Is morality objective The state of the debate

1. � Michael Lacewing Is morality objective?The state of the debate Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Cognitivism There is moral knowledge. In some sense, moral judgments can �fit the facts�. Standard: moral knowledge is �universal�. Bernard Williams: moral knowledge is relative to society. G E Moore�s �naturalistic fallacy�: moral values cannot be deduced from natural facts. But there are still non-natural facts about moral values. What kinds of �facts� can these be? Aren�t values dependent on valuing?

3. Emotivism A J Ayer: when two people disagree over a fact, the matter can be resolved (or at least, we know what would resolve it); when two people disagree over a value judgment, either they disagree over a (natural) fact, or there is no further way to resolve the disagreement. Moral judgments express feelings of approval/disapproval.

4. Emotivism developed Obj: this means there is no such thing as moral reasoning (only factual). Charles Stevenson and Simon Blackburn: there is a disagreement in attitude, and attitudes are not held one-by-one. My attitude of disapproval relates to beliefs about the action (my reasons for disapproving), desires towards it, and to other attitudes of approval and disapproval (similar feelings about similar actions). Many attitudes can be involved in a single practical ethical issue, e.g. abortion. Blackburn: very few systems of moral attitudes are internally coherent and psychologically possible.

5. Cognitivism developed There are truths about moral reasons. Moral judgments can�t be deduced from natural facts, but they can be rationally supported by them. Whether some consideration is a moral reason is a fact, a fact about reasons. Reasons are readily understandable, e.g. reasons for holding scientific beliefs. Facts about reasons are normative facts.

6. Cognitivism developed When two people disagree morally, they either disagree about natural facts or about normative facts. At least one is making a mistake. Moral reasoning is a matter of weighing up what reasons we have to act in particular ways.

7. Are moral reasons objective? Blackburn: our judgments about what reasons we have are a reflection of our attitudes, not a description of independent normative facts. Thomas Scanlon: our attitudes are reflections of our judgments about reasons, they are �judgment-sensitive�. E.g. a desire reflects a judgment that the object of desire is good in some way. Without this evaluative element, the �desire� is not recognisably human (rational), but a mere �urge�.

8. �Correct� judgments? Blackburn and Williams: what is it to judge moral reasons �correctly�? Has someone who judges they have no reason to be moral made a mistake? Modern intuitionism: Rawls� �reflective equilibrium� - what reasons we have is discovered by testing theory and intuitions against each other. Cp. Scientific judgments re. �best explanation� Blackburn: this form of reasoning is equally available to non-cognitivism. Williams: cognitivism retains additional idea of insight into normative reality.