Teaching Diverse Representations of the 1917 Russian Revolution: The Role of Leadership

Teaching Diverse Representations of the 1917 Russian Revolution: The Role of Leadership Joseph Zajda Associate Professor Faculty of Education, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus) John Whitehouse Lecturer in History / Humanities Melbourne Graduate School of Education The University of Melbourne

(Whitehouse, 2008)

Historical Thinking Concepts (Peter Seixas) http://historybenchmarks.ca/

Historical Reasoning (van Drie & van Boxtel) (van Drie & van Boxtel, 2008)

Teaching History: Theory into Practice History is a discipline with its own purpose, content and modes of inquiry (Taylor and Young, 2003, Taylor, 2006, Zajda and Whitehouse, 2009). How does the discipline produce knowledge? What are the issues at work in this process? Teachers must present the discipline as an exploration of the past based on evidence. This means that students use primary and secondary sources to form understandings of the past. The implications of including secondary sources in the history classroom are profound. Historiography is central to historical understanding, not some peripheral aspect of the discipline. Leading students to this understanding creates rich possibilities for historical understanding. As a first step, teachers need to examine key historical works on the topics that they plan to teach. The questions that historians pose about the past can shape curriculum. Rigorous exploration of the past requires distinctive, disciplinary thinking.

The October Revolution - A Socialist Perspective: The course of the preparations conducted by the Party in accordance with Lenin’s plan showed that the rising would begin as a massive, organised action by revolutionary troops, as a resolute assault on the enemy’s key installations and strong points… The Great October Socialist Revolution (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 163.

The October Revolution - A Western Liberal Perspective: The Soviet Government, which controls the bulk of the source materials and dominates the historiography, derives its legitimacy from the Revolution and wants it treated in a manner supportive of its claims. By single-mindedly shaping the image of the Revolution over decades it has succeeded in determining not only how the events are treated but which of them are treated. Among the many subjects that it has confined to historiographic limbo are the role of liberals in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions; the conspiratorial manner in which the Bolsheviks seized power in October; the overwhelming rejection of Bolshevik rule half a year after it came into being, by all classes, including the workers; Communist relations with imperial Germany in 1917-18; the military campaign of 1918 against the Russian village; and the famine of 1921, which claimed the lives of five million people. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (London: Collins Harvill, 1990), xxii.

The October Revolution - A Revisionist Perspective: The October revolution in Petrograd has often been viewed as a brilliantly orchestrated military coup d’état without popular support carried out by a tightly knit band of professional revolutionaries brilliantly led by the fanatical Lenin and lavishly financed by the Germans. This interpretation, which was undermined by Western “revisionist” social history in the 1970s and 1980s, was rejuvenated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Gorbachev era, in spite of the fact that newly declassified Soviet archives reinforced the findings of the revisionists. At the other end of the political spectrum, for nearly eighty years Soviet historians, bound by strict historical canons designed to legitimate the Soviet state and its leadership, depicted the October revolution as a broadly popular uprising of the revolutionary Russian masses. According to them, this upheaval was rooted in Imperial Russia’s historical development and shaped by the universal laws of history as originally formulated by Karl Marx and adapted by Lenin. Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007). 12-13.

The October Revolution - A Second Revisionist Perspective: By the afternoon of the 25th, the coup was all but accomplished - except, provokingly, for the taking of the Winter Palace, which was still under siege with the Provisional Government members inside. The Palace fell late in the evening, in a rather confused assault against a dwindling body of defenders. It was a less heroic occasion than later Soviet accounts suggest: the battleship Aurora, moored opposite the Palace in the River Neva, did not fire a single live shot, and the occupying forces let Kerensky slip out a side entrance and successfully flee the city by car. It was also slightly unsatisfactory in terms of political drama, since the Congress of Soviets - having delayed its first session for some hours, on Bolshevik insistence - finally began proceedings before the Palace fell, thus frustrating the Bolshevik’s wish to make a dramatic opening announcement. Still, the basic fact remained: the February regime had been overthrown, and power had passed to the victors of October.

