Voting Behaviour in the UK 1945-2005

Voting Behaviour in the UK 1945-2005 Part B: Models of Voting Behaviour

Voting Behaviour in the UK: Part B: Models of Voting BehaviourThis PowerPoint follows on from Part A: Electoral Stability and Party Identification 1945-1970. Part C: Social Influences on Voting and Non-Voting: has also been uploaded.Part D: Some Further Information on Voting Behaviour : will be uploaded fairly soon.

Models of Voting Behaviour • The Party Identification Model • The Issue Voting Model • The Radical Model • The Ideological Voting Model • The Dominant Ideology Model • The Voting Context Model As we study these models it is useful to distinguish between long term , structural , sociological influences such as social class, gender , ethnicity etc. on voting behaviour which are emphasised especially [but not only] in the party identification model and the more short term political factors [sometimes called “recency factors”] such as issues, leaders, campaigns and specific events which are emphasised especially [ but not only ] in the issue voting model. General Election results are influenced by a combination of these long term structural and short term political factors.

The Party Identification Model [1] • The Party Identification Model has been described in some detail in the previous presentation. The main points are summarised here. • In this model most voters vote in accordance with their social class position. • Thus in General Elections between 1945 and 1970 an average of approximately 62% of working class voters voted Labour while an average of approximately 66% of middle class voters voted Conservative. • They did so primarily because social class differences in political socialisation encouraged them to identify with the broad image of their “natural class party” and to vote accordingly. • Factors such as party policies and leadership qualities were believed to exercise only limited influences over voting behaviour. • It was believed also that few voters had sets of political beliefs which could be seen as ideologically coherent. For example few were familiar with the terms “left” and “right”.

The Party Identification Model [2] • Substantial minorities did not vote for their “natural class party “. These voters came to be known as “deviant voters” and several reasons were suggested for their voting behaviour. • Such reasons included the possible deference or embourgeoisement of the working class and the tendency for substantial numbers of middle class public sector professionals to vote Labour in the belief that Labour was most likely to defend public sector services, employment and earnings. • Although social class was seen as the main determinant of voting behaviour age, gender, region, religion and ethnicity also influenced voting behaviour although it was noted that in some cases these other factors also had a social class dimension.

The Extent of Partisan Dealignment • For data on the extent of Partisan Dealignmentclick here and then scroll down to page 6 for information from "The 2005 General Election in Great Britain [David Sanders, Harold Clarke, Marianne Stewart and Paul Whiteley]. • I am sorry if this is a little inconvenient but it won’t take long! • Alternatively you may consult your textbooks or “Elections and Voters in Britain” [David Denver: Second Edition 2007]. • As well as data on overall party identification and partisan dealignment it is also very useful to consider trends in partisan alignment with specific political parties. For example party identification with the Labour Party declined considerably in 1983 and rose in the early years of the Blair regime which illustrates the impact of short term political factors on party identification.

Partisan Dealignment and Class Dealignment • The Party Identification Model appeared to be undermined in the 1970s by interconnected processes of partisan dealignment and class dealignment which suggested that fewer voters were now identifying with a political party and that social class was becoming a less significant determinant of voting behaviour. • This resulted in the development of alternative explanations of voting behaviour which will be considered below. • However as we consider these alternatives we should recognise that many voters do still identify [sometimes even strongly] with a political party and that social class is still an important determinant of voting behaviour for many voters even if fewer voters are now voting along class lines . Many “core voters” do vote along class lines • In 2001 there was much discussion of William Hague’ possibly mistaken strategy of appealing excessively to the Conservative “core vote” and claims now that Gordon Brown is tempted similarly to appeal especially to Labour’s core vote in 2010. If so Lord Mandelson may not be happy! • Furthermore in the technical literature on voting behaviour analysts have increasingly argued that party identification is influenced not only by long term sociological factors but also by voters’ most recent attitudes to leaders, issues and events which suggests a considerable overlap between the party identification model and other more political models of voting behaviour. • It is important, therefore, to note the contribution that the party identification model still makes to the explanation of many voters’ voting decisions.

