The Presidential Veto in the Early Republic

1. The Presidential Veto in the Early Republic Nolan McCarty

2. Why Study the Development of the Presidential Veto? • The development of constitutional norms and practices

3. Why Study the Development of the Presidential Veto? • The development of constitutional norms and practices • The role of electoral politics in political bargaining

4. Why Study the Development of the Presidential Veto? • The development of constitutional norms and practices • The role of electoral politics in political bargaining • I rarely have to worry about someone knowing more about the topic than I do

5. Development of the Veto As with virtually every other power enumerated in the constitution, the veto power evolved over time as experimentation, circumstance, and cumulative precedent combined to give the power its actual shape, especially as to its frequency, and other conditions of use. (Spitzer)

6. Three Views of Early Usage • Veto usage was constitutionally proscribed • Veto usage was low, but not qualitatively different from modern usage • Changes in the electoral environment of the presidency led to greater and qualitatively different veto usage • Blame-game Politics (Groseclose & McCarty 2001)

7. Constitutional Constraints • Strict Interpretation of Separation of Powers • Veto was a judicial and administrative function • Use should be limited to preventing the enactment of • Clearly unconstitutional legislation • Poorly drafted, unimplementable legislation • Vetoes emanating from policy disagreements were proscribed

8. Thomas Jefferson unless the President’s mind on a view of everything which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized by the Constitution; if the pro and con hang so even as to balance judgment, a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the balance in favor of their opinion.

9. The “Unconstrained” View • There were no such proscriptions • There is little evidence that framers would have been opposed to “policy” vetoes • Policy justifications were used even in early veto messages

10. Bass (1972) ...if the veto was used sparingly, other factors than conceiving the veto as a limited power had their influence. With fewer demands for legislation, bills were drafted with greater care and consideration than prevailed in later years, giving early presidents less cause to use the negative. While the quality of bills was higher, quantity was lower, lessening the need to employ the veto.

11. Vetoes and Electoral Politics • Vetoes for purely policy reasons are a theoretical anomaly • Should only occur as a result of poor information about presidential preferences • Constrained and unconstrained theories are practically observationally equivalent • As presidential elections become increasingly democratic, veto politics becomes increasing important in defining issue positions before the electorate.

12. Early Vetoes

13. Early Vetoes

14. Early Vetoes

15. Early Vetoes

16. Early Vetoes

17. Early Vetoes 27% 46% 60% 49% 38% 49% 44%

18. Problems of Analysis • Justifications of use are: • extremely varied • open to multiple interpretations • Lacks explicit comparison with modern usage

19. Alternative Approach • Use recent theoretical models of veto bargaining to make predictions about “modern” veto usage • Test these predictions usage data from 1829-1996. • Compare the predicted usage from the “modern” model with actual usage from 1789 to 1828.

20. Theoretical Models • Complete Information Legislative Agenda Control Model • Incomplete Information Legislative Agenda Control Model • Cameron, Matthews, McCarty • Blame-game Politics • Groseclose and McCarty, Gilmour

21. Complete Information Legislative Agenda Control q p v c b* =2v-q c

22. Complete Information Legislative Agenda Control q p v c b* =2v-q q v p c b* =2p-q

23. Complete Information Legislative Agenda Control q p v c b* =2v-q q v p c b* =2p-q • No vetoes should occur in equilibrium

24. Incomplete Information q e m c 2e-q 2m-q

25. Incomplete Information q e m c 2e-q 2m-q q e c m b*=c

26. Incomplete Information q e m c 2e-q 2m-q q e c m b*=c • Expected preference divergence leads to vetoes

27. Blame Game Politics • Congress has good information about presidential preferences • Voters do not • Congress can use its agenda power to force the president to make unpopular vetoes • Incentives strongest during divided government and proximate to elections

28. An Empirical Model of Veto Usage • Dependent variables • Number of regular vetoes and total number of vetoes

29. Estimation • Negative binomial regression • Event count model which controls for “over-dispersion” • Cameron stresses difference across levels of significance • Interpretation: lnt = X

30. An Empirical Model of Veto Usage • Independent Variables • Number of public laws (natural log) • Divided government (split chambers and two opposition chambers) • Pivot polarization • % Electoral College and Unelected president • Election year, Election year*Incumbent, Election year*Incumbent*Divide • Other controls: Democratic president, Economic situation, War, FDR, GC

31. Key Predictions

32. Predicted and actual vetoes

33. Public Vetoes from 1829-1996

34. Results

35. Key Findings • Strong evidence in favor of blame game model. • No evidence for key hypothesis of incomplete information model • Veto usage was quite low before 1829 • Patterns are distinctly different

36. Presidential Influence • Given the findings that veto usage was far less common, the IILAC would predict that pre-Jacksonian presidents had little legislative influence • Blame-game models make no such predictions (in fact the opposite would not be inconsistent)

37. Case Study: The Missouri Compromise • Passed by small majorities • Overwhelming opposed by Monroe’s home state delegation (Virginia) • Monroe composed draft veto message • Polled Cabinet as to constitutionality • Evidence of constraining norm?

38. Case Study: The Missouri Compromise • Passed by small majorities • Overwhelming opposed by Monroe’s home state delegation (Virginia) • Monroe composed draft veto message • Polled Cabinet as to constitutionality • Evidence of constraining norm? • Articulation of the Jeffersonian regime?

39. Not really • Evidence seems to show that Monroe was only opposed restriction of slavery in Missouri, not above 36°30´ • Communicated these preferences to allies in Congress • Blame game (sort of) at the Richmond Nominating Convention

40. Systematic Test • Presidential Rolls: Successful passage votes opposed by the president • Presidential Party Rolls • Presidential NOMINATE rolls • Model similar to veto usage

42. Why BG Started in 1820s • Collapse of Congressional Nominating System • Changes in implementation of the Electoral College • Changing views about political executives

43. Allocation of electors