Who were the victors of October? In urging the Bolsheviks towards insurrection before the Congress of Soviets, Lenin had evidently wanted this title to go to the Bolsheviks. But the Bolsheviks had in fact organized the uprising through the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet; and, by accident or design, the Committee had procrastinated until the eve of the meeting of the national Congress of Soviets. (Trotsky later described this as a brilliant strategy - presumably his own, since it was clearly not Lenin’s - of using the soviets to legitimate a Bolshevik seizure of power.) As the news went out to the provinces, the most common version was that the soviets had taken power. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 64-5.

The October Revolution - Further Reflection More critically, the October Revolution would not have commenced nor ended as it did without Kerensky’s decision on the 24th. It was Kerensky’s attack on the Bolshevik newspapers that forced the issue of Soviet power before the congress met, galvanised its supporters and gave Lenin the revolution which he otherwise had little hope of getting. Indeed, Kerensky’s action had more to do with the launching and outcome of the October Revolution than did Lenin’s own unsuccessful attempt to plot a Bolshevik seizure of power before the Congress of Soviets. Kerensky’s blunder provoked the armed struggle that transferred power before the congress met. This changed the nature of the transfer of power and altered the role of the Congress of Soviets and the essential character of the revolution. It gave Lenin the seizure of power before the congress that he had so long, and unsuccessfully, demanded. Kerensky, not Lenin, began the October Revolution. It allowed Lenin to turn a revolution for Soviet power into a Bolshevik Revolution. Rex A. Wade, The Russian Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 302-303.

Placemat Learning Activity

Three-Level Study Guide Adapted from Herbert (1978)

Critique – Compare – Connect S. Godinho & J. Wilson (2004)

Question Quadrant Textual Closed Open Intellectual Cam (2006)

Question Quadrant Source-Based Closed Open General Whitehouse (2008)

National Centre for History in the Schools (UCLA) Standards in Historical Thinking http://nchs.ucla.edu/standards/thinking5-12.html

July Days - Secondary Source 1 (Christopher Hill) On July 16th and 17th a series of spontaneous demonstrations by half a million workers and soldiers in Petrograd urged the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to assume supreme power: “Take power, you son of a bitch, when it’s given to you,” an irate worker shouted to the Socialist Revolutionary leader, Chernov. The Bolsheviks were taken by surprise by the scale of these demonstrations no less than the Provisional Government, and did their best to prevent the demonstrations turning into an armed rising, since they felt that they had not yet sufficient influence outside the capital to be able to maintain themselves in power…

The leaders of the majority parties in the soviets did not accept the sole power thus thrown at them. The government forcibly suppressed and disarmed the Bolsheviks and their most active supporters in Petrograd and at the front. Pravda was smashed up and forbidden to resume publication, and forged documents were published alleging Bolshevik connections with the Germans. Lenin had to go into hiding. A new government was formed, which proclaimed its complete independence of the soviets, although it still contained representatives of the leading soviet parties. In Lenin’s view the “July Days” marked the end of dual power and the effective surrender of the soviet leaders. He declared that “all hopes of a peaceful development of the Russian Revolution have definitely vanished,” and urged the abandonment of the slogan “all power to the soviets.” Christopher Hill, Lenin and the Russian Revolution (London: English Universities Press, 1947), 116-7.

Secondary Source 2 (Richard Pipes) But in the ultimate analysis the Bolshevik failure seems to have been caused by factors other than inadequate forces or bad planning: contemporaries agree that the city was theirs for the asking. Rather, it was due to a last-minute failure of nerve on the part of the commander in chief. Lenin simply could not make up his mind: according to Zinoviev, who spent these hours by his side, he kept wondering aloud whether this was or was not the time to “try,” and in the end decided it was not. For some reason he could not summon the courage to make the leap: possibly the dark cloud which hung over him of government revelations about dealings with the Germans held him back. Later, when both of them sat in jail, Trotsky told Raskolnikov, in what Raskolnikov took to be a veiled criticism of Lenin: “Perhaps we made a mistake. We should have tried to take power.” Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899-1919 (New York: Knopf, 1990), 431.

