The ECB and the IMF are Not Ireland’s Friends: The New Debtors’ Prison

1. The ECB and the IMF are Not Ireland’s Friends: The New Debtors’ Prison Sponsored by TASC & Smart Taxes May 9, 2011 Croke Park Center, Dublin William K. Black Associate Professor of Economics and Law University of Missouri – Kansas City

2. The Definition of Clueless “We have taken bold, decisive and innovative steps to manage our way through this crisis. The Government over the past 18 months has made budgetary adjustments of more than €8 billion for 2009. Had we not done so, the deficit would have ballooned towards 20 per cent of GDP.” Fianna Fail

3. IMF Praise = Proof of Failure “The measures we have taken have been commended by international bodies such as the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the IMF and the OECD and the approval of the international markets.” Fianna Fail

4. The Blind Leading the Blind In December 2008, Fianna Fail in Government launched a five year plan for economic renewal. That plan, by the people who brought you the banking and the budgetary crises – became Ireland’s consensus plan. The IMF loves the Irish plan – and the Irish government thinks that’s a good thing

5. The IMF’s Productivity t-shirt**(One Size Fits All)

6. Ireland: Cato’s 2nd Eden http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8136“It’s Not Luck” “[Ireland] boasts the fourth highest gross domestic product per capita in the world. In the mid-1980s, Ireland was a backwater with an average income level 30 percent below that of the European Union. Today, Irish incomes are 40 percent above the EU average.” Was this dramatic change the luck of the Irish? Not at all. It resulted from a series of hard-headed decisions that shifted Ireland from big government stagnation to free market growth.

7. Saved Ireland from Debt “After years of high inflation, double-digit unemployment rates, and soaring government debt that topped 100 percent of GDP, Irish policymakers began to cut spending in the late 1980s in a desperate bid to recover financial stability.” Cato 2007. Today: oops!

8. Iceland as Cato’s Eden Cato praised Ireland & Iceland as models • “Iceland’s economic renaissance is an impressive story. [S]upply-side reforms, along with policies such as privatization and deregulation, have yielded predictable results. Incomes are rising, unemployment is almost nonexistent, and the government is collecting more revenue from a larger tax base.” (2007)

9. Iceland & Ireland Sagas Hailed as theoclassical icons Existential threat – saved by Fuld Iceland’s Big 3 banks growing at 50% Anglo-Irish grows 35%; biggest RE bubble >10X Iceland’s GDP Massive bank fraud: asset losses = 60% Everyone has a Euro passport Ireland’s biggest export is the Irish

10. The Troika is Here to Help You Servaas Deroose (EC) urged Greece to “sell beaches to develop tourism and the tourism housing market.” IMF mission chief Poul Thomsen also said Greece should “sell land, including the (former) [Athens] airport….”

11. Does Ireland Belong to the Irish? “Greece must consider a fire sale of land, historic buildings and art works to cut its debts, two rightwing German politicians said today in a newspaper interview that is bound to exacerbate tensions between Athens and Berlin.” Guardian: 4 March 2010.

12. German MPs: Sell Greek Islands "Those in insolvency have to sell everything they have to pay their creditors," Schlarmann told Bild newspaper. "Greece owns buildings, companies and uninhabited islands, which could all be used for debt redemption."

13. But not the Acropolis (Yet) Greece's deputy foreign minister, Dimitris Droutsas, was asked about the idea in an interview with ARD TV. "I've also heard the suggestion we should sell the Acropolis," Droutsas said. "Suggestions like this are not appropriate at this time."

14. For what died the sons of Róisín? Will German, French or DutchInscribe the Epitaph of Emmet When we've sold enough of IrelandTo be but strangers in it For what died the sons of Roisin?Was it greed? [The Dubliners’ Luke Kelly] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C14U7JYGRgA

15. Kelly’s fear of the highest bidder To whom do we owe our allegiance today? Or her faceless men, who for Mark and Dollar Betray her to the highest bidder To whom do we owe our allegiance today?

