Presented by Dr. Kenneth Alibek to the USAF Air War College November 1, 1999

1. Biological Weapons Presented by Dr. Kenneth Alibek to the USAF Air War College November 1, 1999 HADRON, INC.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction Chemical Biological Nuclear TACTICAL STRATEGIC

3. Factors in BW Effectiveness • Choice of agent • Deployment method • Formulation • Manufacturing process • Meteorological and terrain conditions

4. Types of BW Threat • Bacterial weapons • Viral weapons • Rickettsial weapons • Fungal weapons • Toxin weapons • Peptide weapons (a variant of toxin weapons)

5. Partial Listing of Known Biological Weapons Agents

6. BW Deployment Methods • Vector • Contamination of food and water sources • Aerosol (the most effective deployment method)

7. Soviet Biological Weapons Developed and Approved for Use Tularemia Glanders VEE Smallpox Plague Anthrax Q Fever (<1990) Marburg (>1990) STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL

8. Ebola Bolivian hemorrhagic fever Argentinian hemorrhagic fever Melioidosis Lassa fever Japanese encephalitis Russian spring-summer encephalitis Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s NATURAL STRAINS

9. Antibiotic-resistant (AR) plague AR tularemia AR anthrax Antibiotic- and sulfonamide-resistant glanders Immune system-overcoming (IO) plague IO tularemia IO anthrax Smallpox with VEE genes inserted Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s GENETICALLY ENGINEERED STRAINS

10. DRY Tularemia Anthrax Brucellosis Marburg LIQUID Smallpox Plague Anthrax VEE Types of Biological Weapons

11. BW Manufacturing CapacitiesMinistry of Defense • Sverdlovsk facility--anthrax • 100+ tonsstockpiled • Production capacity > 1000 tons annually • Kirov facility--plague • 20 tons stockpiled • Production capacity ~ 200 tons annually • Zagorsk facility--smallpox • 20 tons stockpiled • Production capacity ~ 100 tons annually • Strizhi (new facility)

12. BW Manufacturing CapacitiesBiopreparat • Berdsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders • Production capacity > 1000 tons annually • Stepnogorsk facility--anthrax, tularemia, glanders • Production capacity > 1000 tons annually • Omutninsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders • Production capacity > 1000 tons annually

13. BW Manufacturing CapacitiesBiopreparat (cont.) • Kurgan facility--anthrax • Production capacity > 1000 tons annually • Penza facility--anthrax • Production capacity > 1000 tons annually • Koltsovo facility--Marburg, smallpox • Exact production capacity unknown; dozens of tons annually

14. BW Manufacturing CapacitiesMinistry of Agriculture • Pokrov facility--smallpox, VEE • Production capacity > 200 tons annually

15. Munitions, Submunitions, Delivery Means • Aviation bombs with “biological” bomblets for strategic and medium bombers • Spray tanks installed on medium bombers • Multiwarhead ballistic missiles with bomblet warheads • Cruise missiles with special disseminating devices (under development)

16. Epidemiological Pattern of Smallpox Weapon New foci of secondary infection Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

17. Epidemiological Pattern of Tularemia Weapon Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

18. Epidemiological Pattern of Plague Weapon New foci of secondary infection Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

19. Epidemiological Pattern of Anthrax Weapon Contaminated zone Zone of initial explosion Infected zone

20. Modes of Infection PRIMARY AEROSOL • Caused by aerosols that form immediately after dissemination • Affect “target objects” before sedimentation SECONDARY AEROSOL • Caused by aerosols which have already sedimented, but have aerosolized again due to wind or activity (building ventilation, vehicular activity, street cleaning, maintenance, etc.)

21. Modes of Infection (cont.) SECONDARY DROPLET • Caused by droplet aerosols secreted by people who were infected by primary or secondary aerosols • Seen only with agents contagious by respiratory droplet infection SECONDARY NON-AEROSOL • Transmitted by infected animals (rodents, insect parasites) directly or via objects, food or water, OR • Transmitted by contaminated objects (without involving aerosolization)

22. Effectiveness of the USSR’s BW • Specific expenditure value (Q50) = amount of BW required to affect 50% of the population evenly distributed over one square kilometer (open area) • Smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, plague, VEE, glanders: Q50 ~ 3-5 kg/km2 • Marburg, dry form (and theoretically dry Ebola): Q50 ~ 1 kg/km2

23. Current Defenses AgainstBiological Weapons • Physical: • Early Detection • Limited Capability • Protective Gear • Inadequate • Unrealistic

24. Current Defenses AgainstBiological Weapons Medical: • Vaccines • Available for < 10% of known agents • Genetic engineering can render ineffective • Weeks / months to become effective • Supplies inadequate • Not cost effective • Pre-treatment • Depends on luck • Treatment • Marginal success

25. Medical Research Targets • Treating and preventing a broad spectrum of infections by modulating the immune system • Treating and preventing specific infections caused by biological weapons

26. HADRON, INC. Dr. Kenneth Alibek 7611 Little River Turnpike Suite 404W Annandale, VA 22003 (703) 642-9404 kalibek@hadron.com