Security in the Intermodal Transport Chain

1. Security in the Intermodal Transport Chain NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

2. Introduction • Modern Times: Free Trade and open borders • Setback: 11th September 2001 • Reaction in US: « virtual wall » • Embarrassment in EU • Dialogue US – EU • EIA: officials with professionals • Intention: Agreement US - EU NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

3. American approach – European objections • US: starting point: European Harbours (unilaterally) • EU: holistic view = the whole Transport & Logistic Chain; all modes; global approach • Co-operation with International Organisations • EU needs Agreement between Member States NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

4. Risk categories (I) • Threats to ships and harbours • ISM and SOLAS (by IMO) • ISPS 1st of July 2004 • Control of ships (Security Plan is checked and approved bay RSO = Recognised Security Organisation, International Ship Security Certificate valid 5 years) NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

5. Risk categories (II) • Threats to key infrastructure • Ports: Security plans (including emergency response plan) • Terminals • Contact points (+responsibility) • Annual review of the plan • The whole logistic chain! NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

6. Risk categories (III) • No common security standards • Minimum standards for international transport service providers • Secure actors (like in aviation) • Regulated agent • Known shipper • Advance information NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

7. Risk categories (IV) • Technical equipment • Secure locks and seals (f. i. electronically) • Secure handover procedures • No co-ordination of control of national activities • Common risk assessment methodologies • Classification of security incidents NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

8. Some specific aspects • Data protection • Personal • Business • Storage how long? • Measures should not be more dangerous that the threat itself • Sky marshals NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

9. Financial impact and possible economic result • US measures 1980 – 2001:logistic costs dropped from 16,1 % of GDP to 10,1 % • Financial impact of the security measures after 2001 on the costs per container are estimated at 50 to 100 $ (Hapag Lloyd). • Target: Win-win-situation NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

10. Dimension and Importance • There were always pirates, thieves, smugglers etc. = much bigger security risk than terrorists • But terrorist’s threat more spectacular and important per case • Political leverage effect to get what always was wanted and needed: an efficient and secure intermodal transport chain NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

11. Conclusions • No exaggeration! A reasonable and pragmatic approach is appropriate • The transport business sector is in principle agreeable to security measures – but common sense! • The harbours preceded, the chain will follow NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA

12. Next steps • EU Commission: Consultation paper (23.12.03) – Comments until 27.2.2004 • Negotiations EU with US • Final target: a Worldwide Security Agreement NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA