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Japan Fukushima Update September 4, 2013

Japan Fukushima Update September 4, 2013. C hanges being implemented in the Nuclear industry resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 (Fukushima) Ken Evans Cecil Settles. Background of the accident Nuclear Industry Response Nuclear Regulator Commission Response

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Japan Fukushima Update September 4, 2013

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  1. Japan Fukushima UpdateSeptember 4, 2013 Changes being implemented in the Nuclear industry resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 (Fukushima) Ken Evans Cecil Settles

  2. Background of the accident • Nuclear Industry Response • Nuclear Regulator Commission Response • IEMA Actions

  3. CNN News Clip

  4. Japan Facts • Japan 145,000 square miles • State of California 163,695 square miles • State of Illinois 57,914 square miles • Fukushima Prefecture 5,321 square miles • State of Connecticut 5,554 square miles • Sangamon County 868 square miles • Japan 127.34 million people • Fukushima Prefecture 1.99 million people • California 38.04 million people • Connecticut 3.50 million people • Chicago 2.67 million people

  5. Impact 15,881 Dead /2,668 Missing Zero deaths attributed to radiation • The 4th worst recorded earthquake since 1890. • Honshu Island shifted about 2.5 m (~ 8 feet) eastward and downward • Earth’s day shortened by ~1.8 microseconds. Increased wobble of the earth on axis by ~ 6.7 inches.

  6. 3/11/2011 2:46 pm Magnitude 9 earthquake 03:41 pm Tsunami. Diesel Generators lost 6:00 pm Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Pressure Increase 7:00 pm Evacuation to 3 km – Dai-ichi 03/12/2011 05:44 am – Evacuation to 10 km 09:00 am – Unit 1 Venting 3:36 pm – Unit 1 Explosion 5:30 pm – Evacuation to 10 km – Dai-ni 6:45 pm – Evacuation to 20 km – Dai-ichi 8:00 pm – Unit 1 Seawater injection

  7. 03/13/2011 09:20 am – Unit 3 Vented to reduce pressure 11:00 am – Unit 3 Hydrogen Explosion 03/15/2011 01:25 am – Unit 2 RCIC fails 06:00 am – Unit 4 Explosion & fire 06:10 am – Unit 2 Suppression Pool explosion 09:38 am – Unit 4 11:00 am – Shelter 20-30 km - Daichi 03/16/2013 05:45 – Unit 4 Fire All workers briefly leave site due to high doses

  8. Fukushima Dai-ichi (Site 1) Unit 1 Unit 4

  9. Fukushima Dai-ni (Site 2)

  10. Quad Cities

  11. Unit 3 Unit 4

  12. Unit 1 Explosion Sequence 03/12/2011 (3:36 pm)

  13. Unit 3 Explosion 03/13/2011 (11:00 am)

  14. Unit 3 Explosion Video

  15. The next 3 Slides are current views of Fukushima

  16. August 20, 2013

  17. August 20, 2013 Unit 5 & 6 9 Temp. Tanks ~158,400 gal. (total) 7 Underground Reservoirs ~ 15,000,000 gal. (total) ~ 264,170 gallons per tank ~ 26,417 gallons per bladder

  18. fukushima-no-3-Reuters.jpg Unit 3 Refueling Floor Crane 125 Ton

  19. Unit 4 Fuel Pool Support Structure

  20. Locating accurate information in the first 48 hours was incredibly difficult The American Nuclear Society was one of the first and best websites

  21. …other sources, not so good

  22. Significant Nuclear Events YearReactor Location Event 1957 Windscale (UK) Fire / Operator Error 1961 SL1 (US) Explosion / Operator Error 1975 Browns Ferry (US) Fire / Testing 1979 TMI (US) Core Melt / Operator / INPO 1983 Salem (US) Equipment / Safety Related 1986 Chernobyl (USSR) Design / Control / WANO 1999 Blayais (France) Flooding 2001 WTC (US) Security / External Events 2002 Davis Besse (US) Corrosion / Safety Culture 2003 PAKS (Hungary) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 2011 Fukushima (Japan) Flooding / Core Melt 2011 10 Plants (Japan) Flooding

  23. Nuclear Industry and NRC Response

  24. Significant Organizations NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission – Ultimate civilian authority NEI – Nuclear Energy Institute INPO – Institute of Nuclear Power Operations EPRI – Electric Power and Research Institute WANO – World Association of Nuclear Operators IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