Party Identification and Party Voting 1997-2008 [IPSOS MORI Data]

Causes of Partisan Dealignment [1] • Changes in nature of individual social classes and in the UK class structure as a whole: for example rising working class affluence, decline of traditional working class communities, growth of “new working class” and increased importance of sectoral cleavages within working class could all result in declining identification with Labour Party. • Weakening of traditional class-based processes of political socialisation. • Higher educational levels encourage more voters to “think for themselves” rather than retain past party identification. • Increasing involvement of mass media in coverage of political affairs encourages scepticism of political parties or successfully persuades voters to discard traditional party loyalties.

Causes of Partisan Dealignment [2] • The perceived inabilities of Conservative and Labour Governments to govern effectively reduced party identification with both Conservative and Labour Parties notably between the late 1960s and mid 1970s. • Some sections of the electorate have increasingly espoused post-materialist values and come to believe that the traditional parties are incapable of dealing with issues around civil liberties, environment, nuclear weapons and “Third World” underdevelopment, poverty and debt. • In the original Butler and Stokes formulation partisan alignment derived from long term processes of political socialisation. Nowadays it is recognised that partisan dealignment can be caused by short term –political factors: ideology, leadership, image and policies. • For example the particularly low identification with Labour in 1983 was to a considerable extent due to these short term political factors. • This does men that models of voting behaviour are more interconnected than has sometimes been suggested: for example voters may identify with a particular party mainly because they believe that it has the most competent leaders or because they agree with that party’s stance on issues and/or its general ideological position.

Class Dealignment [1] : Its Meaning, Measurement and Causes • A process of class dealignment implies that fewer voters are voting for their natural class party: middle class voters are less likely to vote Conservative and/or working class voters are less likely to vote Labour. • The measurement of the extent of class dealignment presents two main difficulties. • Firstly the extent of measured class dealignment varies depending upon the class schema used to allocate individuals to social classes. In particular this means that the extent of class dealignment measured via the traditional AB, C1, C2, DE schema differs from that measured via the class schema introduced in the mid 1980s by Heath, Curtice and Jowell and used in subsequent BES surveys.

Class Dealignment [2] • Secondly class dealignment may be measured in absolute or in relative terms. • The extent of absolute class dealignment is measured either by a measure of trends in absolute class voting or by trends in the Alford Index. • Absolute class voting is measured by [the proportion of all middle class voters voting Conservative + the proportion of all working class voters voting Labour] divided by 200. • The Labour Alford Index is the percentage of all working class voters voting Labour- the percentage of all middle class voters voting Labour. • The Conservative Alford Index is the percentage of all middle class voters voting Conservative – the percentage of all working class voters voting Conservative. • There is general agreement that a long term process of absolute class dealignment has occurred in the UK since the high point of class voting in the early 1950s

Class Dealignment [3] • Click here for data from IPSOS MORI which give some indication of the extent of class dealignment 1974-2005. • Click here for BES data illustrating trends in class dealignment. • Also consult Elections and Voters in Britain [David Denver 2007] for alternative measures of class dealignment. • Your textbooks also provide some information on the measurement of class dealignment.

Class Dealignment [4] • In their study “How Britain Votes” [1985] A. Heath, J. Curtice and R. Jowell suggested that it was more appropriate to measure class dealignment in relative terms using trends in odds ratios. • The Odds Ratio for working class Labour voting is calculated as follows: it is : [the percentage of all Labour voters voting Labour divided by the percentage of all Labour voters voting Conservative] divided by [the percentage of all middle class voters voting Labour divided by the percentage of all middle class voters voting Conservative]. • For example if the odds inside the above brackets are 3/2 and 2/3 respectively the odds ratio is 2.25. • As a result of their calculation of odds ratios between 1964 and 1983 Heath, Curtice and Jowell show that no relative class dealignment occurred between these dates. • However it has subsequently been shown that when data for the 1990s are included both absolute and relative class dealignment have occurred. • Clearly the measurement of class dealignment does present some difficult measurement problems.

