The Limits to Europeanization

1. The Limits to Europeanization Kevin Featherstone LSE

2. The limits… • Ontological and empirical; • Problems with the independent variable; • Problems with the dependent variable; • Determining the intervening variables.

3. The independent variable? • The source of the stimulus? What is ‘Europe’ ? • We attribute diverse qualities to ‘Europe’ – without clear definition. Explanatory rigour v. popular discourse. • ‘Europe’ has a meaning greater than specific EU obligations. • Delineate ‘transnational’ European pressures: • Multi-dimensional: socio-cultural; economic; political. • Actors: perceptions, understandings, norms, and values. • Is there a European ‘model’? What is there to import into the domestic system? Coherence and consistency.

4. Identifying the subject… • Who are ‘we’? • No ‘European ‘demos’: with whom do we identify? Frames direction, purpose. • Inclusion, exclusion: defining the boundaries of ‘Europe’ – historically, geographically, culturally, etc. (shifting conceptions, cross-cutting cleavages). Turkey? • A changing ‘we’: multi-ethnic, multicultural.

5. The EU as the independent variable • ‘EU-isation’: EU explains domestic change. • EU attributes: domestic opinion can ascribe to EU qualities beyond matters of legal competence. Expectations, understandings, tactics: e.g. identity cards, privatisation. • What is shared in the EU? • Shifting understandings of the EU’s mission. • Post Cold War: EU lacks a shared ‘narrative’ (T G Ash). Affects domestic response & impacts.

6. Linking mechanisms vary: • Form of stimulus: ‘hard law’ (regulations, directives etc.) versus ‘soft law’ (open method of coordination / Lisbon 2000 agenda). Differences of ‘commitment device’: e.g. EMU v. Lisbon. • Direction of stimulus: not just ‘top-down’ – EU impact on domestic level – also ‘bottom-up’ – national inputs at EU level. Interactive linkages. • 2 complex arenas: EU institutional setting & domestic institutional setting. Ontological distinctions between structure & agency ?

7. ‘Causality’? • Independent variable: common EU commitments, stimuli. • Intervening variable: domestic ‘institutional’ conditions frame responses & explain divergent outcomes. • Dependent variable: domestic adaptation, shifts. Comparison between member states.

8. The dependent variable: what is changing? • Politics: ideas (beliefs), interests, strategies. • Polity: administrative adjustments, change in processes and institutions. • Policy: beliefs, agendas, content, implementation. Effects: breadth/scope?; depth?; permanent? Asymmetrical empowerment.

9. Explaining divergent outcomes: intervening variables • Role of ‘Agency’ - intentional/unintentional (Ioakimides). Discourse: legitimating adaptation to EU (Schmidt, 2002). • Role of ‘Structure’: follow ‘new institutionalism’. • ‘misfit’ between EU & domestic (Knill & Lenschow, 1998). Adaptation most likely when EU does not challenge core structures & practices. • ‘push-pull’ (Boerzel, 2000): adaptation depends on misfit & mobilisation of domestic actors in support. • ‘Reform capacity’ (A. Heritier et al, 2001): a typology of domestic conditions producing high/low capacity for change.

10. Domestic Vetoes • Hypotheses: • Distances between veto players & their number will determine adaptation (Tsebelis, 2002). • the higher the number of veto points, the less likely is adaptation (Heritier & Knill, 2000). • Distinguish between: • Individual & collective veto players (Tsebelis, 2002) • Competitive (diffuse) / collective (consensual) veto points (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998) • Formal (de jure) / informal (de facto) veto points (Heritier & Knill, 2000).

11. Path dependence of domestic system: resistence to change • Corporatist model – interest mediation. • Greek exceptionalism: state corporatism’;‘disjointed’; ‘parentela pluralism’. Clientelism; rent-seeking. • ‘Varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001). • Different institutional types shape economic performance & responses to external pressures. • Distinguish: liberal market economies (UK); coordinated market economies (Germany; Sweden).

12. Greek exceptionalism? • ‘Mediterranean capitalism’ ?(Amable, 2003); high regulation, low competition. • state capitalist ? (Schmidt, 2004); • State mediates inter-firm relations; centrality of state in econ dev.; heavy regulation; adversarial labour relations. • ‘mixed market economies’ (Molina & Rhodes, 2005). • Unions & employers: strong, but fragmented. Problems in delivering collective goods, sustaining coordination.

13. Identifying the constraints… • Crude paradox in Greece: general discourse v. opposition on distributional issues. • Low state institutional capabilities (implementation). • Conflicting political interests (electoral, clientelistic) undermines policy leadership. • Disjointed, skewed union / employer representation. Absence of stable social dialogue. • Weakness of technocratic policy legitimation.

14. The research challenge: ‘Europe’ • ‘Unpack’ conceptual frame: • Clear hypotheses: identifying the linking mechanisms between EU stimuli and domestic response. Distinguish actors & structures. [Also assess depth & scope; permanence.] • Causality – not coincidence, co-variance. • Distinguish EU from other external pressures. • ‘Europeanisation’: a predisposition to find effects.

15. The research challenge: domestic ‘model’ • What ‘variety of capitalism’ in Greece? Hypothesis: structures interests, behaviour and produces domestic resistance. Show link with: • State-centric. Heavy market regulation. • Structure of firms: few big, many small. • Employment pattern: importance of agriculture & self-employment; few part-time. Black economy. High labour costs. • Clientelism, corruption. • Stress here is on rational self interest, not values.

16. The limits to Europeanisation: • Avoid fuzzy, aggregate assumptions of EU links & effects. Primacy of EU impact? Rigour of research design. • Resilience to domestic change: rational interests drawn from current ‘model’. Greek exceptionalism explains membership behaviour? • Changing identities, attributes of ‘Europe’. Divergent national perceptions, expectations of obligations, opportunities with direct/indirect links to EU competences. • Issues here of governability & coordination.