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UNSC exercise

UNSC exercise. Brazil, Germany, India, Japan Argentina, Italy, Korea, Pakistan African Union (53 countries) United States China. The “G4” countries the have the most to gain from adding permanent seats to the UNSC. Groups of countries to know for the mid-term:.

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UNSC exercise

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  1. UNSC exercise • Brazil, Germany, India, Japan • Argentina, Italy, Korea, Pakistan • African Union (53 countries) • United States • China The “G4” countries the have the most to gain from adding permanent seats to the UNSC

  2. Groups of countries to know for the mid-term: • “G5” – top shareholders of the IMF/World Bank United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom • G20 G7 + BRIC + EU + MAKTISAS • “G4” – Countries seeking permanent membership on the UNSC Brazil, Germany, India, Japan • P5 United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia, China • Swiss bloc

  3. TODAY:The United Nations Security Council Reform... a new permanent seat for Japan? Or…?

  4. Today is really about an analytical tool: • The Commitment Problem • One version: • The Schelling Conjecture: Tying your hands increases your bargaining leverage • Another version: • Time-inconsistent preference problems • For both versions we need a • CREDIBLE constraint or • “CREDIBLE COMMITMENT” MECHANISM

  5. Plan • The Schelling Conjecture • Weiss’s argument: • Japan's UNSC seat & domestic politics • The Schelling Conjecture reversed? • Credible commitments & democratization • Ὀδύσσεια • The Odyssey • Kidnapping • Government expropriation • Central Banks (The Federal Reserve) • Your exam as a credible commitment device • Marriage

  6. Let’s start with the Weiss story Tell me about it!

  7. Puzzle Anti-Japanese protests in China Sometimes allowed Sometimes prevented Why?

  8. Typical Schelling Conjecture • 2 actors negotiating at the international level • (e.g., over tariffs) • One actor is severely constrained by a domestic legislature • (e.g., protectionist legislature) • The other actor is a dictator with no constraints • Who has the better bargaining position?

  9. A little animation A* P? D* NSQ L* SQ Line represents some generic policy space A*=“Authoritarian” government’s ideal point D*=“Democratic” government’s ideal point SQ=Status quo P?=A proposal from the authoritarian government, which seems plausible for the democratic government – in the absence of the legislative constraint… L*=Ideal point of the democracy’s legislature NSQ=The new status quo – the best deal the authoritarian government can get, given the credible legislative constraint

  10. Most have argued… • The Schelling Conjecture favors DEMOCRACIES • They have the CREDIBLE CONSTRAINT • E.g., the LEGISLATURE • More generically: • AUDIENCE COSTS

  11. Weiss turns this around! • US announces support for Japan • So, audience costs are in place for backing down! • China – at first – does not object • Then “releases” the protests • Now China has a credible constraint • And the US backs down! • A dictatorship uses audience costs against a democracy

  12. Credible commitment? • Always ask this question! • Here: • China can control when protest STARTS • But cannot put the genie back in the bottle • If China can stop protests as easily as it can prevent them, then the constraint is not credible

  13. International constraints? • Look back at CLASS 5 notes, slide 22 • Internationalconstraints to gain domesticleverage

  14. How does bringing in the IMF help push through economic reform? Figure 1: The logic of bringing in the IMF Payoff to veto player -1 (change policy) Accept Veto player Without the IMF Reject 0 (maintain the status quo) Executive With the IMF -1 (change policy) + loan Accept Veto player Reject -r (reject the IMF)

  15. A pure domestic setting? • Boix’s story of democracy • Do the poor have a credible commitment not to expropriate/tax the rich? • Do the rich have a credible exit threat? • All hinges on • repression costs • income distribution • asset specificity • Explains political regimes in the Middle East – it’s OIL, not Islam or Arabic culture

  16. ‘‘That minority still controls the police, the army, and the economy. If we lose them, we cannot address the other issues.’’

  17. Now onto the 2nd version: Time-inconsistent preference problems

  18. The generic problem of time-inconsistent preferences: Individual’s preferences over time: • Time 1: U(A)>U(B) • Time 2: U(B)>U(A) • Anticipating the change in preferences, can the individual COMMIT @ Time 1 to choosing State A @ Time 2? • Is there a CREDIBLE COMMITMENT?

  19. Examples: • Classic: Ulysses & the Sirens • Time 1=Before listening to the Sirens. • Time 2=While listening to the Sirens. • State A=Sailing home… • State B=Belly of the beast… http://traumwerk.stanford.edu/philolog/2009/10/homers_odyssey_in_art_sirens_f.html American Weekly, Temptaions of Ulysses: Sirens (1948) Pogany – 033 http://www.americanartarchives.com/pogany,w.htm

  20. Time 1 Time 2 • Hostages would like to commit to not pressing charges. Promise Free Testify H K H (T,-10 years) Not Kill Not (–,1) (–, 1) (0,1)

  21. Under democracy: • Time 1: Voters elect a government that offers incentives to firms to invest. • Time 2: Voters elect a government to tax the firm (expropriate the benefits from investment). • Solution: Credible property rights?

  22. Time 1 Time 2 Offer Invest Expropriate G F G (T,0) Not Not Not (0,0) (-S,S) (1,1) Suppose that T>1>S>0

  23. Another common example: • Principal: Government. • Agent: Central bank. • If the central bank is not independent of the government, it may be subject to pressures to lower interest rates before elections…leading to inflation and long-run economic problems.

  24. Education: • Principal=student. • Delegates to agent=professor. • Time 1: Beginning of the semester. • Time 2: Any Thursday night. • State A: State of knowledge. • State B: State of… (Tombs). • Solution: Your agent (me) will give you a bad grade if you do poorly on the exam • Credible commitment? • REPUTATION!!!

  25. Marriage: • Not needed if there is “true love” or “happily ever after.” • Needed because we anticipate the possibility of “Time 2.” • Time 2: U(B)>U(A) • State A=Together • State B=Sirens, Tombs, etc… • “Richer,” “health,” & “better” added for symmetry. • “Poorer,” “sicker,” “worse” are the kickers.

  26. What did you learn today? • The COMMITMENT problem pervades many political, economic, and other relationships. • The analytical tool of CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS can be applied well outside of the study of international relations.

  27. Take-aways • Constraints strengthen negotiation posture • (The Schelling Conjecture) • Usually interpreted as favoring democracies • Weiss turns this around (also see J. Weeks, Cornell) • Constraints only work if they’re CREDIBLE • Recalls “The Commitment Problem” • Credible commitments can solve “time-inconsistent” preference problems

  28. Thank youWE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!

  29. Suggested further readings • Elster, Jon. 1990. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. New York: Cambridge University Press. • Elster, Jon. 2000. Ulysses Unbound. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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