Class Dealignment [5]: Explanations • The factors which cause partisan dealignment are likely also to cause class dealignment but this will not always be the case. • For example it has been argued above that changes in the nature of the working class are likely to cause working class partisan dealignment and also to result in declining working class voting for the Labour Party: i.e. these changes in the nature of the working class are likely to cause both partisan dealignment and class dealignment. • However some working class voters could very easily decide to continue voting Labour despite their partisan dealignment because their dislike for alternative parties is even greater so that the extent of class dealignment is less than might have been predicted by the extent of partisan dealignment. • Also partisan dealignment may occur as a result of the increased importance of post-materialist values but if this was to affect especially middle class Labour voters [which could be plausible] it could result in an overall increase in measured class voting. • However to restate the first point partisan dealignment and class dealignment are often linked.

Class Dealignment [6]: Explanations • Class dealignment is explained by a combination of social structural factors and political factors. • Let us first consider some social structural factors. • Declining working class support for the Labour Party may have occurred because of the embourgeoisement of many increasingly affluent manual workers, because of the decline of traditional working class communities and the growth of the “new working class” and because of the increased importance of sectoral production and consumption cleavages within the working class. However remember the criticisms of the embourgeoisement theory made, for example by Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt. • Declining middle class support for the Conservative Party may have occurred because of increased absolute rates of social mobility meaning that an increasing number of middle class people have working class origins and also as middle class public sector workers see the Conservative Party as unlikely to defend public services and public sector earnings and working conditions. • In the following slides we consider some political explanations of class dealignment especially those which are suggested in the Issue Voting Model.

Issue Voting [1] • In this model it is argued that voters may have become increasingly “rational” and may as a result vote for the party which they believe has the best policies on the issues which they consider to be most salient. Their choice of “best “party is analogous to their choice of the consumer goods which yield the most satisfaction. • It has been pointed out , for example by Butler and Stokes that four important conditions must be met if Issues are to be important determinants of voting behaviour. • Voters must be aware of issue • Voters must have attitude or opinion on the issue • Voters must detect a difference between parties on the issue • Voters must actually convert their preference into actually voting for the party whose views on the issue approximate to their own

The Issue Voting Model [2] • Analysts may describe their models as Issue Voting, Policy Voting, Consumer Voting, Rational Voting or Judgmental Voting Models but these are in effect all fairly similar. • In the issue voting model it is argued that both partisan dealignment and class dealignment might be both a cause and effect of issue voting. • For example if a working class voter identifies less with the Labour Party , say because s/he has become part of the new working class, s/he may be more likely than previously to vote on the basis of issue preferences. • Alternatively if large numbers of working class voters decide that they oppose Labour policies , say on council house sales or unilateral nuclear disarmament, these issue preferences could cause both partisan and class dealignment. • Although it is difficult to separate causes and effects it is nevertheless generally agreed that the Issue Voting Model helps to provide a political explanation of partisan and class dealignment. .

The Issue Voting Model [3] • Opinion pollsters regularly ask samples of potential voters which issues they consider to be most salient and which party has the best policies on each of the salient issues • The saliency of different issues does vary a little from election to election but the state of the economy, health, education and law and order have usually been among the issues considered to be most salient . • It has been suggested that broadly speaking the economy was especially salient in the 1980s and early 1990s; that public services were especially salient in the later 1990s and in 2001 and that asylum, immigration, security and law and order were more salient in 2005. • It has proved difficult to determine voters’ attitudes to increased taxation with any accuracy. Many claim to support increased taxation to finance improvements in Health and Education but they may lie! • With regard to the economy individuals may vote not according to its overall state but according to how the state of the economy affects THEM! • Here analysts are distinguishing between so-called “sociotropic and egocentric [or pocket book] motivations for voting behaviour • They distinguish also between retrospective and prospective voting. • Another important distinction is between positional or spatial issues and valence issues.

