The War on Terror: Fighting al-Qaida in Iraq and Afghanistan

1. The War on Terror: Fighting al-Qacidain Iraq, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaicdain the Islamic Magrib and al-Qacidain the Arabian PeninsulaEric Davisdavis@polisci.rutgers.eduhttp://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/davishttp://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/ The BLaST IU Liberty 17 Fellowship 2013 Summer Institute American Institute for History Education June 20, 2013

2. What are our main questions? • What are the primary causes of war, terrorism and violence in the Middle East? • How has terrorism been caused by the internal politics of nations in the Middle East? (domestic correlates) • How have terrorism in the Middle East been influenced by forces outside the Middle East, e.g., US foreign policy? (external correlates)

3. What are our main questions? • Because Middle East is the most unstable area in the world, how can terrorism be combatted? • What policies should the US follow in a new world of limited budgets and “war fatigue”? • What challenges does the US military face in confronting new types of asymmetric warfare? • What types of training and weapons systems will be most effective in countering terrorism?

4. Lineages of the 1991 Gulf War: Backdrop for terrorism in Iraq

5. US supported the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Iran (ruled 1941-1979) The Shah was extremely repressive (and Westernized) ruler who was culturally alienated from Iranians Shah imprisoned and tortured his people and US did nothing to end his repressive rule When Shah restored to power in 1951, Iranians were hostile to US for its political support of his regime New regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was very hostile to US and still hostile today (see Argo) Origins of 1991 (or Second) Gulf War

6. Gulf War represented cross-currents of rising Islamic militancy and global need for oil Saddam tried to destroy Iran’s Islamic Republic and make Iraq the main military power in Persian Gulf Iran-Iraq War reflected Saddam Husayn’s political ambitions to become regional hegemon and his ego When it invaded on Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq claimed that Kuwait was its 19th province that had been separated illegally from Iraq by Great Britain in 1920 (“lines in the sand”); GB had Mandate over Iraq -1920-1932 Origins of 1991 (or Second) Gulf War

7. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (overthrown 1979)

8. It can be argued that US partially responsible for 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and 1991 Gulf War If US had pressured Shah to democratize, there would have been no Islamic Revolution in 1978-79 If the Shah hadn’t been overthrown, Iraq wouldn’t have dared attack Iran with its powerful armed forces Support for the Shah, who the US returned to power in a 1953 coup, demonstrates that supporting authoritarian regimes is a counterproductive policy The Islamic Republic of Iran has become the US’ most implacable enemy in Middle East 1991 Gulf War and Oil

9. 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War was extremely costly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lent Iraq funds during the war to prevent an Iranian victory After war ended, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait now feared 1,000,000 man battled-tested Iraqi army Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded loans be repaid and increased oil output, driving down oil prices Saddam had promised Iraqis that prosperity would return after Iran-Iraq War ended, but he was unable to keep his promise given declining oil prices 1991 Gulf War and Oil

10. Iraqi Invasion plan for Kuwait, August 1990 (note names of Iraqi military units)

11. Iraqi army quickly defeated Kuwaiti forces Kuwaiti royal family and army fled to Saudi Arabia and Gulf states Iraq thought it had “green light” for invasion from US after Saddam Husayn met with Ambassador April Glaspie (http://dvmx.com/glaspie.html) However, US and allies felt Saddam could not be allowed to control Persian Gulf’s oil wealth and formed UN coalition to evict Iraq from Kuwait Iraq in Kuwait: Aug. 1990-Jan. 1991

12. Important to compare the international effort of 1991 (UN) and Afghanistan (NATO) with the US’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 (US and UK) 1991 Gulf War coalition led by the US included important Arab allies, Egypt and Syria, demonstrating that Arab states had differing interests and would not support Iraq Iraq broke Arab League’s cardinal rule that no Arab League member seize another Arab state Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led to UN coalition

13. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led to UN coalition Iraq tried to manipulate anti-Israeli sentiment Saddam thought that attacking Israel with SCUD missile attacks on its cities would force it to respond with an attack on Iraq Once Israel joined the war, Saddam thought Arab supporters of US/UN would support Iraq Saddam added “God is Great” (Allahu Akbar) to the Iraqi flag to manipulate Islamist sentiments against US-led UN coalition

14. Images (and Stereotypes) of the Gulf War

15. Saddam Husayn was still in power because US led coalition refused to overthrow his Bacthist regime US allowed Iraq to use helicopter gun ships to brutally repress a massive popular uprising (Intifada) US forces ordered not to help insurgents, and to blow up ammunitions dump so rebels couldn’t seize them UN sanctions (1991-2003) after war meant to force Iraq to destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Iraq’s national economy and education system collapsed during 1990s under weight of UN sanctions Aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War