16. Ireland should be so lucky Politically-driven privatization is perverse Incentive to sell cheap to cronies Mexico: Corrupt President Carlos Salinas privatizes telecommunications Telmex – monopoly – sold to Carlos Slim

17. Meet the world’s wealthiest man

18. Morgan Kelly is an Optimist He’s right that Ireland can’t repay Ireland is bankrupt – Morgan’s own logic Tell EU: “the bad banks are yours” Delaying the bankruptcy causes far greater pain to everyone Morgan’s budget plan deepens the recession and hurts everyone

19. Export & Tax Strategy Irish plans, even Morgan’s rely on Ireland having lowest taxes and wages That strategy is an enormous gamble – one the Irish cannot control Other nations can & will compete in a “race to the bottom” EU already taking aim at Irish tax rate Ireland on the “Road to Bangladesh”

20. Think Bolder Morgan’s proposal is to default Ireland’s weakness is its strength v. EU Troika cannot afford to bring Ireland down The real bailout is to German banks They’re getting a better deal than they contracted to receive Ireland needs to recover its sovereignty Needs sovereign currency to get out recession w/o becoming Bangladesh

21. Ireland Needs to Reclaim its Soul and Integrity This crisis was driven by elite bank frauds Investigations have instructed reports not to consider fraud Only by holding elites accountable can Ireland break the grip of crony capitalism and avoid recurrent, intensifying financial crises and the death of honest government

22. Fraud is a “Sure Thing” “Control fraud”: “sure thing” Akerlof & Romer 1993 Finance: accounting = “weapon of choice” Fraudulent lenders’ optimization recipe: • Grow massively • Make really bad loans with higher yield • Extreme leverage, not “pvt. discipline” • Trivial loan loss reserves (ALLL)

23. Recipe for Catastrophe The same recipe maximizes (fake) record profits and (real) catastrophic loss “Criminogenic environments” lead to fraud epidemics & hyper-inflated bubbles Gresham’s dynamic & neutralization “Echo” epidemics: fraud epidemics are criminogenic – cause/permit epidemics Deceit erodes trust: markets can fail

24. Control Fraud: Leading Cause of Devastating Bank Failures Control frauds cause > financial losses than all other property crimes combined Legitimacy + control + power + status = unique dangers from elite fraud • Suborn all controls • Optimize entity for fraud • Use normal corporate means to loot • Shape external environment to aid fraud

25. Gresham’s: Managers “Bank management and boards in some of the other covered banks feared that, if they did not yield to the pressure to be as profitable as Anglo, in particular, they would face loss of long-standing customers, declining bank value, potential takeover and a loss of professional respect.” (Nyberg 2011: v)

26. Punishing Integrity “The few that admitted to feeling any degree of concern at the change of strategy often added that consistent opposition would probably have meant formal or informal sanctioning.” (Nyberg 2011: v)

27. Nyberg’s Incoherence.1 “Over time, managers known for strict credit and risk management were replaced; there is no indication, however, that this was as a result of any policy to actively encourage risk-taking though it may have had that effect.” (Nyberg: v)

28. Nyberg’s Incoherence.3 In addition, there were some indications that prudential concerns voiced within the operational part of certain banks may have been discouraged. Early warning signs generated lower down in the organisation may in some cases not have reached management or the board. If so, the pressure for conformity in the banks has proven to be quite expensive. (Id.)

29. Nyberg’s Incoherence.4a “The mandate of the Commission did not include investigating possible criminal activities of institutions or their staff, for which there are other, more appropriate channels. Under the Act, evidence received by the Commission may not be used in any criminal or other legal proceedings.” (Nyberg 2011: 11)

30. Nyberg’s Incoherence.4b “The Commission has not investigated any issues already under investigation elsewhere. Instead, the Commission used its limited time and resources to investigate, as its Terms of Reference specified, why the Irish financial crisis occurred.” (Nyberg 2011: 11) So fraud cannot explain why it occurred?

31. Nyberg’s Incoherence.5a “Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to understand the precise reasons for a great number of the decisions made. However, it would appear that they generally were made more because of bad judgment than bad faith.” (Nyberg 2011: 11)

32. Nyberg’s Incoherence.5b “Indeed, a fair number of decision-makers appear to have followed personal investment policies that show their confidence in the policies followed by “their” institution at the time. Such faith usually produced large personal, financial and reputational losses.” (Nyberg 2011: 11)

33. Nyberg’s Incoherence.6a “The [compensation] models, as operated by the covered banks in Ireland, lacked effective modifiers for risk. Therefore rapid loan asset growth was extensively and significantly rewarded at executive and other senior levels in most banks, and to a lesser extent among staff where profit sharing and/or share ownership schemes existed.” (2011: 30)

34. Nyberg’s Incoherence.6b “Targets that were intended to be demanding through the pursuit of sound policies and prudent spread of risk were easily achieved through volume lending to the property sector. On the other hand, most banks also included performance factors in their models other than financial growth.” (2011: 30)

35. Nyberg’s Incoherence.6c “Occasionally, management and boards clearly mandated changes to credit criteria. However, in most banks, changes just steadily evolved to enable earnings growth targets to be met by increased lending.” (Nyberg 2011: 34)

