Analysis of the Practicability of External Emergency Planning in Germany

1. Analysis of the Practicability of External Emergency Planning in Germany based on Experiences from the Fukushima Accident F. Gering, B. Gerich, E. Wirth und G. Kirchner BfS – Federal Office for Radiation Protection, Germany fgering@bfs.de

2. Are we well prepared for „Fukushima-like“ releases in Germany ?

3. Off-site emergency planning in Germany <100 km:Intake of stable iodinefor children andpregnant women <25 km:Intake of stable iodinefor adults< 45 years <10 km: Evacuation,Sheltering

4. Off-site emergency planning in Germany (2) Example for evacuation planningat NPP Biblis

5. Study of BfS (ongoing) • Assessment of radiological consequences for several long-lasting (up to 30d), severe releases (all INES 7)with the RODOS system • NPP Unterweser and NPP Philippsburg • Based on real weather data from 2010 • RODOS simulations up to 150 km • Estimated doses were compared against German dose reference levels

6. Results: Eff. Dose (adults), external exposure and inhalation KKU, const. emiss., Dec. KKU, Fukushima, June

7. Sheltering Eff. Dose (adults), external exposure and inhalation Day 4 Day 6 Day 8

8. Summary of radiological consequences with respect to sheltering

9. Intake of stable iodine (children, pregnant women) Thyroid dose for infants from inhalation of radioiodine • Cities affected: • Wilhelmshaven • Bremerhaven • Bremen (partially) • Oldenburg (partially) • approx. 175 000 children 200 km

10. Conclusions (1) • The size of areas, where reference levels for protective actions „sheltering“, „evacuation“ and „iodine prophylaxis“ are exceeded, by far exceeds the emergency planning for many of the accident scenarios considered in this study. • Current plans for implementing protective actions in the sector (from the EPZ), which is directly hit by the contaminated plume, and in the neighbouring sectors does not fully account for long lasting releases where often all sectors around the NPP are affected to similar extent. • In case of long lasting severe releases the critical situation can occur, that reference levels for protective actions are not exceeded in any 7-day-interval (for which some of the reference levels are currently defined in Germany), but the total dose over the release period by far exceeds the reference level.

11. Conclusions (2) • In case of long lasting severe releases an one-time intake of stable iodine often is not sufficient for protecting the population against large thyroid doses. Multiple intake of stable iodine tablets is currently not sufficiently considered in emergency planning. (Intake of stable iodine at different times for different areas?) • In case of long lasting severe releases the protective action “sheltering” imposes additional problems (e.g. the danger of being forced to order late evacuation even during passage of the plume, lifting of sheltering in one area while ordering in an another area), which may endanger the applicability of the action in general. • Concepts for lifting of countermeasures have to account for scenarios with long lasting releases.

12. Outlook • Consequences of long lasting releases on emergency planning might be discussed in an European research project possibly starting this year. • We are very much interested to learn about similar considerations in other countries ! • Contact: fgering@bfs.de

13. Appendix

14. Dose reference levels in Germany

15. Evakuierung

16. Einnahme von Iodtabletten

17. Umsiedlung Eff. Dosis (Erw.) durch Bodenstrahlung über 1 Jahr 20 mSv (1200 km2) 50 mSv (200 km2) 100 mSv (56 km2)

18. Eff. Dosis durch externe Strahlung und Inhalation KKP, FKA-30d, Dez. KKP, FKA-15d, Okt.

19. Schilddrüsendosis für Kleinkinder durch Inhalation KKP, FKA-30d, Dez. KKP, FKA-15d, Okt.