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P roposal to Ensure Personnel Surety at CFATS Facilities. Presented to DHS by Chemical, ONG and Pipeline SCCs. CFATS RBPS 12. Requires appropriate background checks: Verify and Validate Identity Check Criminal History Verify and Validate Legal Authorization to Work
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Proposal to Ensure Personnel Surety at CFATS Facilities Presented to DHS by Chemical, ONG and Pipeline SCCs
CFATS RBPS 12 • Requires appropriate background checks: • Verify and Validate Identity • Check Criminal History • Verify and Validate Legal Authorization to Work • Identify People with Terrorist Ties • Owner/Operators can satisfy 1-3 independently • Must rely on DHS to satisfy item 4
Benefits of Proposal • Provides both a short term and long term solution to ensure effective personnel surety at CFATS sites in the fastest time frame. • Leverages existing Federal vetting programs, promotes efficiency and minimizes duplication. • Eliminates redundant PII collection and reporting. • Minimizes burden on owner/operators and DHS. • Focuses priority on workers with NO current vetting • Workers are vetted prior to, rather than after, gaining access to regulated sites • Long term approach would use current technologies and industry best practices
Interim Approach -- Employees • Workers who have been vetted: • Recognize existing government vetting programs that include all 4 elements in RBPS 12 (TWIC, HME, ATF, etc) • Workers who have NOT been vetted - Use one or both of two options: • Transitional Vetting Program • Owner/Operators conduct checks for 1-3 and provide DHS with PII [verbal confirmation] for check of 4 (terrorist screening) • Expanded TWIC • Revise TSA policy to allow TWIC population to include CFATS-regulated facilities
Interim Approach -- Contractors/Visitors • Owner/operators would NOT directly vet contractors or visitors • Contracting/visiting companies could vet their own employees to RBPS 12 items 1-3 • For item 4, contractors would provide DHS with PII, AND/OR utilize a network of “Trusted Agents” that might include • TWIC enrollment centers • Local Safety Councils • Channelers (e.g. Axiom, Cogent) • Trusted Agents could: • Verify identity and collect PII • Submit to DHS for Terrorist Screening • Receive confirmation from DHS • Provide confirmation to Contractor • Owner/operators could require confirmation of PII submissionsto ensure compliance for contractor or visitor personnel requiring unescorted access
Long-Term Approach • Option 1: CFATS Credential • Create a new credential just for CFATS workers who require unescorted access to restricted areas • Option 2: Critical Infrastructure Worker Identification Credential (“CIWIC”) • The CIWIC would replace all other Federal Credentials through use of multiple endorsements. • Either option should learn from the TWIC experience • Establish a DHS/SCC Workgroup on Long Term Approach
Workgroup Participants Clyde Miller, BASF Peter Weaver Chair of PCIS ILTA, member of CSCC 973-245-6233 RPWeaver@ilta.com clyde.miller@basf.com 202-842-9200 Terry Whitley, Shell Cynthia Hilton Chair of NPRA Security Committee Institute of Makers of Explosives, member of CSCC 713-241-4061 202- 266-4319 Terry.whitley@shell.comchilton@ime.org Rick Kane, Rhodia Chair of Chemical Sector Coordinating Council (CSCC), Jamie Conrad SOCMA representative Counsel to SOCMA 609-860-3054 202-822-1970 Richard.kane@us.rhodia.comjamie@conradcounsel.com Jeff Gunnulfsen NPRA Security Committee Director 202-552-4371 jgunnulfsen@npra.org Mike Williamson Tesoro, member of NPRA Security Committee 210-626-4726 Michael.m.williamson@tsocorp.com