The Issue Voting Model [4]:Positional Issues and Valence Issues • When analysing the importance of party issues and policies psephologists have increasingly emphasised the distinction between positional issues and valence issues. • Parties differ on positional issues when they are located at different positions on the left-right spectrum ,for example in relation to taxation and public spending, privatisation and trade union reform. • However it has been argued that in the General Elections of 2001 and 2005 positional differences between the main parties have declined and that the parties have attempted to attract votes on the basis that they will manage ,say, the economy, health, education or law and order more efficiently. That is: their appeal to the electorate is more in terms of valence issues than positional issues. • Authors in Britain Votes 2005 demonstrate statistically that the outcome of the 2005 General Election was affected much more by valence issues than by positional issues.

The Issue Voting Model [5]: Criticisms • It may be that the Issue Voting Model was helpful in explaining the declining party identification with the Labour Party in the 1970s in terms of declining support for key Labour policies of Nationalisation, increased Welfare State spending and support for the Trades Unions . • However it increasingly came to be argued that the usefulness of the model was undermined by the difficulties of distinguishing between cause and effect in voting behaviour. • Thus voter x might tell a pollster that Party A has the best policies on salient issues and that s/he intends to vote for Party A. However this does not necessarily mean that issues and policies determined the voter’s choice and it may be that the voter has modified his/her stance on issues and policies to conform to a voting decision which may have been determined , say, by party identification or broad ideology. • This suggests that long term party identification is still an important determinant of voting behaviour for many voters even if their numbers are declining. • As already mentioned respondents may be less than candid about their policy preferences; especially voters may claim that they support higher taxation when in reality they do not. • The Issue Voting Model does not appear to provide a good explanation of the 1983, 1987 and 1992 General Elections. If voters had voted solely on the basis of salient positional issues Labour would have done better than they actually did in practice.However valence issues may well have helped to explain these results.

The Issue Voting Model [6]: More Criticisms • In How Britain Votes Heath, Curtice and Jowell argued that the broad ideologies of parties and voters had more impact on voting behaviour than did specific spatial issues and policies. • However in their later work they recognise the difficulty of distinguishing between party ideologies and party policies and agree that voters’ assess parties’ ideological positions partly via the consideration of party policies so that it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of issues and ideologies on voting behaviour. • Further information follows on the ideological model of voting behaviour.

The Issue Voting Model [7]: Further Criticisms • We may note that in some respects the description of the voting decision-making process in the issue voting model is presented as a progression away from reliance on ingrained, habitual processes of political socialisation [as in the party identification model] towards increasingly judgmental rational individual decision making • However in the dominant ideology model of voting behaviour it is suggested that many individual voters can be swayed by the slogans , sound bites and photo-opportunities of apparently charismatic politicians and by the biased coverage of important issues in the mass media so that , whatever else the voting decision may be, it cannot be described as entirely rational.. • Further information on the dominant ideology model and on criticisms of it is provided below. In particular critics of the dominant ideology model are likely to argue that voters easily recognise and discount political biases within the mass media so that rational, judgmental voting is indeed increasingly possible.

The Issue Voting Model [8] • In 1997 and 2001 Labour was preferred to Conservative on all or almost all of the salient issues • Labour also had a more attractive image in most respects . • Labour was also perceived as having the best potential PM and the best team of leaders • By 2005 Labour popularity had declined according to all of these criteria. However it was still preferred to the Conservatives but not by so great a margin as in the two previous General Elections. • Perhaps Issue Voting helps to explain these results but the criticisms of the issue voting model remain and it is clear that other models are also relevant to the explanation of voting behaviour.

Ipsos Mori Monthly Issue Indices • Ipsos Mori ask a representative sample of individuals what they consider to be [1] the most important issue facing the country and [b] other important issues facing the country . The respondents’ answers are aggregated to form an issue index. • Click here for the most recent index. It is perhaps most interesting to look at the long term changes in the perceived importance of different issues. • Click here for the issue index archive containing earlier editions of the index and future editions when they appear.