July Days - Secondary Source 3 (Sheila Fitzpatrick) In one sense, the July Days were a vindication of Lenin’s intransigent stand since April, for they indicated strong popular sentiment against the Provisional Government and the dual power, impatience with the coalition socialists, and eagerness on the part of the Kronstadt sailors and others for violent confrontation and probably insurrection. But in another sense, the July Days were a disaster for the Bolsheviks. Clearly Lenin and the Bolshevik Central Committee had been caught off balance. They had talked insurrection, in a general way, but not planned it. The Kronstadt Bolsheviks, responding to the sailors’ revolutionary mood, had taken an initiative which, in effect, the Bolshevik Central Committee had disowned. The whole affair damaged Bolshevik morale and Lenin’s credibility as a revolutionary leader. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 58.

July Days - Secondary Source 4 (Rex Wade) The July Days have often been called a “dress rehearsal” for the October Revolution. In reality they were more like February than October. The July Days, like the February Revolution, began as popular demonstrations against the war, the economic situation and a government that had lost credibility. Like February, the political parties were active in stimulating discontent but did not plan the actual revolt. Rather, again like February, socialist political leaders, in the July case the Bolsheviks in particular, stepped forward at the end to try to consolidate the popular revolt in the streets (unsuccessfully this time). The July Days and the February Revolution (and the April Crisis), but not the October Revolution, were characterised by massive popular street demonstrations. Such demonstrations were conspicuously absent in the October Revolution, which began and concluded very differently. The similarity with October rested primarily with the popularity of the demand that the Soviet take full power and create a radical revolutionary government, and with the prominent role played by Bolshevik, Left SR and anarchist agitators; it is in this demand for Soviet power and the support from the radical left that the July Days can be called a “prelude” to October. Rex A. Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), 289-290.

Teaching History and Learning National Identity Recently, in a number of countries, teaching and learning history, as a curriculum discipline, has been characterised by political, economic, cultural and ideological imperatives, whose teleological goal is one of the nation-building process and one of cultivating a modern dimension of national identity in the global culture (Macintyre and Clark, 2003; Baques, 2006; Nicholls, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Simpson and Halse, 2006; Janmaat and Vickers, 2007; and Zajda, 2007). In the USA, history continues to be a ‘staple of the American curriculum in both elementary and secondary schooling’ (Thornton, 2006, p. 15). Similarly, in the Russian Federation, history lessons in schools play a significant role in the nation-building process, citizenship education, patriotism, and values education, which is closely monitored by the state (Zajda, 2007, 2009).

Images of the October 1917 Revolution in Russian School textbooks • Many Russian contemporaries, who lived at the time, already regarded the October 1917 events as another political perevorot, (coup), which temporarily brought to the top one of the Russian parties, namely the Bolsheviks, or the Majority Party (who were actually the minority party in 1917, and did not have the majority at the Congress of the Soviet). The Bolsheviks “won” over the other parties by arming itself with popular propaganda slogans for the masses, and by using conspiratorial and forceful military strategies: • The Bolsheviks were quick to declare the October Revolution as the socialist one…But did this third revolution bring in the end the creation of the socialist society? We will find the answer when we analyse further events in Russia (p. 116).

As we glance back to the October Revolution of 1917 in the section Shturm vlasti (the Attack on the Government) this crucial moment in the world history, which brought the Bolsheviks to power, is now described as a low-key event, in radical contrast to the accepted Soviet versions, which typically portrayed it as one of momentous significance. In contrast to Soviet pictorial representations of the mass storming of the Winter Palace, students now learn that in fact, only small detachments, organised by the Military-Revolutionary Committee (which was directed by Trotsky, whose role is finally acknowledged in the new generation textbooks, published in the 1990s and after 2000) actually ‘seized’ the Winter Palace. The 1917 Provisional Government, lead by Kerensky (who was not present), simply ‘ceased to exist’ and its ministers were arrested. However, students are not invited to reflect further on the reasons for such different versions of the same event, or to consider that while the coup itself was not a mass event, it did set in train drastic and far-reaching changes in the political, economic and social structure and culture of Russian society.

