SECURE

15. SECURITY & RESILIENCE INTEGRATION INTO ARCHITECTURE • 3. MENTAL • PSYCHOLOGICAL • SOCIO-CULTURAL • IDEOLOGICAL • CASE-STUDIES • 1. PHYSICAL • APPROACH • POSSIBILITES • CONCERNS • COSTS • SUSTAINABILITY • CASE STUDIES OBJECTIVES 2. CASE STUDIES TECHNIQUES & EFFICACY 4. OPTIMUM BALANCE SENSIBLE SECURITY • LIMITATIONS • Buildings or built environment for CRITICAL FACILITIES, INFRASTRUCTURE or any other purpose INVOLVING LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE running into couple of hundreds atleast. • Only the threats- natural and man-made NOT COVERED UNDER THE AVAILABLE BUILDING CODES . • Only the PSYCHO-SOCIAL ASPECTS without going into the medical and psychiatric manifestations or impacts. • Only best practice indicators from deductions or available data, not binding in any way and definitely NOT MEANT TO SUPERCEDE OR SUBSTITUTE any existing guidelines from the security establishments or local norms at any time.

16. WITH METHODOLOGY UNDERSTANDING PHYSICAL SECURITY LITERATURE SURVEY DISCUSSIONS CONFERENCES TESTING & APPLICATION LITERATURE INTERVIEWS FIELDWORK S E C U R I T Y ------- S E N S I B L E 1. SECURITY ASSESSMENT THREAT, RISK, MULTI HAZARD, STRUCTURAL FAILURE BUILDING CATEGORIZATION 3 HISTORICAL EQUIVALENTS DESIGN STRATEGY COMPONENTS ARCHITECTURAL MEASURES EQUIPMENT 4 CASE STUDIES GLOBAL PROJECT NATIONAL COMPLETED CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC BLDG COST ANALYSIS SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS CHAPTERIZATION 2 SECURITY STRATEGY DESIGN STRATEGY COMPONENTS ARCHITECTURAL MEASURES EQUIPMENT • 6 • CASE STUDIES • EXTENSION • PERCEPTION • VARIABLES • OPERATIONAL • EFFICACY • INTENT VS EFFECT • FACTORS & • INFLUENCES 5 PSYCHO- SOCIAL ASPECTS PSYCHOLOGY SOCIOLOGY HUMAN RIGHTS CIVIL LIBERTIES 7 CONCLUSIONS BUILDING TYPE CATEGORIZATION AS/SECURITY COST & PSYCHO SOCIAL COEFFICEIENT FOR SECURITY MEASURES MECHANISM FOR CORELATION OF ABOVE FOR OPTIMIZATION UNDERSTANDING MENTAL SECURITY LITERATURE SURVEY & FIELDWORK DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATN APPLICATION & CORELATION QUALTIFICATION & OPTIMIZATION

17. Security engineering is a specialized field of engineering that focuses on the security aspects in the design of systems that need to be able to deal robustly with possible sources of disruption, ranging from natural disasters to malicious acts. • “Vikas aisa ho jo aafat se bachaaye • …..aisa na ho jo khud aafat ban jaaye” • - AK Sinha, VC, Bihar Disaster management Authority, (India 2015) SENSIBLE SECURITY • OPTIMIZATION IN ARCHITECTURE , TO • AVOID DESTRUCTION OF BUILDING COMPONENTS AND LOSS OF LIVES • AID SECURITY EFFORTS • EFFICIENT SYSTEM SYNERGY • RETAIN AMBIENCE & AESTHETICS • MINIMUM CHALLENGE TO CIVIL LIBERTIES & SENSIBILITIES • MINIMIZE FEAR AND MAXIMISE PROTECTION • FEEL SECURE FOR A POPULACE, A CULTURE.......HUMANITY • ONUS ON ARCHITECT ‘MASTER COORDINATOR OF • PROGRAMME • BUDGETS • MEP & INTERIORS • DRAWINGS AND DETAILS • CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