The Radical Model of Voting Behaviour [1] • This model was developed primarily by P.Dunleavy and C. Husbands in “British Democracy at the Crossroads [1985] • They argued that in the two General Elections of 1974 and in the General election of 1979 governments had had little control over the timing of the General Elections but that this was not the case in 1983 and 1987. • If for example Mrs Thatcher had been forced to call a General election in, say 1981 of 1985 there is little doubt that the Conservatives would have lost: her control over the timing of the General Election affected the results significantly. • The effects of individual issues and policies on voting behaviour have been over-estimated by supporters of the issue voting model for the reasons already mentioned in the section on criticisms of Issue Voting. • Voting behaviour is heavily influenced by both sectoral production cleavages and sectoral consumption cleavages within social classes but sectoral production cleavages are considered by Dunleavy and Husbands to be more significant than in other models of voting behaviour.

The Radical Model of Voting Behaviour 2 • Voters [both middle class and working class] who work in the public sector are more likely to vote Labour than voters[ both middle class and working class ] who work in the private sector. • This is because public sector workers tend to feel that the Labour Party is more likely than the Conservative Party to defend public sector earnings and working conditions possibly via higher taxation while private sector workers are likely to resent higher taxation being used to finance the public sector. • Voters who use public sector services[ health care, schools, housing and transport ]are more likely to vote Labour than voters who voters who rely more heavily on private services . • Rates of unionisation have traditionally been higher in the public than in the private sector. • Consequently although social class remains a significant influence on voting behaviour non –class voting is more likely among working class voters who work in the private sector and middle class voters who work in the public sector. • Non-class voting arises also among middle class voters who regularly use public services and among working class voters who regularly use private services. • Dunleavy and Husbands also emphasise that the process is not a mere passive one. Thatcherite governments actively pursued policies (sale of council houses, privatisation, encouragement of private health care etc) which increase sectoral cleavages in ways likely to enhance support for the Conservative Party.

The Radical Model of Voting Behaviour [3] • Dunleavy and Husbands argue that the governments, political parties, business interest groups and the mass media help to spread so-called dominant ideology which encourages voters to vote Conservative or perhaps for moderate Liberal or Social Democratic parties and against the Labour Party if it should espouse more radical left-wing policies as it did, for example, in 1983. • We may argue therefore that Dunleavy and Husbands’ radical model contains as one of its aspects the dominant ideology model of voting behaviour. • Further information on the dominant ideology model of voting behaviour is provided later in this presentation.

The Ideological Voting Model [1] • The development of the ideological voting model is associated especially with “How Britain Votes”. {Heath, Curtice and Jowell 1985}. The main points of this complex detailed study may be summarised briefly as follows. • The authors state that they aim in their model to combine the most useful elements of the party identification and issue voting models. • Whereas in the party identification model it is argued that most voters identify with political parties on the basis of their social class but that most voters do not have coherent ideological positions Heath and co. argue that many voters do have coherent ideological positions deriving mainly from their social class position and that their voting was influenced in 1983 more by ideology than by voters, preferred policies on salient issues.

The Ideological Voting Model [2] • Thus Labour lost electoral support in 1983 because although the ideology of Thatcherism was relatively unpopular in 1983 the radical left ideology espoused by Labour in 1983 was even more unpopular and because of its unpopular ideology Labour also lost votes to the SDP-Liberal Alliance . • Voting behaviour is not determined only by class –related ideology and although Heath and co. are critical of the issue voting model they do agree that parties can influence voting behaviour to a limited extent via the policies which they adopt on salient issues. • Furthermore voting behaviour is influenced also by valence issues and Labour lost electoral support in 1983 because it was widely perceived as poorly led, economically incompetent, disunited as well as saddled with unpopular policies. • Also Heath and co. estimate that changes in the UK class structure involving the relative growth of the middle class and the relative decline of the working class accounted for as much as 50% of Labour’s decline in electoral support between 1964 and 1983. • Further information on the ideological voting model can be found on pp-103-108 of Elections and Voters in Britain [2nd Edition 2007; David Denver]. Among other things he points out that in some cases [but not all] parties’ issue positions to some extent reflect their ideologies which means that it is difficult to determine whether voters are voting ideologically or on the basis of issue positions.

