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Violeta Cakulev Alcatel-Lucent Avi Lior Bridgewater Systems ITEF 79 – Beijing, China

Diameter IKEv2 PSK: Pre-Shared Secret-based Support for IKEv2 Server to Diameter Server Interaction draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-0 3. Violeta Cakulev Alcatel-Lucent Avi Lior Bridgewater Systems ITEF 79 – Beijing, China. Diameter IKEv2 PSK.

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Violeta Cakulev Alcatel-Lucent Avi Lior Bridgewater Systems ITEF 79 – Beijing, China

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  1. Diameter IKEv2 PSK: Pre-Shared Secret-basedSupport for IKEv2 Server toDiameter Server Interaction draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-03 Violeta CakulevAlcatel-LucentAvi LiorBridgewater Systems ITEF 79 – Beijing, China

  2. Diameter IKEv2 PSK • Specification of the interaction between the IKEv2 Server (e.g. Home Agent, Access Gateway) and Diameter server for the IKEv2 based on pre-shared secrets • Not covered in RFC 5778

  3. Status Update • One revisions since IETF 77 • Revision -03 • IKEv2-PSK-Request may contain Key AVP • If included it contains Key-SPI AVP with Security Parameter Index (SPI) to be used to identify the appropriate PSK • AVP occurrence table is updated • Missing references • RFC 4285 and 5778 added as informative references • Various editorial changes

  4. Open Issues (1/2) • Issue: Auth-Request-Type AVP in the Request MUST be set to Authorize-Only (value 2) • Is there any need for Auth-Request-Type AVP in the request if only Authorize-Only (value 2) is used in this application? • Today this value is constrained, but it may change in the future • Better to be explicit then implicit • What should be the behavior of the receiver if the Auth-Request-Type AVP is set to the value 1 or 3, which are valid values?What is the error code send back to the sender? • Send Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_VALUE and include the Auth-Request-AVP in the Failed-AVP AVP • Other possibility is to send DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY • In this case the receiver does not know what went wrong • No further discussion • Close the issue?

  5. Open Issues (2/2) • Issue: Keying-Material AVP is mandatory AVP in Key AVP • When IKEv2 Server requests the key it may use SPI to help AAA determine which key needs to be returned • In this case Key AVP would need to be in the request • What would Keying-Material AVP contain? • Solutions • Modify draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran such that Keying-Material AVP is optional • Preferable solution • Do not modify draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran • If Key AVP is sent in the request it is populated with all 0s or ignored by the AAA

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