IPL/HBS Conference, Turin, March 7 th , 2005 – Georg Leutert

1. Negotiation of restructuring processes at European level and the role of European Works Councils: the case of the … European Works Council IPL/HBS Conference, Turin, March 7th, 2005 – Georg Leutert

2. 1) Background • Formation of FEWC in 1996 • 16 members, 3 external experts • Five countries: • Intense co-operation and exchange with Volvo EWC • Frequent meetings • Strong co-ordination/leadership by Select Committee • Day to day business handled by own secretariat

3. 1) Background • First negotiations in 1999 (Visteon) • Formally recognized as negotiating body in 2000 • A total of eight agreements negotiated, thereof two re-negotiated agreements and one in progress

4. 2) Major agreements • Visteon (2000) • Background: Outsourcing of Ford’s own supplier plants - FEWC response: • Resolution dated 10 May 1999 • Members decided to delegate conduct of negotiations to FEWC • Declaration of mutual solidarity • Agreement ensured continuity of the plants (sourcing commitments) • Agreement constituted basis for subsequent national agreements on issues of co-determination in the context of Visteon • Still today, the FEWC is keeper to the agreement (as well towards Visteon)

5. 2) Major agreements • GFT (2000) • Background: Integration of Ford’s European manual transmission business into 50/50 joint venture • FEWC response • All employees have remained Ford employees • Agreement on forward looking investments • Agreements protects plants and ensures their future development

6. 2) Major agreements • European Framework Agreement/Code of Conduct (2003) • Agreement on social rights and social responsibility signed by Company and Unions • Well accepted by employees throughout Europe • Seems to be one of the few effective instruments we have in order to conciliate global competition and the European Social model • Initiative in progress to extend to global scale

7. 2) Major agreements • IOS (2004) • Background: Restructuring of Ford’s PD processes by integration into cross-brand PD-operations • FEWC response • Exclusion of job losses • Re-investment of savings into new products • Employees who require redeployment, due to IOS, will be provided with the appropriate retraining to ensure their employability

8. 3) Strategic approach/recommendations • We have to chase for early information and act quickly • We have to build strong employee networks for on-going information exchange • We have to present ourselves as (strong) unity • We should be in the position to calculate costs on a total cost basis • We (in the West) should try to be better, not cheaper • It is crucial to insert clauses for re-negotiation in each and every agreement we sign

9. 3) Strategic approach/recommendations • Short-term business policy is fatal but sometimes increases management’s readiness for concessions • We have to act as “co-managers”, argue the way management does • If we act too late or if we act against major economic principals we risk to end up with a pyrrhic victory • We should strictly separate between purely national topics and European topics but always be ready for actions of trans-national solidarity

10. 4) Conclusions • EWC can be a platform for strong unity/solidarity among employee representatives • By the way: Has there been more concrete and lived international solidarity between workers in the past 60 years in Western Europe than some recent cases of EWC show us? • In MNC’s we just can’t win on our own; we can tackle the problem of competition between production sites if we are decided to go for a fair distribution of the existing production volume and see the benefit of joint action

11. 4) Conclusions • We risk to die ‘in solidarity’ if our strategy is not based on a solid business model; current financial and economic performance of automotive manufacturers (except of Toyota) is that tough that we can easily pull the rug out from under our own feet