The Ideological Voting Model [3] • Increasingly psephologists have recognised that parties’ issue positions to some extent reflect their ideologies which means that it is difficult to determine whether voters are voting ideologically or on the basis of issue positions. • Post 1983 Labour modified its policies on a range of issues which could be seen as representing an ideological shift toward the centre-left. • However Ian Budge argues on the basis of a careful study of party manifestos that Labour shifted to the centre left between 1983 and 1987 but back towards the Left by 1992.[see future teaching notes for more detail] • Be that as it may Labour’s overall electoral results improved gradually between 1983 and 1992: its relative lack of success is usually explained mainly in valence terms: in particular it was not seen as competent to run the economy. • However in 1992 the Sun screamed, “It’s the Sun wot won it.” So how important was “dominant ideology” as an influence on voting behaviour in 1992?

The Ideological Voting Model [4] • Under the Leadership of Tony Blair New Labour moved decidedly to the Right on economic issues. • New Labour accepted Conservative privatisations, Conservative industrial relations legislation which reduced T.U. power and Conservative taxation policies…but also introduced minimum wage and New Deal. • These policy/ideological shifts contributed to increased support for Labour in all social classes. • Labour now had the most popular policies on spatial issues, was most highly rated on valence issues, had the most credible leaders and received more sympathetic mass media coverage than in past General Elections. • Labour may have gained support in 1997 because of its changed ideological position but by how much is uncertain because so many other factors were working in Labour’s favour. • Between 1997 and 2001 and especially between 2001 and 2005 all of the factors causing Labour popularity continued to do so but more weakly which explains the decline in Labour’s vote share and its reduced overall majority by 2005. • By 2005 more voters reported that they saw few major differences between the parties and this trend is likely to continue as David Cameron “rebrands” the Conservative Party. This ideological shift is one factor helping to explain the Conservatives’ higher opinion poll ratings but it is not the only one.

Ideological Voting Model [5]% Feeling “a great deal of difference between the Con & Lab parties.” • 1964 48 • 1966 44 • 1970 33 • Feb 74 34 • Oct 74 40 • 1979 48 • 1983 88 • 1987 85 • 1992 56 • 1997 33 • 2001 17 • 2005 21

The Dominant Ideology Model [1] • The Dominant Ideology Model of Voting Behaviour is associated mainly with Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher Husbands’ study entitled British Democracy at the Crossroads [1985]. • The theory suggests that dominant groups and institutions in society [governments, political parties and business interest groups] can use their power to persuade voters to accept a dominant ideology sympathetic to the interests of these dominant groups and institutions and to vote accordingly. • These dominant groups and institutions may attempt to use the mass media to disseminate the dominant ideology and the mass media in any case are likely to be sympathetic to this ideology. • Voters who have accepted the dominant ideology are more likely to vote Conservative than to vote Labour and are in particular unlikely to vote Labour if the Labour Party espouses radical left wing policies as in 1983.

The Dominant Ideology Model [2] • The Dominant Ideology Model suggests that governments [whether Labour or Conservative] have opportunities not so easily available to opposition parties to persuade the voters to re-elect them. • For example current Prime Ministers may be able to solidify their image as World leaders. • Governments may be able to manipulate statistics [e.g. unemployment statistics to their own advantage. • In the early 1980s Conservative policies such as council house sales and privatisation could be used in attempts to persuade target voters of the desirability of private enterprise as a whole. Such policies were not necessarily successful because council house and share buyers may have been Conservative voters anyway. • Few such opportunities were available to the Labour Opposition in the early 1980s and its leaders and radical policies received very unsympathetic coverage from the mass media. • By the mid 1990s Mass media coverage of the Labour Opposition was much more sympathetic and once in government were able to manage its relations with the mass media very effectively but Labour would eventually be open to charges of excessive “spin”

The Dominant Ideology Model [3] • Perhaps the most significant element of the Dominant ideology Model is that the mass media are themselves biased in the interests of Conservatism or moderate social democracy and against more radical ideological positions and that these biases can have a significant impact on voting behaviour. • It is very difficult to assess the extent and influence of mass media bias. • There are different approaches to the study of the mass media such as Marxist, Democratic Pluralist and Functionalist approaches each of which generate different conclusions as to the roles of the mass media in contemporary capitalist societies. • There are also competing analyses of mass media effects such as the hypodermic syringe model, the two step flow model, the cultural effects model and the encoding-decoding model each of which generate different conclusions as to the strength of mass media effects . • For practical reasons I cannot assess all of these issues here.

