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Future Investment Strategies For the US Military. Air Force Association. October, 2011. Budget Realities Require Reduced Federal Spending. Potential. Administration Projection. Sources: President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2012; Eurostat. Casualties are a Key Strategic Issue.
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Future Investment Strategies For the US Military Air Force Association October, 2011
Budget Realities Require Reduced Federal Spending Potential Administration Projection Sources: President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2012; Eurostat
Casualties are a Key Strategic Issue CORRELATION OF U.S. CASUALTIES IN KOREAWITH PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS U.S. INVOLVEMENT NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER: DO YOU THINK THE U.S. WAS RIGHT TO SEND TROOPS TO STOP THE COMUNIST INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA (YES) U.S. ARMY-MARINE CASUALTIES GALLUP POLL: DO YOU THINK THE U.S. MADE A MISTAKE IN GOING TO WAR IN KOREA (NO) George Ball Undersecretary of State 1961-1966 George Ball Briefing Chart to President Johnson and NSC, July 21, 1965 Casualty Concerns Remain A Significant US Strategic Vulnerability Source: M. Lorell, et. al., Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War, RAND, 1986
Adversaries Strategy….Inflict More Pain Than US Population Can Bear “We had patience in our fighting with the Soviet Union with simple weapons for 10 years. We exhausted their economy, so they disappeared. We will not abandon our fight until the weapons run out.” — Osama Bin Laden • "You will kill ten of us, we will kill one of you, but in the end, you will tire of it first." • — Ho Chi Minh “You are not willing to sacrifice lives to achieve our surrender. But we are willing to die to defend our rights as an independent sovereign nation” — Slobodan Milosevic • “Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle." • — Saddam Hussein Adversaries Attempt to Prolong Fighting and Impose Casualties
Global Proliferation of Improvised Explosives Cost Combatants One GCV ~$10-15 M = Cost of an Estate in DC One IED~$200 = Cost of an Iphone* Widespread Effect for Minimal Cost *w/2 yr contract
US is Losing Precision Weapons Monopoly What if……. From Anywhere in Here This Guy Could Hit This 5 Km Precision Guided Weapons Will be Coming to a Battlefield Near You…… Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) 120mm Guided Mortar What Happens When the Bad Guys Don’t Miss…..
Ground Forces Sustain Majority of Casualties Casualties (Killed and Wounded) US Ground Engagements Are Unpopular and Unlikely in the Near Future
Future Presidents Could Be Reluctant to Engage Ground Troops “…In this effort, the United States is prepared to act as part of an international coalition. … The United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal.” President Barack Obama March 18, 2011
The Libyan Intervention March 2011 September 2011 Libya Demonstrated That Without Control of the Air a Large Army was Defeated by a Militia
Airstrikes Most Efficient Tool Against Al Qaeda Senior Al Qaeda Killed/Captured Afghanistan 9 Ground Personnel Predator/Reaper Personnel 63 Number of CAPs estimated based on the proportion of total deployed forces in Afghanistan.
Scorecard of How the US Chooses to Fight….. Unsuccessful (Most Objectives NOT Met/High Casualties) Successful (Most Objectives Met/Low Casualties) • Operation El Dorado Canyon • The first (decisive) 90 percent of Operation Desert Storm • Operation Southern Watch • Operation Provide Comfort • Operation Northern Watch • Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia) • Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia 1995) • Operation Desert Fox (Iraq 1998) • Operation Allied Force (Kosovo 1999) • The “take down” phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan 2001) • Unified Protector (Libya 2011) • Ongoing Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa • Operation Eagle Claw (1980 Iran Hostage Rescue) • Operation Infinite Reach (Strikes in response to Africa Embassy Bombings) Primarily Air Operations • Vietnam • Beirut 1983 • Somalia 1993 • Afghanistan post-2001? • Iraq post-2003? • Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada 1983) • Operation Just Cause (Panama 1989) • Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti 1994) Primarily Ground Operations A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R
Aerial Robot Armies • What if the US could intervene with little or no cost in casualties or treasury • Air armadas could decisively determine the winners and losers of conflicts • Airpower has the ability to strike anyone, anywhere…… • Unmanned airpower is the most cost effective way to influence world events* See the Enemy From 60,000 ft Kill the Enemy In Benign Threat Environment Or Kill the Enemy When He Doesn’t Know You are Here UAVs “Go Out There and Die for Their Country -- and We Don't Mourn.” General Michael Ryan, CSAF, Feb 1999. *CSBA Report: Changing the Business of Defense, Oct2011
The Post-Cold War Drawdown -28% -29% -20% Congressional Budget Office 1997 Largely Equal Share Reductions Across the Services
Future National Security Strategy • Technology has disproportionally effected each of the services • Air Power is much more effective and US holds a distinct advantage • Ground Power is becoming increasingly vulnerable • Given the history of conflicts over the last 20 years would an “equal cut” result in giving the President the best options to deal with future conflict? US 1940s US 2010s US 2030s ?
High Threat ConflictLong Range Airpower is the Only Way to Deal with China…. “Europe is a landscape; East Asia is a seascape. Therein lies a crucial difference between the 20th and 21st centuries.” Robert D. Kaplan 16 16
Medium Threat Conflict:Airpower Offers Cost Effective Containment 1993 - 2002 2003 - 2012 Operations Northern and Southern Watch with Limited Strikes Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn $B FY12 $806 billion $13 billion A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R
In a Constrained Environment…..What is The Future of Modern Warfare? Ground-Centric Defeat, Hold, Win Hearts and Minds Large Land Army, Enabling Air and Naval Power Air-Centric Power Projection, Range, Limited Vulnerability Limited Ground Engagements What Should the US Choose When it Can’t Afford to Do Both?
Decline of the Post-WWII International Order China Indonesia • International trade, financial, security and political institutions founded by the US and close allies in wake of WWII under increasing strain • Distribution of economic, military and financial power vastly different with change accelerating • US and traditional allies increasingly lack resources to stabilize established systems • Rising powers expect changes to international system in accord with their values and increasing capabilities Nigeria Colombia Algeria Russia Australia India USA Jordan Philippines Mexico Tunisia Lebanon UK Taiwan Israel Japan Real Growth in International Military SpendingFrom 2000 to 2010 France Germany Italy Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, In Constant $ 2009