Representation of the 1917 Revolution in Grade 10/11 (final years of secondary schooling) Russian history textbooks • The Role of Leadership in the 1917 Revolution • In Rossiia v XX veke (Russia in the 20th Century), by Levandovski and Shchetinov, one of the core textbooks for Year 11/12 history classes, with a circulation of 100,000 copies, (recommended by the Ministry of Education), in the Theme 4 is ‘Russia in the revolutionary whirlwind of 1917’ (pp. 88-117), one of the Section reads ‘The Bolsheviks assume power’, where the revolution of 1917 is described as follows: • Lenin’s most convincing argument was ‘We have thousand of armed workers and soldiers…who are capable of taking the Winter Palace…if we attack immediately and suddenly… • Petrograd Soviet, lead by Trotsky, establishes a Military-Revolutionary Committee (MRC)…From 24 October, the detachments of MRC, consisting of read guard-workers, soldiers, and sailors of the Baltic Fleet began to occupy central buildings and places in the capital: railway stations, bridges, the central telegraph office, and power stations. During the night of 26 of October, the rebels seized the Winter Palace. The Provisional Government seized to exist, and its ministers were arrested (p. 114).

The Role of Leadership At the end of 1916 Lenin, still in exile in Switzerland, in his pessimistic appraisal thought that he will never see the revolution in Russia. A provisional government set up in March 1917, which included Kerensky, released political prisoners, among them Iosif Dzugashvilli (now known as Stalin, or his new name ‘steel-like’, from the Russian ‘stal’ or steel) in Siberia. In April Lenin arrived in Russia in the infamous ‘sealed train’. After Lenin’s inspiring April theses, the Bolsheviks adopted the two winning slogans—‘peace’ and ‘land’. The Provisional Government under Kerensky had lost the initiative. Although some progressive social legislations were adopted, the major policy issues remained unsolved—Russia’s participation in the war, and the land reforms. Most importantly, the Provisional Government lacked the legitimacy in the eyes of the masses, following the disappearance of the ‘semi-divine’ attributes of the Tsar. Having failed to launch major reforms, which were expected, the government lost the support of the masses. Its socialist ‘pretensions’ alienated the middle classes and the military. (Nove: 22). The time was right for seizing power. The Bolsheviks decided to act. Lenin’s hour had arrived.

The Role of Leadership On the eve of uprising, the Central Committee (of the Bolshevik’s Party) voted on the resolution (10th October 1917) for an armed uprising. ‘Lenin, Sverdlov, Stalin, Trotsky and others voted for it, and Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others voted against it. They felt that the revolution had insufficient forces, and were in favour of waiting for the opening of the Constituent Assembly (when the elections to this Assembly were held, resulting in an anti-Bolshevik majority, Lenin did not hesitate to dissolve it—JZ) and there decide the question of governance’ (Zharova and Mishina: 168). Convinced that the forces defending the Provisional Government were small, the two leaders, responsible for the taking of the Winter Palace—V. Antonov-Ovseenko and G. Chudnovski gave the order to take the palace at 00.50AM on 26 October, 1917… (Zharova and Mishina: 172).

The Role of Leadership On the night of 25th October, the ‘revolutionary detachments’ occupied various central buildings—railway stations, banks, central electricity station, and the telephone exchange. ‘In the words of Trotsky, “people were blissfully asleep, unaware that the government was changing” (Zharova and Mishina: 171). The Winter Palace, was defended by a small force of volunteers. On October 26 (by the old Julian calendar, then still in use, or 7th November by the new calendar) after midnight, a small group of the Red Guard entered the Palace—the few defenders having surrendered, and arrested the government. Antonov-Ovseenko, one of the leaders, who arrived at the Winter Palace, said to the Ministers: “I announce that in the name of the Military-Revolutionary Committee you are all under arrest”, to which, A. Konovalov, one of the Ministers, replied: “Provisional Government yields to force and surrenders” (p. 172).

The Role of Leadership On 26th October at the 2nd Congress of the Soviet, Trotsky (unlike Lenin, had joined the Bolsheviks quite late, in July 1917) addressing the representatives of all right-wing socialist factions said: “We [the Bolsheviks] have openly forged people’s will towards the uprising. Our uprising has won. Now you are proposing: “Renounce the victory, and conclude the agreement. With whom? The pathetic few? You are already bankrupt. Your role has been played out. Go where you now belong—in the dust bin (sornaia korzina) of history” (Zharova and Mishina, p. 172).