16. Images from the 1991 Uprising (Intifada) Mass grave of Iraqis killed in 1991 uprising and bodies of those found after 2003 “Highway of Death” – Kuwait, January 1991 Kurds displaced from Iraq to Turkey during Intifada

17. US feared that only Saddam could keep Iraq from fragmenting after the Gulf War If Iraq split up, Turkey, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia might try and seize parts of country and its oil wealth Because Iraq is a major oil producer, and occupies strategic position , US feared foreign takeover of parts of the country, e.g., by Turkey, Syria or Iran This US action was a major strategic blunder because Saddam rebuilt his repressive security apparatus, using oil smuggled out of Iraq despite 1990s UN sanctions Why did US not overthrow Saddam in 1991?

18. What are the takeaways of the Gulf War? • International efforts are most effective, esp. when involve building political coalitions • The Gulf War didn’t have an “American face” • Don’t do a half way job – the US should have supported the Iraqi uprising after the war • By leaving Saddam in power, US let hundreds of thousands of Iraqi die in Feb.-Mar. uprising • Decision made Iraqis very suspicion of US

19. How did the Gulf War impact terrorism? • It destroyed Iraq’s economy and education system allowing criminal and terrorist groups to exploit the social and political decay • It weakened the power of the central state • It undermined nationalism and led Iraqis to turn to sectarian entrepreneurs (ethnic & religious) • It enabled foreign powers - KSA, Arab Gulf states and Iran - to promote radicalism in Iraq

20. The Iraq War of 2003

21. Saddam Husayn’s Bacthist regime very weak after 1991 Gulf War bombings and national uprising Many Bacthist officials killed during the Intifada Saddam tried to “Islamicize” and “retribalize” Iraqi society to gain support of traditional forces Economic and educational decline, and Saddam’s policies that promoted traditional forces, led to rise of conservative Islamist movements Educated middle and professional classes decimated Iraq prior to the 2003 War

22. Iraq prior to the 2003 War Collapse of national economy encouraged oil smuggling and transformation of the Iraqi economy into a large criminal enterprise Oil smuggling and the sale of ancient artifacts became the main source of wealth Many criminal organizations claimed that they were Islamic charities assisting the poor These criminal organizations were hostile to US invasion of March 2003

23. Images from US “Shock and Awe” campaign

24. “Shock and Awe” campaign gave US false sense of victory in Iraq Military unaware that massive firepower and bombing was not enough to win in Iraq With volunteer army and decline in enlisted personnel, US military thought technology could compensate for reduced force levels Only130,000 troops sent when 400,000 recommended Anticipating rapid US victory, Saddam had insurgency ready, with weapons caches/funds in areas loyal to him “Shock and Awe” vs. “Hearts and Minds”

25. Donald Rumsfeld said in Baghdad in April 2003 that massive looting was part of “untidy” aspect of freedom and that “stuff happens” Such comments did not build Iraqi trust regarding US efforts to build democracy in Iraq US military only secured Ministry of Defense (Republican Palace) and Ministry of Oil This policy reinforced Iraqi view that US invaded Iraq to control its oil wealth April-May 2003: Losing Hearts and Minds

26. April-May 2003: Losing Hearts and Minds All other ministries were destroyed and Iraq Museum, with priceless artifacts, was looted After 5 days and repeated calls, Iraq Museum was finally secured by American troops Looting undermined Iraqi confidence in US which already suspect for not supporting 1991 uprising Iraqis did not trust US statements about wanting to build democracy in their country

27. Baghdad looting: April 2003

28. US troops guarding Ministry of Oil, destruction of Ministry of Culture and Baghdad looters

29. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) governed Iraq from May, 2003-June 2004 CPA disbanded 385,000 Iraq army against advice of US military and Iraqi politicians National police were dismissed and 125,000 state factory workers fired Agriculture subsidies eliminated in August 2003, forcing many farmers to migrate to urban areas While CPA mandated salary increases helped employed middle classes, their policies hurt poorer Iraqis, the majority of the population CPA policies and hearts and minds

30. Most US officials sent to Iraq had little knowledge of the country and spoke no Arabic US took advice of Iraqi expatriates, many of whom had personal agendas and had been in Iraq for decades US wanted complete control in Iraq, and thus focused on eliminating Bacthists from all positions of power US didn’t make distinction between high Bacthist officials and large number of Iraqis who forced to join the party, but who really despised Saddam’s regime De-Bacthification led to disastrous consequences as Iraq lost many highly proficient technocrats Why did US follow bad policies in Iraq?