18. PRIVATE SECURITY CONSULTANTS: • EQUIPMENT LAYOUT AND INSTALLATION. • RISK ASSESSMENT and security scheme- uncontested* • BUDGET independent of construction. • Role from program to concept: CRITICAL • Absence in coordination * • inadequate sizing • inappropriate provisioning * • rendered infructuous on many occasions • retro-fitting • cost- financial, spatial and aesthetic. • MANDATORY FORMALITY • absence of Codes or standards . • Mutual lack of trust : NO TEAM SPIRIT. • Are completely unaware that security can be integrated into architectural design and made aesthetically innovative. • Security man’s perspective: • secure at any cost • not necessarily apathetic to ambience • larger interest of safety • work in tandem with the project team • Secure built environment : IDEAL WORLD DISCUSSIONS WITH SECURITY MEN • SECURITY ADVISORS/EXPERTS • Overt vsCovert. • GIFT city design options : CPTED • Security incompatibilities: REAL ESTATE LOSSES • No documented reference material. • Individual innovations – INTERIORS & LANDSCAPE. • securing of India vs the world: • Intel • Democratic politics and civil liberties. • Pay structures. • Paucity of resources . • Public private partnership. • Lack of coordination with Architects, • Motivation for this research • GIFT city, Gandhinagar, Gujarat :SMART CITY • unique master planning • the concept revolves around a barrier free society without fences and boundary walls. • QUESTION MARKS on hotels , mandatory • Security strategy in progress

19. The note-worthy speakers included: • Mr. Shekhar Dutt (former National Security advisor & Defence Secretary Government of India) • Gen. JJ Singh (REtd.)- Former Chief of Army staff • Lt.Gen. N.C. Marwah, NDMA. • Ms. Meenakshi Lekhi, MP, BJP. • Mr. Marrof Raza, Mentor, SWI. • Reiterated a number of the issues raised by this research • insight into the world of security and way of thinking • trench between the 2 worlds seemed possible to bridge. • extremely supportive of the research intent & pledged support Secure Cities 2015 The 7th edition of SWI’s Secure Cities initiative since 2009 CONFERENCE & WORKSHOPS • Additionally: • Public Private Partnership • Debate of covert vs overt security strategy- • On ‘Smart and safe cities’ : • seamless integration • “effective use of • Smart…. can decide in time of crises. • On Disaster Management • the NDMA vision for a Disaster Resilient India • no sustainable without ‘Disaster Risk reduction’. • Hazard Vulnerability & Risk Assessment • Personal discussions -scheduled. • Building failure -biggest factor for loss of life and property - • Security installations • after construction costs 18-25% • at the start cost only 1%. • Conference by experts of the field of security, blending in • Counter terrorism, • Disaster management • cyber security • smart cities, • Infrastructure development and Resilience • TOPICS ON AGENDA : • Smart and safe cities • Intelligent security and Resilience in Urban ecosystems • Security risk management and Critical infrastructure protection. • Disaster management and emergency response • Securing cities from Global threats.

20. IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE AREA PROGRAM/BRIEF • INTEGRATION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE • MUST BEFORE FINALISATION OF AREA PROGRAM & BUDGET • IN CONSULTATION WITH SECURITY CONSULTANT/ADVISOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT : CHAPTER 1 DEVELOPED COUNTRIES : SPECIALISED COVERNMENT AGENCIES. IN INDIA : UNORGANISED SECTOR DEPENDANT ON PRIVATE CONSUTLANTS /SECURITY : CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS STATE LEVEL SECURITY GREATER DISCONNECT • ARCHITECTURAL DWGS ARE NOT THEIR CORE COMPETENCE- THERE ARE OFTEN GAPS IN UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNICATION • NEED HELP WITH SPACIAL ASSESSMENT & PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT • WORKSHOP IN CONJUNCTION WITH ALL OTHER STAKEHOLDERS TO GET COMPLETE PICTURE.

21. ASSET TO BE PROTECTED • “What to protect? • Against what? • Current/expected vulnerabilities? • Consequences of loss? • Specific levels of protection? • Appropriate protection measures? • Protection constraints? • Specific security design requirements? • Response of integrated systems of personnel, technologies and procedures to security incidents?” • (Demkinn.d.) • EXTERNAL • POTENTIAL • INTERNAL • VULNERABILITY • THREAT • ADVERSARY CAPABILITY X INTENT TO HARM = LIKELHOOD OF AN ATTACK OR MALICIOUS EVENT • SINGLE OR MULTIPLE • VARYING DEGRESS OF PROBABILITY • RANGE FROM INDIVIDUAL TO DISASTERS • BEYOND CONTROL OF OWNER OR OCCUPANTS • ELIMINATION NOT POSSIBLE ONLY MITIGATION THREAT ASSESSMENT : 1.1 • THREAT X PROBABILITY = RISK SECURED ENVIRONMENT • RISK MANAGEMENT • EVALUATE & QUANTIFY RISK • PRIORTISE REQUIREMENTS • BASED ON CRITICALITY & VULNERABILITY • COST EFFICIENCY & APPROPRIATENESS