The Dominant Ideology Model [4] • Supporters of the dominant ideology model make the following claims. • There are important biases in the mass media’s coverage of political affairs. • This applies especially to the national press which has traditionally had a pro-Conservative bias while even pro-Labour newspapers have supported only a relatively moderate social democratic variant of Labour ideology and distanced themselves from Labour radicalism. • For example the Sun’s support for Labour 1997- 2009 did not imply support for red –blooded socialism • Even though the TV and Radio broadcast media are legally required to be free of party political bias theorists such as those from the Glasgow University Media Group claim that in various ways the broadcast media fall well short of political neutrality.

The Dominant Ideology Model [5] • Supporters of the Dominant Ideology Model recognise that although readers of particular newspapers often vote in accordance with the partisanship of these newspapers this may be because they choose to buy a paper which reflects their own existing political views not because reading a particular paper has persuaded them to vote in a particular way. • They recognise too that readers may well recognise political biases within the press and discount them or ignore them because they buy newspapers mainly for their coverage of non-political issues. • However accepting the above caveats supporters of the dominant ideology model argue that the long term ant-Labour coverage of political issues in some sections of the mass media does lead to reduced Labour voting. • For example they would argue that long term anti-Labour biases combined with particularly strident anti-Labour campaigns during the 1992 General Election did contribute to reduced Labour voting in 1992.

The Dominant Ideology Model [6] • Furthermore it is argued that mass media influences are likely to increase among voters whose partisan and class alignment has weakened as has occurred for many voters in the last 30 -40 years. • Also supporters of the dominant ideology model are critical of the description of the voting decision-making process in the issue voting model as a progression away from reliance on ingrained, habitual processes of political socialisation [as in the party identification model] towards increasingly judgmental rational individual decision making • Instead in the dominant ideology model of voting behaviour it is suggested that many individual voters can be swayed by the slogans , sound bites and photo-opportunities of apparently charismatic politicians and by the biased coverage of important issues in the mass media so that , whatever else the voting decision may be, it cannot be described as entirely rational • Against this, however, critics of the dominant ideology model argue that the vast majority of voters can recognise and discount both the political propaganda of the mass media and the political spin of political leaders meaning that the basis assumption of increased voter rationality is acceptable.

The Dominant Ideology Model [7] • I have tried here to provide a concise summary of the Dominant Ideology Model but may I reiterate here that students wishing to find further information on the mass media and its effects on voting behaviour will have to read more widely. • Chris Livesey’s website at sociology.org has useful information on theories of the mass media and David Denver’s Elections and Voting Behaviour has further information on the mass media and voting behaviour. • Click here for IPSOS MORI data on newspaper readership and voting behaviour in General Elections 1992-2005

The Voting Context Model • In the voting context model it is emphasised that although voting decisions are influenced by all of the factors emphasised in all of the models of voting behaviour mentioned above ,they also vary according to the differing nature of elections and the differing circumstances surrounding them. • In this model it is emphasised that individuals' votes may vary in different elections because of the different constituency characteristics in different types of election, • because individuals may have different objectives in different types of election [registering their ongoing support for their preferred option or voting tactically to prevent the election of the least preferred candidate], • because individuals may vote according to different criteria in different types of election • and because, nowadays although the First Past the Post electoral system is used for Westminster Elections different electoral systems are used in elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly and to the European Parliament and to elect the Mayor of London. • Further information on the Voting Context Model can be found in future teaching notes.

Models of Voting Behaviour • The End

Voting Behaviour in the UK 1945-2005