A Total Force Policy for the Operational Reserve

1. A Total Force Policy for the Operational Reserve Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

2. Purpose of Today’s Discussion • Update you on the status of the new Total Force policy initiative focused on an Operational Reserve • Obtain your input and support for this effort: • Assumptions • Definition of an Operational Reserve • Elements of a new Total Force policy • Examination of new Models

3. “The significant problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them.” Albert Einstein

4. SECDEF Policy: 19 January 2007 • Involuntary mobilizations are a maximum of one year at a time. • Mobilizations will be on a unit basis. • Planning objectives: • one year mobilized: five years dwell for RC • one year deployed: two years dwell for AC • Compensation/incentives for those who mobilize/deploy more • Review hardship waiver process for exceptional circumstances • Minimize use of Stop Loss

5. Today’s Paradox • RC units and individuals are increasingly operational. • Augmenting active duty forces on a daily basis • Retaining strategic surge capabilities • Providing a front line for homeland defense missions • Offering skills to the military that are unique to the civil sector • But current policies and practices are not optimized to sustain an All-Volunteer Operational and Strategic Reserve in the future • The length and frequency of activation and deployment exceeds policy objectives for many members of the Guard and Reserve • Units and individuals are not always as ready and accessible as required • Demand and supply for certain skills are out of balance - Major cross-leveling is required to fill units • Prospects of extensive involuntary reactivations may undermine employer and family support and members’ willingness to serve

6. Assumptions • The United States is engaged in a long war. • The United States will face large and small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. • RC units and individuals will contribute to military operations on a continuing basis at a rate higher than pre-2001 levels. • The nation will maintain its commitment to an All-Volunteer Force. • The force must be managed both to meet the needs of combatant commanders and to ensure that citizens continue to volunteer to serve in an All-Volunteer Force. • A new Total Force policy is needed to guide future force management.

7. Definition of an Operational Reserve What is the New Guard and Reserve? Today’s new Guard and Reserve has both a strategic and operational role How will the New Guard and Reserve Support Operational Missions? The new Guard and Reserve will be organized, equipped and trained to support operational military mission requirements to the same standard as the Active components. Individuals and units will be tasked to prepare for and participate in missions, across the full spectrum of operations, in a cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for service members and their families and employers.

8. Total Force Policy Elements and Potential Issues • Equipping • Interoperability • Training sets • Transfers • Resources • New resource paradigms • Cost effectiveness • Support • Expectation management • Families and employers • Compensation and benefits • Bonuses and incentives • Readiness • Criteria for AC/RC mix • Training and Manning • Rebalancing • Force management • Homeland Defense • Access • Title 10/Title 32 • Voluntary/involuntary service • Predictability Question: Are These the Right Elements and Issues?

9. Return from DEP Ready Reset Train Deploy ??? MOS ID for MSN Mobilize Option 2 Return from DEP Ready Reset Deploy Train Train ??? MOS ID for MSN Mobilize RC Resourcing Options Option 1 • Unit identified early in cycle for a specific wartime mission • Unit would then be progressively resourced the remaining years to meet directed readiness goals • Unit executes Train-Mobilize-Deploy – ready to deploy upon mobilization • Unit identified late in cycle for a specific wartime mission • Unit must rapidly ramp up to specific mission task level • Unit unable to execute Train-Mobilize-Deploy – must complete portion of training after mobilzation • Exerts extreme stress on RC unit during ready and deploy phases *** What affordable resource level is required to mitigate stress on RC force?

10. Market-Based Model When the needs of the mission are consistent with the availability of the individual Expectation Management: • Make “the deal” explicit • One size does not fit all • Mission characteristics dictate the speed of the “spin cycle”

11. Mission Characteristics • Military vs. civilian acquired skills • Unit integrity vs. individual accomplishment • Home station vs. deployed • Mission accomplishment as a by-product of training? • Applicability to state mission requirements (National Guard)

12. Examples Military Skills Acquired Civilian UnitIntegrity Individual Deployed Home Station No Missionaccomplished as by-product of training? Yes Applicable to state mission requirements? No Yes Tank unit Intelligence unit Medical unit

13. “Spin Cycle” • Higher values for military-acquired skills/deployed/unit integrity= longer duration of activation • Higher values for civilian-acquired skills/ individual/home station= shorter duration of activations possible The longer the duration, the less frequent the activation– slower spin cycle.

14. BACK-UP SLIDES

15. SECDEF Policy Memos Previous Policy Statements Secretary Melvin R. Laird, August 21 ,1970 memo: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces. “…economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on combat and combat support of Guard and Reserves.” “A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning equipping and employing Guard and Reserves Forces.” Secretary William J. Perry, April 07, 1995 memo: Increased Use of Reserve Forces in Total Force Missions “We need to…capitalize on Reserve Component capabilities to accomplish operational requirements while maintaining their mission readiness for overseas and domestic operations.” “Increased reliance on Reserve Components is prudent and necessary in future policy, planning and budget decisions.” Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, June 21,1982 memo: Equipment Shortages in the Guard and Reserve “The Total Force Policy…clearly established that the National Guard and Reserve Forces “will be used” should this Country enter into armed hostilities.” “…units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component. Therefore, Active and Reserve Components Deploying at the same time should have equal claim on modern equipment.” Secretary James R. Schlesinger, August 23, 1973 memo: Readiness of the Selected Reserve. “It must be clearly understood that…Guard and Reserve Forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active Forces.” “Total Force is no longer a concept. It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.” Secretary William Cohen, September 04, 1997 memo: Integration of the Reserve and Active Components. “Our goal, as we move into the 21st Century, must be a seamless Total Force that provides the National Command Authorities the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations.” Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, July 09, 2003 memo: Rebalancing the Forces. “Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need to involuntarily mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization in the first 15 days of a rapid response operation…Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years. “