31. Insurgency began in summer of 2003 in north-central Iraq among Sunni Arabs in al-Anbar Province In south, Muqtada al-Sadr’s (Shiite) Mahdi Army (JAM) immediately challenged US in 2003 Donald Rumsfeld refused to admit an insurgency existed until fall of 2003 Having excluded Iraq experts and State Department Arabists, and relying on a small military force, US was headed for defeat in Iraq by 2006 Insurgency helped by high unemployment of youth, caused in part by CPA’s policies Freedom without order: the insurgency and the Mahdi Army

32. Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army

33. April 2003 looting destroyed many government offices, thereby undermining state’s effectiveness Inadequate US force levels and lack of national police made it impossible to control “sectarian entrepreneurs” Iraqi government’s neglect of agriculture created large rural exodus, and no urban jobs Ethnic cleansing occurred in poorer neighborhoods, but esp. in those with large in-migration of youth from rural areas With lack of security and no state services, Iraqis forced to turn to sectarian organizations US force levels and ethnic cleansing

34. US troops guarding Ministry of Oil, destruction of Ministry of Culture and Baghdad looters

36. al-Qacida overplayed its hand in Sunni Arab triangle, killing Iraqis and stealing their wealth Rise of “Awakening” movement among Sunni Arab tribes in al-Anbar Province destroyed al-Qacida in less than a year Mahdi Army declared a truce in August 2007 that led to calm in Baghdad and southern Iraq In March 2008, Iraqi army suppressed JAM in Basra, Baghdad and the Shiite south of Iraq Surge helped as well through embedding additional 30,000 US troops in residential neighborhoods What caused situation in Iraq to turn around?

37. Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha and his brother, Ahmad Abu Risha, leaders of the Sons of Iraq (Anbar Awakening) The Anbar Awakening al-Qaicda leader al-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006)

38. Ahmad Abu Risha current leader Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha founder of Sons of Iraq Sons of Iraq checkpoints Images from the “Awakening” – aka “Sons of Iraq”

40. Documented civilian deaths from violence 112,972 – 123,628 (Monthly table) Further analysis of the WikiLeaks' Iraq War Logs may add 12,000 civilian deaths. http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/

41. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have not been given enough credit for role in reducing violence PRT role dramatically increased by Gen. David Petreaus (Ph.D, International Relations Princeton University), with new counter-insurgency approach PRTs followed new “bottom up” approach, listening to Iraqis and implementing their goals and agendas Iraqis feel respected because they define development goals and projects, while US helps implement them Why role did PRTs play in stabilizing Iraq?

42. US policy in Afghanistan, 2001-2012

43. Images of Afghanistan

44. “Taliban” means “students” in Pashto Pashtuns are 40% of Afghan population and Taliban are almost entirely Pashtun Movement popular when seized power in 1996 because ended warlord control of economy Warlords had charged tariffs on roads in their territory and hurt national economy Warlords brutal- when one raped young girl and hung by Taliban, movement seen as virtuous Who are the Taliban?

45. US largely ignored Afghanistan after military overthrow of Taliban regime after 9/11 In 2001, US/West promised Afghanistan much development aid, but delivered relatively little Few alternative economic opportunities are available to farmers beyond poppy production Regional warlords continued to exploit peasants after Taliban regime was overthrown How is the US confronting the Taliban and al-Qacida in Afghanistan?

46. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, neighbor states do not want to see political stability and democracy prevail Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia have attempted to undermine Iraq Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have attempted to undermine Afghanistan Saudi Arabia has funded many Taliban “madrasas” which really not schools, but military training camps US military strategy needs to be sensitive to the political environment in fighting wars in Middle East The role of “neighborhood effects”

47. Pakistan concerned with lack of its ability to control Pashtuns in its remote northwestern provinces Inter-Security Services (ISI) – Pakistan’s CIA - has been Taliban’s main supporter since 1990s Pakistan state wants to promote Pashtun interest in Afghanistan so Pakistani Pashtuns do not seek independent state carved out of its NW provinces Pakistan’s “double game”: partially supports US war on terror, while supporting Taliban at same time US and NATO forces cannot defeat Taliban when they enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan

48. Geopolitics of Taliban Movement

49. The Afghan political leadership Taliban flag Afghani president Hamid Kharzai Taliban leaders, including Mullah Abdul Salaam Zareef (center) Fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar (perhaps)

50. Government corruption has alienated many Afghans; undermined their faith in democracy Pres. Hamid Karzai has allowed his relatives to engage in massive corruption al-Qacida has rebuilt its strength along the Afghan border with Pakistan, with many Arab fighters Political instability and fear of India has undermined ability of Pakistan army to fight al-Qacida Many new, younger Taliban leaders have joined the movement since 2001 Why has Taliban gained strength since 2006?