22. THREAT X PROBABILITY • INNATE VULNERABILITY • CRITICALITY OF FUNCTION/CONTINUITY/OTHERS • VALUE- LIVES/PROPERTY/DATA RISK ASSESSMENT : 1.2 Natural disasters- earthquakes, cyclones, winds, floods Fire Blasts Panic- manifested as possibilities of stampede etc. Biological/Chemical/ Radiological Theft Hostage situations or armed attack Women’s security Sabotage Pests & Rodents Collateral damage Riots or civil unrest SAMPLE RISK ASSESMENT CHART ABOVE • PUBLIC BUILDINGS: • THREATS : A TO H & L • VULNERABILITY : POPULATION & NUMBERS • CRITICALITY : FUNCTIONS LIKE HOSPITALS • VALUE : IDEOLOGICAL & SYMBOLIC • TYPES: • PERMANENT: • INDOOR EG. MALLS OR HOSPITALS • OUTDOOR EG INDIA GATE • TEMPORARY: • INDOOR LIKE POOJA PANDALS • OUTDOOR LIKE FAIRS & MELAS.

23. RISK CATEGORIES: MULTI HAZARD : 1.3

24. “The human body is capable of surviving .. pressures higher than what conventionally constructed buildings will commonly survive. It is commonly, failed building components or building debris such as walls and columns or being thrown into building interiors, that injures people.” (DOD 2013) STRUCTURAL RISKS : 1.4 NATURAL DISASTERS FIRE BLASTS K. COLLATERAL DAMAGE L. RIOTS OR CIVIL UNREST WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION STRUCTURAL FAILURE “..objective is to reduce the probability that the building itself becomes a hazard in an explosion Preventing cascading events due to loss of control of process….. an incident in 1 unit should not affect the continued safe operation of other units. Minimising financial losses Building containing… critical equipment ... should be protected.” (Jomyn.d.) • STUDY STRUCTURAL ACTION • REDUCE THE SEVERITY OF INJURY • FACILITATE RESCUE • EXPEDITE REPAIR • ACCELERATE RETURN TO FULL OPERATION.

25. EXPLOSIVE REACTION : 1.4.1 • BLAST WAVES - SUPERSONIC SPEEDS • - REFLECTIONS- MAGNIFY • - DIMINUTION WITH DISTANCE

26. AIR SHOCK WAVES INITIAL REFLECTED QUASI BLAST WAVE STRUCTURAL ACTION : 1.4.3 GROUND SHOCK WAVE SURFACE/RALEIGH WAVE GROUND COMPRESSION RADIAL SHEAR WAVE • WAVE PROPERTIES: • MULTI DIRECTIONAL • DIFFERENT MAGNITUDES • DIFFERENT FREQUENCIES • = UNPREDICTABLE • = LOAD REVERSALS • = EXTREME SHEAR PRESSURES OVER A SHORT PERIOD • INSTANTANEOUS IMPACT ON: • STRUCTURAL SYSTEM & COMPONENTS VARYING AS/PROXIMITY • FAÇADE & OTHER INSTALLATIONS • FRAGMENTATION, DISMOUNTING, THROWING AROUND

27. “Frame buildings designed to resist gravity, wind loads and earthquake loads in the normal way have frequently been found to be deficient in 2 respects: • Failure of beam to column connections • Inability to tolerate load reversal.” • (ZeynepKoccaz 2008) STRUCTURAL REACTION : 1.4.4 COLLAPSE LIMIT DESIGN: AVOID OVERALL COLLAPSE THOUGH BUILDING CANNOT FUNCTION ANYMORE FUNCTIONALITY LIMIT DESIGN : CONTINUE FUNCTIONALITY

28. “Addressing blast & seismic design goals may be achieved….An understanding of the differences between these 2 loading phenomenon, effects on the structure and performance requirements are essential to select and implement the appropriate choices..” (WBDG 2014) SEISMIC VS BLAST “ Progressive collapse is defined as the spread of an initial local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the collapse of an entire structure or disproportionately large part of it. The initial failure or damage could be from a number of different causes, which might include natural or man-made hazards…” (ASCE 7, WBDG 2014)

29. “Blast loads are dynamic loads that need to be carefully calculated, just like earthquake and wind loads” (ZeynepKoccaz 2008) • More attention to design and detailing of structural components • Must for exterior bays and lower floors of buildings • Shorten slab lengths and improve the punching shear resistance.” • Appropriate detailing of slab-column interface. • Bottom reinforcement in slabs continuous through column • Continuously tied reinforcements in both directions • Anchorage of reinforcement at edge of slab • Beam to beam connections • Beam to column connections. • Potential for direct lateral loading on face of columns • Adequate ductility and strength. • Encasing lower floor columns in steel jackets or steel belts or CFRP • Embed steel column within perimeter concrete columns or walls • For smaller loads columns and walls with spiral reinforcements. • Possibility of uplift • Columns designed for transient tensile forces. • Progressive collapse analysis • Hardening- • Several shear walls -beneficial for seismic design also. • Central shear wall with a peripheral movement resisting frame.” • (Jomyn.d.) RESILIENT STRUCTURES : 1.4.5

30. BLAST WAVE= HEMISPHERICAL SHOCK WAVE • AMPLIFIED BY REFLECTION • MULTI DIRECTIONAL • “ DECAY AS FUNCTION OF DISTANCE FROM SOURCE. • DIMINISH WITH ANGLE OF OBLIQUITY TO SOURCE” “Designing structures to be fully blast resistant is not a realistic and economical option, however current engineering and architectural knowledge can enhance the new and existing buildings to mitigate the effects of an explosion”(Zeynep Koccaz 2008) ARCHITECTURAL DEDUCTIONS : 1.4.6 & STRATEGY : 1.4.7 • MINIMISE • CATASTROPHIC FAILURE • EFFECT ON BUILDINGS & ITS OCCUPANTS • FLYING DEBRIS • MAIN STRUCTURAL CONCERNS • FAILED BUILDING COMPONENTS • FLYING DEBRIS • OCCUPANTS AND PROPERTY BEING THROWN AROUND • MEP FAILURE DUE TO DETACHMENT FROM MOUNTING OR STRUCTURAL ATTACHMENT. • PROGRESSIVE TOTAL STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE • FIRE & SMOKE • PANIC AND STAMPEDES • COUNTER DESIGN STRATEGY • EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT • DISTANCE FROM SOURCE • STRUCTURAL FORM • STRUCTURAL HARDENING • ISOLATION OF ASSET • MATERIAL SELECTION- FAÇADE & INTERIORS

31. “ Probability that the one or more threats will occur is based on historical data extrapolated to the future and considerable probabilistic acumen applied to the time and place of the project in question.”(Demkin n.d.) SECURITY PROGRAMMING I 1.5

32. RESILIENCE • RESIST • RESPOND • RECOVER • SECURITY • DETER • DETECT • DELAY LAYERED DEFENSE CORE= ASSET VALUE= OVERLAP LAYERING/ZONING SECURITY DESIGN STRATEGY : CHAPTER 2.1 STRATEGIES CRIME CPTED OFFENDER TARGET/VICTIM CRIME LOCATION/ ENVIRONMENT

33. …a multidisciplinary approach to deterring criminal behavior through environmental design. its strategy relies on ability to influence offender decisions that precede criminal acts. MAXIMISE VISIBILITY : DDD FOSTER POSITIVE SOCIAL INTERACTION NON-PHYSICAL DELINEATION OWNERSHIP INTRUSION CPTED : CHAPTER 2.1.1 LAYER TO LAYER ALSO NO ACCESS DESPITE VISIBILITY LEAST EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL NO CONCEALMENT NO OBSTRUCTION LIGHTING – TOO LITTLE/MUCH INCORRECT CPTED VEGETATION CONTROL

34. SECURITY DESIGN DEPENDS ON • BUILDING TYPE/FUNCTION • LOCATION • RISK. THREAT VULNERABILITES “To ensure an appropriate and cost effective level of security, architects need to acquaint themselves with the range of security factors that affect design” (Demkin n.d.) • SECURITY DESIGN MUST CONSIDER • LOCAL CODES & BYE-LAWS • INTERFACE WITH OTHER BUILDING SYSTEMS • COST EFFECTIVENESS IN SHORT & LONG TERMS • SCALABILITY & ADAPTABILITY SECURITY DESIGN COMPONENTS : 2.2 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS: LANDSCAPE & SITE PLANNING INCL. CPTED ARCHITECTURE & STRUCTURE INCL. FAÇADE & INTERIORS PERSONNEL- NOT IN SCOPE EQUIPMENT SECURITY ENGINEERING