In the section ‘The coup or revolution’ there is a brief evaluation of October 1917 as a temporary change of government: Many of the contemporaries understood the October 1917 events as one of the series of political coups, by a temporary in power dominant party in Russia…From then onwards, the term ‘coup’ was firmly entrenched in the tapestry of memory narratives and historical narratives of the rivals of the Bolshevik party… We feel that we can draw on this perception, but we need to remember, however, that the October events were not simply one of periodic political coups, but laid down the foundations of the new great revolution, which turned upside down social, economic, political and cultural strata in Russia, and which shook the whole world. Bolsheviks (to their credit-JZ) swiftly proclaimed the October revolution as a socialist one… (p. 116).

Evaluation • It is now well-documented that the Bolsheviks were able to seize power and topple the government—with very small forces. While the Soviet textbooks persisted in a myth-making and nation-building narrative of “storming” of the Winter Palace (the seat of the government), the reality was very different—a relatively bloodless and peaceful change of government. The army stood by, indifferent and demoralised, and the only defenders of the government were small detachments, including a women’s battalion. • The October Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent Bolshevik’s triumph was not, as the students now see, either inevitable or predestined. A series of major, and soon to be fatal, errors in politics during the 1916-1917 period had been committed: • the failure of foreign policy in conducting the increasingly unpopular war, which had strained the resources to the limit, and imposed an unimaginable hardship on the people • the leadership weakness of Tsar Nicholas II in not addressing the issue of economic and social reforms and the continuation of Stolypin’s (Prime Minister, prior to his assassination in 1911) far-reaching land reforms, thus saving the monarchy and the Russian Empire from the collapse • Kerensky’s persona dramatis of the man for all seasons, which had resulted in the demise of the Provisional Government • the timely presence of both Lenin (his tactical genius in seizing power at the crucial moment) and Trotsky, who establishes a Military-Revolutionary Committee (MRC). It provided the necessary leadership and military strategy for overthrowing the Provisional government.

References Danilov, A., Kosulina, L., & Brandt, M. (2007). Istoriia Rossii [History of Russia]. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Erokhina, M. and Shevyrev, A. (2006) Old Heritage and New Trends: School History Textbooks in Russia. In J. Nicholls, J. (Ed.), School History Textbooks across Cultures. Oxford: Symposium Books. Pankratova, A. (ed.) (1950) Istoriia SSSR, (Grade 10 textbook), 9th edition. Moscow: GUPIMP. Shestakov, V., Gorinov, M., and Viazemski, E. (2002) Istoriia Otechestva: XX vek (History of the Fatherland: 20th Century: Grade 9 textbook). (2nd edition). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Smirnov, V., Belousov, L.. & Dokuchaeva, O. (2009). Vseobshchaia Istoriia: Noveishaia Istoriia [World History: Modern History]. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Van Drie, J. & van Boxtel, C. (2008). Historical reasoning: Towards a framework for analyzing students’ reasoning about the past. Educational Psychology Review, 20, 87–110. Whitehouse, J. A. (2008). Teaching the historians. Agora, 43(2), 4-8. Zagladin, N. (2004) History of Russia and the World in the 20th Century. Moscow: Russkoe Slovo. Zajda, J. (2007) The New History School Textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992-2004. Compare, 37(3): 291-306. Zajda, J. (2009) Teachers and the Politics of History Textbooks. In L. Saha and A. Dworkin (Eds.), The New International Handbook of Research on Teachers and Teaching (pp. 373-387). New York: Springer Science+Business Media Zajda, J. and Whitehouse, J. A. (2009) Teaching History. In L. Saha and A. Dworkin (Eds.), The New International Handbook of Research on Teachers and Teaching (pp. 933- 945). New York: Springer Science+Business Media. Zajda, J. (2010). The Politics of the New History Textbooks in the Russian Federation. In J. Zajda (Ed.), Globalisation, Ideology and Education Policy Reforms (pp.3-17).Dordrecht: Springer. Zajda, J. (2011). Ideology and Nationalism in history School Textbooks in Putin’s Russia, 2001-2010. In R. Guyver and T. Taylor (Eds.), History Wars in the Classroom-Global Perspectives (pp. 125-143).New York: Information Age Publishing. Zharova, L. and Mishina, I. 1992. Istoriia Otechestva (History of the Fatherland). Grade 10. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. .

Teaching Diverse Representations of the 1917 Russian Revolution: The Role of Leadership