  25. Post Fukushima Assessments of Note • NEI / INPO / EPRI - The Way Forward - U.S. Industry Leadership in Response to Events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant • NRC - Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From The Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident. • The National Diet of Japan - Executive Summary of the Interim Report Investigation Committee on the Accidents at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company December 26, 2011 • ANS Nuclear News – Special Report – Fukushima Dai-ichi

  26. US Nuclear Industry Response • Industry initiatives in place before NRC regulations • FLEX - Diverse and flexible coping capability. Relies on diverse and multiple emergency assets FLEX Diverse and flexible Portable equipment and strategies Emergency equipment pre-staged Onsite Emergency equipment pre-staged Offsite

  27. Dresden – Portable Berm - FLEX 6 feet 40 foot section Each 40 foot section contains a rubber bladder that is filled through a pump and water line

  28. Dresden - Portable Pumps - FLEX

  29. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Task Force of senior NRC experts Report issued on July 12, 2011 (Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From The Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident) No imminent risk from continued operation Enhancements to safety and emergency preparedness are warranted 12 Recommendations to the NRC Commission

  30. NRC Regulatory Framework for the 21st Century • Recommendation 1 Framework for Defense-in-depth versus Risk • Recommendation 2 Reevaluate and upgrade Design-Basis Seismic and Flooding protection at each reactor • Recommendation 3 NRC evaluate potential enhancements to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and floods (Long Term) .

  31. NRC Regulatory Framework for the 21st Century (continued) • Recommendation 4 Strengthen Station Black Out. Design-Basis and Beyond-Design-Basis • Recommendation 5 Require Hardened Vents in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments • Recommendation 6 Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment (Longer Term)

  32. NRC Regulatory Framework for the 21st Century (continued) • Recommendation 7 Spent Fuel Pool makeup and instrumentation • Recommendation 8(Ken’s Presentation Area) Strengthen and integrate emergency response EOPs / SAMGs / EDMGs • Recommendation 9 • Prolonged Station Blackout and multi-unit events. .

  33. NRC Regulatory Framework for the 21st Century (continued) • Recommendation 10 Additional EP topics for multiunit events and prolonged SBO (Longer Term) • Recommendation 11 • EP topics related to decision-making, radiation monitoring, and public education. (Longer term) • Recommendation 12 Reactor Oversight Program. More attention on Defense-in-Depth requirements. .

  34. Implementation of Recommendations THREE-TIERED PRIORITIZATION • Tier 1 Activities • Started without unnecessary delay • Tier 2 Activities • Need further technical assessment • dependence on Tier 1 issues • availability of critical skill sets • Tier 3 Activities • Further NRC Staff study • Waiting on completion of shorter-term actions • Dependent on the critical skill sets • Dependent on resolution of NTTF Recommendation 1

  35. Tier 1 • Seismic and flood hazard reevaluations • Seismic and flood walk downs • Station blackout (SBO) regulatory actions • Equipment covered under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(hh)(2) • Hardened Vents for Mark I and Mark II containments • Spent Fuel Pool FP instrumentation • Emergency operating procedures, Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs), and extensive damage mitigation guidelines • Emergency preparedness staffing and communications

  36. Tier 2 • Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) makeup • Emergency preparedness regulatory actions

  37. Tier 3 • All items identified as long-term in the NTTF report • Ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards • Seismically induced fires and floods • Reliable hardened vents for other containment designs • Hydrogen control and mitigation • EP for prolonged SBO and multiunit events • ERDS capability • Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events • Decision-making /radiation monitoring / public education • Reactor Oversight Process modifications. Defense-in depth staff training on severe accidents and SAMGs

  38. Recommendations for further consideration • Filtration of containment vents • Instrumentation for seismic monitoring • Basis of emergency planning zone size • Prestaging of Potassium Iodide beyond 10 miles • Transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage • Loss of ultimate heat sink

  39. IEMA Actions • Provided comments on NRC Recommendations • Conducted internal assessments • Developed Action Plans based on internal assessments • Continued monitoring of Fukushima changes in Illinois • Continued monitoring of NRC Fukushima task force actions • IEMA Nuclear facility Inspection staff has been orientated to Illinois licensee’s plant specific FLEX Mitigation Plan”

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