35. “Security Engineering is the process of identifying practical, risk managed, short and long term solutions to reduce and/or mitigate dynamic ‘man-made’ hazards integrating multiple factors, including construction, equipment, manpower and procedures.”(DOD 2013). SECURITY ENGINEERING : 2.3 2.3.1 PERIMETER CONTROL

36. HUMANS • VEHICLES • GOODS • GATES • GUARD ROOM • SCANNERS • FORCED ENTRY BARRIERS • AUTHORIZATION • ARCHITECTURAL PLANNING ACCESS CONTROL : 2.3.2

37. ARCHITECTURAL PLANNING • MINIMUM NUMBER OF ACCESS POINTS • ANGLE OF VEHICULAR APPROACH • INDIRECT APPROACH • DESIGNER CRASH BARREIRS • QUEUEING SPACE • STAGGERED ENTRY ACCESS CONTROL : 2.3.2 AVOIDABLE APPROACH LENGTHENED APPROACH INDIRECT APPROACH

38. SETBACKS • VERTICAL VS HORIZONTAL • FIRE TENDER PATH • ADJOINING BLDGS • MASSING TECHNIQUE • CLUSTERING “Minimum CCSD (Conventional Construction stand-off distance) should not be taken as a common master planning strategy as the construction requirements any way are higher so it is a trade-off calculation. Planners will have to analyse trade-offs between stand-off distance and the associated wall, window and door construction to determine what stand-off distance may be most economical”(DOD 2013) STAND-OFF DISTANCE : 2.3.3 MINIMUM STANDOFF : SET BACK & NEIGHBOURS MASSING & CLUSTERING: MAXIMIZE STANDOFF MAXIMIZE STANDOFF – VERTICAL SPRAWL & VERTICAL STANDOFF

39. CLUSTERING • ANGULATION & MASSING • ZONING • PARKING • UNDERGROUND • MULTILEVEL • SEGREGATION • SECURITY VALET VEHICULAR CONTROL : 2.3.4 BASEMENT PARKING : ENDANGERS ENTIRE STRUCTURE VEHICULAR ENTRY- MORE STRUCTURAL HARDENING GIFT CITY- SEPARATE MULTI LEVEL CAR PARKING VEHICULAR SEGREGATION

40. ELIMINATE PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE • STRUCTURAL ISOLATION • SCREEN & PRIORTIZATION • ISOLATION OF CRITICAL ASSET • STRENGTHEN OF OUTER ENVELOPE OR EXPOSED PARTS- BY LIMITATION STRUCTURAL HARDENING: 2.3.5 THICKER OUTER WALLS WITH MINIMAL OPENINGS MASSING TACTICS : MINIMISE EXPOSED FACE & SCREEN IN PLANNING VERTICAL ZONING MASSING TACTICS- MINIMAL HARDENING FOR MAX EFFECT.

41. SURVEILLANCE OF SEMI-PUBLIC • VANTAGE POINTS • CRIMINAL • SECURITY • WATCH TOWERS • UNOBSTRUCTED SPACE • LANDSCAPE • CONCEALMENT • UTILITIES LOCATION • SIGNAGE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SURVEILLANCE : 2.3.6 CPTED SURVEILLANCE MASSING TACTICS- INTROVERTED FOR HARDENED OUTSIDE AND CPTED INSIDE. WATCH TOWERS

42. MASSING • CIRCULATION SPACES • MAIN ENTRY • VESTIBULE & FOYER • ZONING • STRUCTURAL • VERTICAL • BACK-UP • AREA/SIZES • MONITORING • REDUNDANCY • CONNECTION & OPENINGS • DRIVE BY • NEIGHBOURS • INTERNAL CIRCULATION • CRITICAL ASSET • DOOR DESIGN • PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT • CONTROL ROOM • PROGRAM • MEP DESIGN • LOCATION • FACILTIES • INFORMAL OVERSIGHT • LONELY AREAS • MAILROOM/LOADING DOCKS • FAÇADE FEATURES • TERRACES • REFUGE ROOM EFFECTIVE BUILDING LAYOUT : 2.3.7 MASSING TACTICS HORIZONTAL ZONING VERTICAL ZONING