36. Nyberg’s Incoherence.6d “Rewards of CEOs reached levels, at least in some cases, that must have appeared remarkable to staff and public alike. It is notable, that proportionate to size, the CEOs of Anglo and INBS received by far the highest remuneration of all the covered bank leaders.” (2011: 30)

37. Nyberg’s Incoherence.6e 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Anglo €2,346 €2,721 €2,354 €3,015 €4,656 €2,129 INBS €910 €1,034 €1,269 €1,836 €2,313 €2,417 AIB €1,399 €1,445 €2,563 €2,436 €2,105 €1,152 BoI €1,594 €1,919 €2,525 €3,998 €2,972 €3,095 EBS € 589 €601 €655 €760 €678 €522 IL&P €946 €1,025 €1,138 €1,335 €1,362 €942 (2011: 31, Figure 2.13)

38. Nyberg’s Incoherence.6f “Financial incentives were unlikely to have been the major cause of the crisis. However, given their scale, such incentives must have contributed to the rapid expansion of bank lending.” (2011: 31) Why?

39. Nyberg’s Incoherence.6g “Nevertheless, it was claimed by a number of bankers that management and staff were not motivated by compensation alone. Most would compete, it was claimed, as they had during the previous period of lower compensation, on the basis of natural competitiveness and professional pride.” (2011: 31)

40. Nyberg’s Incoherence.7a “The core principles, values and requirements governing the provision of credit are contained in a bank’s credit policy document which must, as a regulatory requirement, be approved at least annually by a bank’s board. The policy defines the risk appetite acceptable to the bank and appropriate for the markets in which the bank operates….”

41. Nyberg’s Incoherence.7b “The purpose of such a credit policy is to set out clearly, particularly for lenders and risk officers, the bank’s approach to lending and the types and levels of exposures to counterparties that the board is willing to accept.” (2011: 31)

42. Nyberg’s Incoherence.7c “all of the covered banks regularly and materially deviated from their formal policies in order to facilitate rapid and significant property lending growth. In some banks, credit policies were revised to accommodate exceptions, to be followed by further exceptions to this new policy, thereby continuing the cycle.”

43. Rapid Growth = Bad Loans.1 “As all banks had effectively adopted high-growth strategies (IL&P less so), the aggregate increase in credit available could not be fully absorbed by good quality loan demand in Ireland. Banks had two options to remedy this; diversify their lending into other markets or relax lending standards.” (Nyberg 2011: 34)

44. Rapid Growth = Bad Loans.2 “substantial numbers of new loans were made in Ireland. By implication, credit standards fell. The lowering of standards manifested itself as both a reduction in minimum accepted credit criteria and (more subtly) as an increase in accepted customer and property leverage.” (Nyberg 2011: 34)

45. Endemic Violations “The resulting asset growth meant that internal lending limits (both sector and large exposure limits) were exceeded. Regulatory sector limits in some banks were also exceeded, both prior to and during the Period. Gradually, as such excesses became more frequent, they were viewed with less seriousness.” (Nyberg 2011: 34)

46. Hyper-inflating bubbles “The demand for Development Finance was so strong over the Period that bank and individual growth targets were easily met from this sector. Both of the bigger banks continued to lend into the more speculative parts of the property market well into 2008, even though demand for residential property (a major end-user) had begun to decline by the end of 2006.” (Nyberg 2011: 35-36)

47. Nyberg on ALLL “In the benign economic environment before 2007, the banks reduced their loan loss provisions, reported higher profits and gained additional lending capacity. The banks could no longer make more prudent through-the-cycle general provisions, or anticipate future losses in their loan books, particularly in relation to (secured) property lending in a rising property market.” (Nyberg 2011: 42)

48. Accounting Incoherence “The higher reported profits also enabled increased dividend and remuneration distributions during the Period. All of this led to reduced provisioning buffers….” “the incurred-loss model [IAS 39] also restricted the banks’ ability to report early provisions for likely future loan losses as the crisis developed from 2007 onwards.” (Nyberg 2011: 42-43)

49. Helpless Banks & Auditors “From 2005 the banks’ profits, capital and lending capacity were enhanced by lower loan loss provisioning while the benign economic conditions continued. As the global crisis developed from mid-2007, the banks were constrained by these incurred-loss rules from making more prudent loan-loss provisions earlier, and the auditors were restricted from insisting on such earlier provisioning.” (Nyberg: 55)

50. Pathetic Reserves v. Loss “The composite provisioning level for the covered banks at end 2000 was 1.2% of loans…. If this 1.2% provisioning level had been applied at the 2007 year end by the covered banks, aggregate provisions would have increased by approximately €3.5bn (i.e. from the €1.8bn actual to €5.3bn).” (Nyberg 2011: 43)