43. BEHAVIOUR UNDER TRUAMA LIKE FIRE, EXPLOSION OR EVEN SEISMIC • HAZARDUOUS FLYING DEBRIS • GLASS TYPE • GLAZING DESIGN • OPENING SIZE / SHIELD • DOOR DESIGN • PRESSURE REVERSAL JOINTING • CLADDING DESIGN- EG. STONE • INTERIOR FINISHES • FALSE CEILINGS & MEP DETACHMENT BUILDING MATERIALS & FINISHES : 2.3.8 EQUIPMENT ABOVE FALSE CEILING GLAZING DETAIL & GLASS SPECS INTERIOR DETAILS : CLADDING & FINISHES CLADDING DETAIL : ANTI SPLINTER & STRUCTURALLY TESTED SAFETY GLASS EXTERNAL SKINS: COST VS OPENNESS

44. MEP DESIGN • REDUNDANCY OF INSTALLATIONS • LIGHTING- TOO LITTLE OR TOO MUCH: CPTED • DETACHMENT FROM VULNERABLE STRUCTURAL BASE. • SERVICE TRENCHES/TUNNELS- ACCESS CONTROL • PROTECTION OF CONTROLS & REMOTE OPERABIITY • AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION • PROTECTION OF ENTRY POINTS • EASILY ACCESS SWITCH • AIR INTAKE DISCONTUATION & PROTECTION • CRITICAL SERVICES’ CONTINUATION MEP DESIGN: 2.3.9 MASS NOTIFICATION: 2.3.10 • MASS NOTIFICATION • INTEGRATED WITH CENTRAL CONTROL • REMOTE TAKEOVER INCASE OF EMERGENCY • REDUNDANCY • REAL TIME INFO • MOCK DRILLS MASS NOTIFICATION & REMOTE CONTROL EQUIPMENT ABOVE FALSE CEILING LIGHTING ESP FOR BASEMENTS & WOMEN AREAS SHAFTS & TUNNELS : ACCESS CONTROL + BAFFLES

45. SITE SELECTION • INTERNAL REFUGE • FRONT OFFICE SECURITY • CODAL ENFORCEMENT & UPDATION • SECURITY SOFTWARES GOOD PRACTICES : 2.3.11 • SOFTWARE SPECS & COMPATIBILITY: • SURVEILLANCE • MONITORING • POLICING • ACCESS CONTROL & RECORDS • FIRE CONTROL • BIM/BMS • MASS NOTIFICATION • REMOTE CONTROL SECUIRTY FOR PUBLIC INTERACTION

46. REALISTIC APPROACH • BUDGET TO FIT • ESTIMATE & PRUNE • CPTED & ARCHITECTURAL COMPONENTS • NO EXTRA COST • EXISTING BUDGETS • BETTER APPLICATION • - BROAD BASED COST OF SECURITY/RESILIENCE CRIME PREVENTION & INTERNAL DEFENCE VARIABLE AS PER RISK PROFILE BULT-IN – PART OF CONSTUCTION OR EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS CONSTRUCTIONAL COEFFICIENTS TO BE WORKED OUT. MANDATORY SECURITY SCANNERS, BARRIERS, GUARD ROOMS & GATES AS PER THE GOVT. REGULATIONS- NON-NEGOTIABLE USUALLY BIG BUDGETS- CAN EB UTILSIED BETER WITH EFFICENT PLANNING NATURAL DISASTERS INCLUDED IN STRUCTURAL BUDGETS, MANDATORY REQUIREMENT, NON-NEGOTIABLE BUDGET& COSTS: 2.3.12 COST ANALYSIS INITIAL OR BUILT IN RECURRING OR UPGRADABLE < LIFE SPAN BUILDING WITHOUT SECURITY BUILDING WITH SECURITY DESIGN PROS & CONS OVERALL LIFE CYCLE COSTS INCLUDE RECURRING COST ANALYSIS VS ENHANCED COST TOTAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE > OPERATIONS WITHOUT SECURITY DESIGN OPERATIONSWITH SECURITY DESIGN

47. NEXT STOPS BUDGET & COSTINGS EQUIPMENT HISTORY PSYCHOLOGY SOCIOLOGY CASE STUDIES THANK YOU